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But he that is an hireling, and not a shepherd, whose own the sheep are 
not, seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep. The hireling fleeth, 
because he is an hireling and careth n o t ..
The Bible, Gospel of John, chapter 10, verses 12 and 13. KJV.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation 
from it or information derived from it may be published without the 
prior written consent of the author.
A bstract
Ownership matters. It affects residual rights under incomplete con­
tracts and, therefore, incentives. The first chapter of this thesis an­
alyzes in how far ownership can be substituted by other economic 
factors. Contrary to an assumption found in the literature market 
foreclosure can be achieved without vertical integration in the follow­
ing scenarios: repeated games, reputation games, and also in a finitely 
repeated game when there are switching costs.
The main chapter is concerned with implications of ownership in 
regulated industries where a monopolistic supplier of an essential input 
is required by a regulator to charge cost based prices. Our analysis 
focuses on the impact of ownership on the monopolist’s incentives to 
exploit informational asymmetries about production costs. We conduct 
a comparative study of vertical integration, vertical separation, and 
joint ownership. Effects on welfare, investments incentives, and entry 
are analyzed for each ownership structure. Joint ownership performs 
best. Accounting separation is shown to be generally ineffective as 
regulatory instrument.
We use an alternative model which allows to take into account net­
work duplication. Starting from a free market analysis of equilibrium 
pricing and entry decisions we explore the relation between ownership 
and the degree of regulation required in order to ensure efficient out­
comes. Two part tariffs, network duplication, price discrimination and 
a long-term commitment to fixed input prices induce reductions of final 
prices.
The final part of this thesis investigates results in the theory of com­
petitive market equilibrium. Many of these results rely on restrictive 
assumptions on consumer behaviour. We analyze in how far tradi­
tional equilibrium theory is robust against a relaxation of underlying 
assumptions. We do not assume agents to be rational in the sense that 
their choices arise from maximisation. Randomly fluctuating demand 
is allowed for and consequences for predictions made by traditional 
competitive equilibrium theory are re-examined.
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CHAPTER I
1 Introduction
Concerning the organisation of this thesis a few preliminary remarks 
may be in order. Chapters are numbered in Roman numbers. Sections, 
subsections etc. within these chapters are numbered in Arabic num­
bers, separately for each chapter. The same applies to footnotes. Each 
chapter contains a short abstract, introduction, conclusion, and refer­
ences. In the introduction to the thesis as a whole we aim at presenting 
ideas, intuition, and links between the different chapters. Therefore, 
most references will be given in the separate introduction of each chap­
ter. The few references we do give in the introduction are included in 
the reference list of the chapter referred to.
The size of a firm is well known to be among the issues that the 
neoclassical theory of the firm, despite of all the useful explanations 
it has provided in relation to many production process oriented ques­
tions, has not been able to explain. Neither from an individual firm’s 
point of view nor from the point of view of social welfare has tradi­
tional theory provided answers to the question of what determines or 
should determine the boundaries of the firm. It has not even provided 
a framework within which these questions can be addressed because it 
leaves the extent of the firm undefined. Some modern market economy 
phenomena like horizontal or vertical mergers and takeovers can there­
fore not be explained on the basis of neoclassical theory and even less 
can policy recommendations on these issues be founded on neoclassical 
theory.
An early attem pt to explain why certain transactions are carried 
out within the firm and others are ’contracted out’ is the approach 
suggested by Coase (1937). The central underlying idea is the impor­
tance of transaction costs. This drives the conclusion that the market 
will be used to carry out a given transaction unless the same can be
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done at lower costs within the firm. Although this approach provides 
an important rationale for the existence of an asymmetry between those 
transactions carried out in the market and those carried out within the 
firm it does not define a difference in nature between these two kinds 
of transactions. Rather, both can be viewed as transactions in an ’in­
ternal’ market known as firm and an ’external’ market depending on 
which possibility appears to be advantageous. A similar criticism ap­
plies to the suggestion that the firm should be viewed as a certain type 
of contract (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)). While it is possible to 
^define and describe such possible types of contracts that can be viewed 
as ’firm’ this would not help to explain the amount and kind of trans­
actions that should be included in the standard type of contract called 
’firm’ and those that should be agreed in separate contracts.
An argument that does address the question has been put forward 
by Williamson (1985), namely the idea that the degree to which op­
portunistic behaviour is profitable for a particular party depends on 
whether or not the transaction concerned is carried out within one and 
the same firm. Williamson argues along the following lines. In the 
case of two separate firms where relationship specific investments need 
to be undertaken in the first stage and surplus is realised and divided 
in the second stage, the following problem may occur. Informational 
asymmetries or the large number of situations that may, in all possible 
states of the world, arise during a contractual relationship make a com­
plete specification of all actions to be carried out under the contract 
either impossible or too costly. Therefore, a hold-up problem results in 
the final stage and will, in general, induce inefficient investment levels 
to be chosen in the first stage. But this would no longer be the case if 
firms merged before investment decisions are taken.
This is essentially the idea that has been taken up and formalised 
in the ownership rights approach (see 1 Grossman and Hart (1986)) 
in the following way. All decisions that remain to be taken after an
1 An outline of this idea as well as various other views on the theory of the firm are found 
in Hart (1989). For further and more recent references (and implications for corporate 
governance) see Hart (1995a) and Hart (1995b).
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(incomplete) contract has been agreed will be taken by the owner of 
the assets needed to carry out the purpose of the contract. Therefore, 
ownership crucially affects the incentives of parties involved and there 
are clear cut reasons for choosing particular boundaries of a firm. Hori­
zontal or vertical mergers or break-ups become worthwhile even though 
substantial transaction costs may be involved in the respective process.
During the past decade a fast growing literature based on the im­
portance of ownership rights has developed and started to explore the 
costs and benefits of particular firm boundaries. Research has been 
conducted with a view to shedding light on many important phenom­
ena in modern market economies. Vertical and horizontal firm and 
industry structure, principal-agent relationships, antitrust policy and 
regulated industries are just some of the areas in which ownership has 
been identified as a crucial factor and interesting insights have been 
won in all these areas.
In particular, an extensive literature on determinants and effects 
of vertical integration has been built on ownership rights. We do not 
attem pt to survey2 this literature here but just point to a most concise 
summary of two classes of effects resulting from vertical integration 
which has been given by Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994). They 
point out that most issues discussed in this context can be subsumed 
under one of the following two main purposes for vertical integration, 
namely (1) overcoming externalities between the parties involved, and 
(2) creating strategic advantages with respect to third parties (p. 147). 
Much of the literature on vertical integration can be seen as an investi­
gation of the question which of the above effects dominates in a given 
setting. The conclusions as to whether or not vertical integration is 
desirable rely on the fundamental assumption that residual rights of 
control are allocated to the owner of the assets in question.
There is, however, a need to balance the import of ownership with 
the import of other economic considerations that may be relevant to 
the situation in question. An attem pt to highlight effects of owner­
2Surveys are for example Perry (1987) or Waterson (1993).
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ship may bear a danger of neglecting other factors affecting the issue. 
Assumptions made may then reflect the convenience of modelling a 
given situation rather than the situation itself. Demonstrating the de­
gree to which ownership matters has proved to be a fruitful line of 
research and will partly be followed in this thesis. But conclusions de­
rived from the ownership rights approach should be considered in the 
light of the following question. To what extent can the effects that 
have been attributed to ownership (and rightly so) be generated by 
alternative devices? Paraphrasing, one may ask whether or not results 
which are driven by the fact that, under contractual incompleteness, 
ownership entitles to residual rights, should be attributed to ownership 
exclusively.
This question is taken up in the chapter on vertical integration 
(chapter II) and may be regarded as an attem pt of viewing ownership 
implications in a broader framework encompassing other economic fac­
tors such as dynamic effects, reputation, relationship specific invest­
ments, to name just a few.
It would be a misunderstanding to interpret this chapter as a criti­
cism of the literature based on ownership rights. It rather attem pts to 
shed light on the interpretation of results derived within the ownership 
rights approach. For pointing out alternative strategies that lead to an 
effect attributed to vertical integration, for instance, can as well be in­
terpreted as pointing out strategies that can be substituted by vertical 
integration.
A particularly clear case demonstrating how the importance at­
tributed to ownership may rely on an assumption deserving re - ex­
amination is found in a paper on market foreclosure and vertical inte­
gration by Hart and Tirole (1990). The authors show that, in a ver­
tically related markets setting, an upstream monopolist has incentives 
to integrate with one downstream firm in order to foreclose another 
downstream firm from the input supply market. The argument is that 
a non-integrated monopolist, having supplied one downstream firm, al­
ways has ex post incentives to supply a further downstream firm as well.
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Due to the upstream firm’s inability to commit to exclusive-dealing no 
firm in the downstream market will anticipate to make monopoly profits 
and therefore no downstream firm will sign an exclusive-dealing con­
tract that would be based on these profits. Any such contract would 
have to be non-enforceable because, firstly, it does not comply with 
antitrust regulations and, secondly, there may be informational asym­
metries about quantities supplied to other firms (this could happen, for 
instance, via third parties, i.e. firms operating in different markets). 
This contractual failure of preventing opportunistic behaviour, Hart 
and Tirole argue, can be overcome with the help of vertical integra­
tion.
While this conclusion is certainly true the question arises whether 
or not this failure can be overcome by vertical integration only. From a 
policy oriented point of view one may ask whether or not an antitrust 
policy that forbids mergers which are suggestive of foreclosure motives 
is sufficient to prevent foreclosure. In other words, the question is which 
alternative strategies are available to the upstream firm that would 
enable it to successfully commit to exclusive-dealing while remaining a 
separate legal entity.
Apart from shedding light on the question how unable to precom­
mit a non-integrated supplying monopolist is, i.e. which alternative 
commitment devices exist, this analysis may serve as a solution for a 
puzzle created by some antitrust cases. Following Hart and Tirole’s 
assumption it is hard to explain why certain (non-integrated) suppliers 
not only manage to sustain successfully an exclusive-dealing oriented 
policy but are even willing to spend large amounts of resources on 
defending their exclusive-dealing practices before court. Such casual 
evidence can, on the other hand, be well explained once various com­
mitment devices that are at the disposal of vertically separated firms 
are taken into account.
One very obvious scenario in which commitment arises as equilib­
rium outcome is the following simple modification of Hart and Tirole’s 
basic model. Considering a multiperiod game in which, in each period,
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there is a positive probability that the stage game will be repeated one 
finds that, unless discount rates are too high, expected future profits are 
sufficient to prevent the monopolist from breaking an exclusive-dealing 
contract. This simple model may well capture the fact that firms take 
into consideration the chance of dealing with a given trading partner 
again in the future. Corporate strategy, especially in oligopolistic or 
even semi-monopolistic industries, can hardly be assumed to be fully 
captured by a one shot game.
Confining attention to finitely repeated games in order to escape 
from the usual criticism folk theorem type of results are exposed to, 
one finds that it is sufficient to introduce (small) costs incurred by 
the upstream firm in case of switching to another downstream firm. 
Such costs may result from the necessity of modifying the production 
process due to any firm specific input requirements, from contractual 
negotiations or many other factors that are likely to affect the situation.
A third and probably most obvious alternative is commitment sus­
tained by reputation effects. An upstream monopolist may invest in 
building up a reputation for exclusive-dealing as long as there is a suf­
ficiently long future. We also point out briefly how various enforceable 
contracts can be used to implement mechanisms that enable the up­
stream firm to precommit to restrict output ex post.
This chapter concludes with a case study that demonstrates how TI 
Raleigh Ltd. defended their exclusive-dealing practices before court. 
Some of the arguments brought forward by the company can be linked 
to commitment devices presented in this chapter.
Given the crucial role of ownership right allocations one would ex­
pect these considerations to be vital in all industries. Moreover, in­
dustries in which the production process consists of various vertically 
related stages would appear to be key industries for the application of 
vertical integration theory. However, this apparently trivial statement 
does not seem to apply to vertically related industries which are reg­
ulated (or, rather, in much of the literature ownership has not been 
taken into account to the degree it deserves to be). There is, in fact,
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a large literature on regulated industries that, to a large extent, takes 
ownership structures to be given exogenously. Analytical difficulties 
may present one reason for this development, but other reasons may 
be present as well. There may be assumptions that have been used 
as substitutes for a thorough economic analysis. In particular, it has 
often been assumed that vertical separation may serve as alternative 
to regulation of intermediate goods prices and that, therefore, verti­
cal separation is desirable. On the other hand, it has been assumed 
that economies of scope outweigh inefficiencies such as discriminatory 
practices of an integrated firm and that, therefore, vertical integration 
is to be favoured. Moreover, the fact that in the US as well as in 
several European countries decisions about ownership structures have 
already been taken may have further discouraged a detailed thorough 
analysis of ownership in regulated industries. Chapter III of this thesis 
attem pts to emphasise the role of ownership in regulated industries and 
to show how the implementation of particular ownership structures can 
reduce the regulatory burden considerably. The interplay between reg­
ulation and liberalisation has long been recognised and corresponding 
steps have been taken by regulatory authorities throughout the world. 
The interplay between regulation and ownership structures may de­
serve attention to a similar degree, but most certainly it deserves more 
attention than it has been granted in much of the literature of this field 
of economics.
But, surprisingly, the above criticised feature of economic analysis 
of regulated industries may be found to be symptomatic for a much 
more general tendency in this field, namely a lack of examining a ques­
tion one would have thought to arise naturally. This question is sim­
ply in how far features that are characteristic for regulated industries 
prevent general results to apply. Instead of identifying an industry’s 
particular segments needing regulation and proposing adequate reme­
dies for these very segments there appears to be a tendency towards 
assuming that market failure, or at least the need for regulation, au­
tomatically extends to every segment of the industry. While it may
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be true that there are ’spillover’ effects between different industry seg­
ments the emphasis of regulatory effort should be on the problematic 
industry segment. Once this segment has been regulated satisfactorily 
the other segments should be left to competition which suggests that 
liberalisation is the suitable policy for all potentially competitive seg­
ments. The following quotation may serve as an example for a different 
view often held: ’A discussion of an access rule without reference to the 
rest of the regulatory environment has limited interest. The quality of 
an access pricing rule depends on the determination of prices for the 
final products.’ (Laffont and Tirole (1994b) p.27). We are inclined 
to argue, on the other hand, that regulation in segments other than 
the bottleneck may be the legitimate result of complications arising in 
these segments3 like, for instance, high fixed costs, but one should not 
start the analysis from the outright assumption that all segments need 
to be regulated.
Our focus is on regulated industries in which production relies on 
the use of an essential facility, often a network. In telecommunications, 
electricity, gas and water supply, networks are needed for the produc­
tion or delivery of the final product to the customers. The essential 
feature of such industries therefore is (not only that the production pro­
cess involves several stages which are vertically related but) the fact 
that an essential input, namely network access, is provided by a monop­
olistic supplier. As long as the network operation involves considerable 
economies of scale network duplication is socially undesirable and mo­
nopolistic provision should be maintained. This is the distinguishing 
feature of network related industries. Other potential differences such 
as final goods price regulation, rate-of-return regulation, entry restric­
tions or assistance etc. are superimposed by regulatory regimes rather 
than inherent industry characteristics.
Historically, these industries tended to be organised as state-owned 
monopolies. Efficiency considerations led to privatisation in many 
countries. In order to prevent the now privatised monopoly from ex­
3 Any further complications, on the other hand, may require further regulatory tools.
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ploiting its position as sole supplier it has to be constrained by regula­
tion, possibly in conjunction with liberalisation, i.e. the introduction 
of competition to the non-monopolistic segments.
But in designing a suitable regulatory regime the emphasis should 
be placed on the simple goal of regulating effectively the very domain 
that is affected, in our case, access provision. Once this is achieved 
the essential intermediate good is provided at prices that are socially 
desirable all other aspects of the industries will in no way need to be 
treated differently from other industries (in which production involves 
stages that are vertically related). Instead of designing an ever increas­
ing number of regulatory tools most of which interfere with each other 
in highly non-trivial ways one would have to attem pt a satisfactory 
regulation of the very aspect that distinguishes these industries from 
such where one would fully rely on market forces. This key aspect is the 
pricing of network access in a non-discriminating and socially desirable 
way.
These considerations, however, must not be overemphasised. We 
will describe access pricing rules, for example, that make sense only if 
final goods prices are regulated. Our point is that instead of assuming 
informational asymmetries to be too vast to allow for any success­
ful regulation of the bottleneck per se one should identify ownership 
structures that minimise, or even eliminate, these problems. Once such 
ownership structures are found one can attem pt to develop a regime of 
minimal regulation in the sense that regulation is, as much as possible, 
confined to segments that cannot be run efficiently in the absence of it.
Having identified the existence of (and the necessity of access to) a 
bottleneck segment as the particular industry characteristic deserving 
regulation, the overall problem is, of course, far from being resolved. 
Even in a setting of complete information about costs the determina­
tion of an optimal access price is not trivial. Allocative efficiency is 
achieved when marginal cost pricing is implemented which, however, 
would not allow the network operating firm to break even due to con­
siderable fixed costs involved in the operation of the network. Covering
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the fixed costs by a transfer payment from the state would imply that 
the particular industry is subsidised by consumers of other goods or 
by income earners generally. Distortions of one kind or another will 
result and be more or less undesirable depending on the way in which 
the subsidy is raised (shadow costs of public funds). Two-part-tariffs, 
firstly, have potential to foreclose low-volume users from the market 
and, secondly, may encourage inefficient resale. A menu of two-part- 
tariff contracts can only ease these problems but not abolish them in 
principle. Second best (Ramsey) pricing, on the other hand, allows 
the access provider to break even but imposes excessive informational 
requirements on the regulator as all elasticities (including cross elastic­
ities) enter the calculation of the optimal prices. Therefore, theorists 
as well as regulators have turned to cost based pricing rules. But pric­
ing at average costs or fully distributed costs not only involves thorny 
issues related to cost allocation (especially for multiproduct firms) but 
also destroys allocative efficiency and gives little incentives for cost 
minimisation. Nor can rate-of-return regulation be an ideal solution 
because this would imply productive inefficiency due to minimal incen­
tives for the firm to undertake (effort or any other) non-contractible 
investments with a view to achieving productive efficiency.
This problem has contributed to the relative popularity of the effi­
cient component pricing rule (ECPR) or Baumol-Willig rule (see Bau- 
mol and Sidack (1994) and Willig (1979)) which states that the access 
price should be set equal to the sum of the direct costs of providing 
access and the opportunity cost to the incumbent. 4 Based on a con­
testable markets framework this concept assumes that, due to potential 
competition, final goods prices are at the competitive level. Although, 
under this assumption, the ECPR is optimal this rule has been criti­
cised for various reasons. If the assumption about optimal regulation 
of final goods prices does not hold the ECPR simply protects the in­
cumbent’s monopoly rent. Further, it abstracts from incentive issues
4This concept, obviously, makes sense only in a setting with an integrated incumbent 
because a network operator not active in the final market would not incur any opportunity 
costs apart from production costs.
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such as the incumbent’s incentive to inflate the marginal cost of access 
provision. Further, adequate incentives for cost reduction exist only 
if there is a sufficiently long time lag between cost reduction and ad­
justment of the pricing rule. Laffont and Tirole (1994b) argue that the 
ECPR is not optimal in case there are asymmetries between incumbent 
and competitor such as brand loyalty (captive customers), cost asym­
metries, etc. But, as Armstrong and Vickers (1995) show, this criticism 
applies to the simplest form of the ECPR (’margin rule’) only, but not 
to the general interpretation using the opportunity costs in a general 
sense. They demonstrate how the opportunity cost term has to be ad­
justed in order to take into account various complications (bypass, no 
contestability, relaxed assumptions on production).
The paper by Laffont and Tirole quoted above suggests a further 
alternative. It is pointed out there that, under a global price cap, i.e. 
including access charges, a firm has incentives to charge Ramsey prices. 
Under this regime, therefore, the task of determining elasticities etc. 
is delegated to the firm that may not have complete information but 
it certainly has more than the regulator and may therefore engage in 
some form of price discrimination. More importantly, they argue, the 
problem of regulatory capture that, due to unknown elasticities, results 
from the regulator’s discretion in fixing the access price, disappears. 
This usage based approach is certainly attractive in that it implements 
approximately efficient prices, a feature that all approaches that are 
based merely on costs must lack. But caveats such as remaining infor­
mational requirements about demand and the price cap concept based 
on weights given by exogenous demand forecasts 5 remain.
However, there is a serious drawback which all access pricing con­
cepts discussed so fax have in common. All these concepts are based, 
in one way or another, either on network operating costs or, as in Laf­
font and Tirole (1994b), on a profit constraint. But these costs or 
profits are generally not entirely known to the regulator because, due
5 A similar criticism applies, of course, to any kind of price cap regulation per se because 
price caps are taken to be exogenous but will, in general, depend on past performance.
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to accounting and cost allocation procedures, considerable degrees of 
freedom may be involved. The network operating firm not only has a 
considerable informational advantage but also an incentive to exploit 
this asymmetry and to extract as high an informational rent as it pos­
sibly can. Not only does such a strategy increase revenues but it also 
creates an asymmetry between the incumbent and other firms in the 
downstream market by raising rivals’ costs.
Summarising our remarks so far we can state that, firstly, access 
pricing is a key problem in network related industries and successful 
regulation of access provision would pave the way for a policy of libera­
lisation in all other, i.e. potentially competitive, areas of the industry 
in question. Secondly, the determination of the access price that should 
be implemented is a rather complicated issue, theoretically as well as 
practically, especially because of the informational asymmetries that 
may highly compound the difficulties outlined above. These two facts 
can be regarded as the starting point of the chapter on network access 
(chapter III).
In a setting in which access prices are based on production costs 
we focus on the network operator’s incentives to exploit his informa­
tional advantage. These incentives, we argue, depend on the ownership 
structure that has been implemented in the industry. In particular, we 
compare vertical integration (with and without accounting separation) 
of the access provider with one downstream firm, vertical separation, 
and various forms of joint ownership. While the welfare ranking be­
tween some of these ownership structures depends on industry charac­
teristics we establish the existence of one particular ownership struc­
ture (namely joint ownership in conjunction with an optimal capital 
adjustment rule) which always yields efficient outcomes in the sense 
that the access price fixed by the regulator will not be distorted at 
all by informational asymmetries. The particular joint ownership con­
cept we suggest is designed to annul entirely any incentives to distort 
information about costs. Following the spirit of the above introduc­
tion, namely that liberalisation is adequate once the access problem
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has been resolved we do not assume regulation of final goods prices, 
entry assistance or restriction or other policies along these lines.
There are issues which, although not directly related to access pric­
ing, are vital in this context. For instance, there may be (non-verifiable) 
investment decisions to be taken by the network operator that would 
generate a surplus part of which accrues to downstream firms. Simi­
larly, positive externalities result from investments that are taken by 
individual downstream firms because such investments may affect the 
profit of the upstream firm and of downstream rivals. We include these 
issues in our analysis and demonstrate that the ownership structure 
that is optimal with respect to access pricing also performs best as 
far as investments are concerned. In regulated industries the case for 
joint ownership is, therefore, twofold: fair access provision and efficient 
incentives for investments.
Entry, or rather entry deterrence, is another issue we analyze in 
our model. Again, joint ownership with optimal adjustment of cap­
ital shares performs best, the reason being that incentives for entry 
deterrence vanish entirely.
Note again the difference in spirit between our entry analysis and 
much of the regulatory literature. While, following the paradigm of li­
beralisation after successful access price regulation, we measure welfare 
as (possibly weighted) sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus 
which, under the assumptions of our model, amounts to aiming at low 
prices of the final goods. In other words, the downstream industry 
should be as competitive as possible and entry is therefore regarded as 
desirable which, in turn, implies that we favour ownership structures 
that give least incentives for entry deterrence. (De-)regulation liter­
ature, on the other hand, often includes entrants’ fixed costs in the 
welfare function which paves the way for excess entry results. This 
procedure is, of course, perfectly legitimate as long as the results are 
applied to industries in which entry sunk cost play an important role 
in the downstream (or non-monopolistic) sector. Our analysis, on the 
other hand, focuses on industries with a potentially competitive seg­
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ment in which entry sunk costs are small and entry is desirable. As­
suming that entry sunk costs are relatively small implies that entry 
restrictions in competitive segments of regulated industries are as un­
necessary as entry restrictions for any other industries that are con­
sidered to be competitive. This difference in approach only illustrates 
what has been stated earlier. Having realised that industries with a 
naturally monopolistic segment need to be regulated economists seem 
to infer that regulation must necessarily be extended to all segments 
of the industry. However, if some segments of the industry in ques­
tion are potentially competitive one would expect the introduction of 
competition into these segments to be the suitable objective.
In other words, we argue that pursuing the aim of optimal regulation 
may well lead to over-regulation. The end in view should rather be 
minimal regulation that simply achieves the task of preventing the 
firm acting as supplier in the monopolistic segment from exploiting its 
market power, not more and not less.
There are, of course, qualifications to be made. Once we leave be­
hind the idealised world of the economic model it may be less clear 
whether or not access price regulation has been successfully imple­
mented to such a degree that no distortions arise. Real life may con­
front regulators as well as other parties involved with effects not taken 
into consideration in the model. Further informational or other im­
perfections may necessitate further regulatory tools. Without denying 
the relevance of such effects we rather want to make the point that 
regulation should concentrate on the efficient provision (and pricing) 
of bottleneck facilities and should then introduce competition into ’po­
tentially competitive’ segments.
Another issue tackled in this chapter may be mentioned here by 
way of introduction. Discussing the question of a monopolists’s vertical 
structure it has been argued that the costs and benefits of a break-up 
are hard to be quantified and the former may or may not outweigh the 
latter. Economists have generally hesitated to take an unambivalent 
stand on the issue and regulatory bodies have taken different decisions
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on this matter. However, it has also been argued in the literature that 
structural separation may be closely (or even fully) substituted by a 
separation of accounts. Accounting separation has been assumed to 
ban discrimination and therefore to procure the benefits of structural 
separation without imposing the costs thereof on the industry (or on 
anybody else). But this conclusion can only develop due to a lack of 
consideration for implications of ownership. We show in our chapter 
on network access that the argument outlined above does not hold. On 
the contrary, an imposition of accounting separation may be completely 
neutralised by the incumbent firm’s strategy. The crucial step in the 
argument is simply that ownership matters. Residual rights exist and 
depend on ownership of assets and not on published accounts. Again, 
one of our central points can be subsumed under the principle outlined 
earlier. The occupation with specific industries or classes of industries 
may bear a danger of neglecting to take into account principles that 
apply more generally.
Another central point that is related to the issue is that a compre­
hensive study of access pricing must aim at taking into account features 
such as asymmetric information and ownership. There are various stud­
ies that take into account either information or ownership which make 
significant contributions to the theory but fail to analyze the interplay 
between both factors. Relatively few studies deal with both issues at 
the same time. Although this may involve analytical complications it is 
worthwhile to analyze both issues in one model because ownership af­
fects considerably the incentives to exploit informational asymmetries. 
Again, this is simply a special case in which a more general insight must 
be taken into account, namely that, in a world of incomplete contracts, 
ownership affects incentives.
Chapter IV ’s focus is similar to the one of chapter III, namely 
vertically related industries in which a bottleneck may exist. Many 
of the introductory remarks apply to both chapters. However, it is 
not exactly a generalisation or continuation of the preceding one. It 
rather sheds light on related issues in a slightly different framework.
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We use an alternative model which allows to take into account other 
settings including more than one upstream firm. Apart from vertical 
integration and vertical separation as defined in chapter III we consider 
the case of an upstream competitor that may or may not be integrated 
with a downstream firm.
A price setting game is analyzed which allows to draw conclusions 
as to the import of different classes of contracts or tariffs allowed for. 
Further, we analyze other issues relevant to this setting such as the 
impact of a monopolistic input provider exerting price discrimination 
between different downstream firms. We also point out how a change 
in the timing structure affects the outcome. If access prices are chosen 
before entry occurs then more entry and lower prices will result. A long­
term commitment of access providers may reduce hold-up problems 
and therefore constitute a suitable aim for regulatory policy. Entry of 
a competitor that is more efficient than the incumbent does not imply 
that the final outcome is more efficient. Implications of ownership 
structures for pricing and entry decisions are analyzed and compared.
This chapter does not model explicitly informational asymmetries 
(although, as we argued in detail, this is a relevant point). The idea 
rather was first to examine a setting without regulation but with fea­
tures of regulated industries as far as the number of firms and the 
vertical relation of markets are concerned. Starting from this free m ar­
ket analysis of equilibrium pricing and entry decisions, we then explore 
the relation between ownership and the degree of regulation required 
in order to ensure efficient outcomes. At this stage then, we can draw 
conclusions as to the informational requirements for regulation. In a 
setting in which, without any kind of regulation, the efficient access 
price tends to be charged in equilibrium, the informational require­
ments are obviously very small and, even without making asymmetric 
information explicit in the model, one can argue that such a setting 
lends itself for regulated industries.
Our final chapter (chapter V) addresses a rather fundamental issue 
that is relevant to the theory of competitive markets. The focus of
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this chapter is on the demand side and addresses the question in how 
far human (choice) behaviour lends itself to a formal mathematical 
description and, more importantly, in how far results derived on the 
basis of strict behavioural requirements are robust against a relaxation 
of these assumptions.
Traditionally, economic theory has assumed that individuals are 
able to order all available alternatives according to their tastes, i.e. 
preferences, and always select the very best alternative. In consumer 
theory alternatives are usually bundles of goods, preferences are as­
sumed to satisfy regularity conditions such as continuity, completeness 
and, in most cases, transitivity and convexity, and all individuals are 
rational in the sense that they choose the bundle which is optimal 
according to their preferences.
An extreme example for strands of economic theory relying on the 
utility (or preference) maximisation paradigm is the theory of com­
petitive markets or, from now on, general equilibrium theory as first 
formalised by Debreu (1959). Not surprisingly, this field of economics 
also stands out for a remarkable precision and theoretical appeal of its 
results. Agents maximise utility independently, firms maximise their 
own profits, all agents act in a purely self-interested way without even 
attempting to coordinate their actions but, despite of all this, there ex­
ists an equilibrium price vector which, if implemented by the ’Walrasian 
auctioneer’, leads to simultaneous clearing of all markets. Moreover, 
the resulting allocation of the competitive equilibrium turns out to be 
Pareto optimal. These results can be obtained for arbitrarily many 
agents, goods and, in the case of a multi-period setting with uncer­
tainty, even for arbitrarily many periods and states of nature. Con­
versely, any Pareto optimal allocation can be obtained as equilibrium 
outcome of free trade simply by ensuring an adequate distribution of 
initial endowments prior to trade.
Undoubtedly, general equilibrium theory is a field of economics in 
which most powerful tools have been used and most precise results have 
been obtained in return. But there can be as little doubt that these
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very results rely on equally precise assumptions, particularly about in­
dividual choice behaviour. It may, for instance, seem demanding to 
require of all agents the ability to order all bundles of goods, espe­
cially in a modern market economy in which many consumers would 
not even be aware of the existence of numerous (perhaps lately devel­
oped, or imported) goods. The assumption that agents know and take 
into account all states of nature that may occur in any future period 
of the relevant time horizon and optimally transfer income between 
these states and periods seems strong if not heroic.6 In recent years it 
has been argued that individual choice behaviour is rather marked by 
inconsistencies even in extremely simple situations. Various avenues 
have been pursued to explain this kind of human choice behaviour all 
of which abandon the assumption that agents can or do maximise pref­
erences or at least they assume that agents may not choose exactly the 
optimal alternative.
This scenario begs the following question. In how far are precise 
results derived in equilibrium theory sensitive to deviations of hu­
man behaviour from the ideal world as defined by the assumptions 
of many theoretical models and, in particular, by the utility maximi­
sation paradigm. General equilibrium theory has been criticised for 
both, its assumptions as well as its predictions. It therefore appears 
to be a prime candidate for a sensitivity analysis that would attem pt 
to shed light on the questions how sensitive results derived in general 
equilibrium theory are and which of the results are most sensitive. The 
latter question is important because a break-down of some of the less 
plausible predictions in case the utility maximisation paradigm is sub­
stituted by alternative assumptions would be an argument in favour of 
a substitution along these lines whereas it would be rather worrying if 
predictions that are in line with empirical observations can no longer 
be obtained.
In order to provide some basic insights along these lines we proceed 
as follows in chapter V. We abandon the assumption that all individ­
6As pointed out earlier, this fact is one of the motivations for incomplete contracts.
24
uals’ choices necessarily result from maximisation of preferences. De­
mand is modelled as stochastic and may result from moods, random 
influences, or some coincidence that may induce an agent to buy a cer­
tain good. On the other hand, we allow for choices to be the result 
of state dependent preferences in order to capture the other extreme 
of the whole spectrum of rationality. We start from a general equi­
librium model in which utility functions or, equivalently, continuous 
preferences, are substituted by demand densities defined on the budget 
hyperplanes. As one would expect, in this model markets generally 
do not clear. We then define an expected equilibrium in which ex­
pected total excess demand equals zero. Such equilibria exist but are 
not unique unless some rather restrictive assumptions are made about 
the agents’ consumption distributions. As markets clear on the average 
only and not for actual realisations of demand (i.e. with probability 
one) we introduce rationing into the model and argue that rationing 
is probably a more realistic result than precise market clearing. The 
amount of rationing, however, is shown to become small for economies 
with many agents. For any finite size of economy we can give a bound 
for the probability that the amount of rationing for a certain good 
exceeds a given limit.
All results outlined above, as well as some other results obtained in 
the final chapter, appear to point into the same direction in the follow­
ing sense. The predictions of general equilibrium theory which are not 
robust against a relaxation of utility maximisation are the least plausi­
ble ones. Those that obtain in some modified way become more, rather 
than less, plausible due to these modifications. And those predictions 
that obtain in an unmodified form are the most obvious where, for the 
moment, obvious is defined by ’in harmony with empirical observation’. 
There are even new results that can be obtained due to the assumption 
of random demand and that may serve as motivation for assumptions 
made in some areas of economic analysis. An example for this latter 
type of (new) results would be rationing that induces agents to (ran­
domly!) buy and sell assets for liquidity reasons which is exactly the
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assumed behaviour of ’noise traders’ in the financial markets literature.
More realistic in the sense of more descriptive assumptions may be 
less convenient for formal analysis and may lead to less precise and 
less ideal results. The payoff of using them nonetheless lies in a higher 
degree of realism of the predictions obtained under these assumptions.
The statements made above, in our view, imply neither that general 
equilibrium theory is wrong or useless nor that it cannot be success­
fully applied to various economic questions. Our interpretation of the 
sensitivity analysis outlined above is rather that general equilibrium 
theory provides results which are not only theoretically attractive due 
to their content and precision but also a useful borderline case from 
which economic analysis may start. To find more final answers to 
specific problems, however, it may prove useful to relax some of the as­
sumptions that are commonly made, especially those that concern the 
least calculable, precise, and predictive element contained in it, namely 
human behaviour of choice.
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CHAPTER II
Market Foreclosure W ithout V ertical Integration 1 
A bstract
This chapter challenges the assumption that vertical integration is the 
sole way for upstream and downstream firms to monopolise the down­
stream market. Future trade, switching costs, and reputation may 
constitute alternatives for vertical integration and lead to dominant 
outcomes.
1 Introduction
Following our remarks on the role of ownership in the general introduc­
tion this chapter analyses the plausibility of a particular contractual 
assumption used in a paper by Hart and Tirole (1990), (H-T) from now 
on, on the behaviour of integrated and non-integrated upstream and 
downstream firms.
In the above paper it is demonstrated that vertical mergers can 
have anticompetitive effects and that there are foreclosure incentives 
leading to vertical integration. Many of the conclusions reached are 
certainly interesting and shed light on questions that are of practical 
interest. The aim of our analysis is not to question the possibility of 
anticompetitive effects arising from vertical integration, but rather it is 
to show how foreclosure and monopolisation can be achieved with the 
help of contracts which are not based on profit sharing and which are
*A summary of the main ideas of this chapter can be found in Hardt (1995).
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not necessarily enforceable. In fact, the results of the ex-post monopo­
lisation version of the model by Hart and Tirole are, to a large extent, 
driven by the assumption that nonenforceability of exclusive-dealing 
contracts implies the inability of firms to commit to monopolisation.
While, on the one hand, their analysis provides good arguments for 
foreclosure motives underlying vertical integration it also presupposes, 
on the other hand, that non-integrated upstream and downstream firms 
cannot commit to monopolise the downstream market.
This supposition, however, is vulnerable theoretically as well as 
practically. Theoretically, this assumption implies that a monopolist 
cannot behave as a monopolist given the sequential structure of moves 
in the model. Having sold output to consumers whose reservation price 
exceeds the monopoly price he will, due to ex post incentives, sell ad­
ditional amounts to other agents. Practically, the supposition incurs 
problems when confronted with casual evidence. Frequently, cases have 
been made against upstream firms because of their refusal to supply 
downstream firms. In many of these cases, however, the upstream 
firms are not integrated with downstream firms but, still, they stick to 
agreements made with certain downstream firms not to supply others. 
Special attention will be drawn to an antitrust case against Raleigh in 
1981.
We describe the setting in section 2. Section 3 contains models of 
some scenarios in which non-integrated firms are able to commit to 
monopolising a downstream market. Section 4 discusses briefly some 
implications. A case study is analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes 
this chapter.
2 T he Com m itm ent Problem
The basic features of the model by Hart and Tirole are the following. 
The concept of ownership is the one based on residual rights (under 
incomplete contracts) along the lines of Grossman and Hart (1986). 
There are two potential upstream firms, U\ and C/2, and two down­
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stream firms, D\ and D 2 . Firms do not know ex ante which type of 
intermediate good will be traded. Vertical integration between U{ and 
D{ allows for profit sharing (which would not be feasible otherwise). 
Costs of integration are summarised by a fixed amount E. There is 
competition in the downstream market for final goods. The intermedi­
ate good is produced by U± and U2 at constant marginal costs C\ and 
C2-
Here, we focus on the special case of the ex-post monopolisation 
variant of the model when the less efficient upstream firm has infinite 
marginal costs. 2 In this framework, (H-T) show that, in spite of 
other claims that had been made, Ui (U from now on) might have 
incentives to merge with a downstream firm in order to monopolise the 
downstream market. Our point is to show how monopolisation can be 
achieved even without integration.
The reason why this is not possible in H-T’s analysis is the fol­
lowing: U, it is argued, after selling the monopoly quantity qm to 
a non-integrated downstream firm, D\ say, for a lump-sum payment 
equal to monopoly profit, 7rm , would always have ex-post incentives to 
supply D 2 as well. Z>i, anticipating I /’s cheating would not sign an 
exclusive-dealing contract 3 in equilibrium. Analogously, after supply­
ing each downstream firm with a share of the monopoly quantity for 
the respective share of the monopoly profit, the upstream firm would 
have incentives to supply further amounts. Again, in equilibrium, no 
firm would accept such an offer.
We wonder in how far this argument applies to practical situations. 
Firms considering vertical integration usually have a long history of 
mutual trade relationships and, more importantly, they intend to en­
2 Hart and Tirole analyze mergers between a relatively efficient upstream firm, Ui, and 
a downstream firm, D \.  In their constant returns to scale framework this means ci <  c%. 
So the special case corresponds to C2 =  00. But our point could also be made for the 
general case ci, C2, with C2 <  00. The difference is simply that the efficient upstream firm, 
Ui, then must commit to supply a positive but low quantity to other downstream firms, 
i.e. the quantity that, otherwise, would be supplied by the inefficient upstream firm, U2 .
3The underlying assumption here is that cheating is observable but, for legal or for 
informational reasons, it is not verifiable.
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gage in future trading. Thus, a one-shot game seems to be of limited 
applicability in this context. In the following section we will explore 
several ways to take these effects into account.
3 C om m itm ent in D ynam ic Settings
As indicated in the previous section we hold effects arising from long­
term relationships to be important in these situations. Cheating today 
most certainly affects trading tomorrow. In what follows we demon­
strate this view with the help of some simple game-theoretic models, 
and contracts.
3.1 Possibility of Future Trade
One of the most straight-forward ways to think about the situation 
would be the following setting: in any given period firms expect that, 
with probability a, there will be trade between the respective firms 
in the following period. Firms maximise their future expected payoff 
discounted at rate 8. This setting corresponds 4 to an infinite horizon 
game with discount factor 8 = a  • 8.
Consider the following situation: suppose that, in the industry in 
question, it has been common for the efficient upstream firm to trade 
the Cournot quantity with each of the downstream firms. However, U 
suggests to monopolise the downstream market.
In period t , U proposes to D\ to monopolise the market, i.e. sign 
the contract (qm, 7rm). Consequent to this offer D\ can either accept 
(’A’) or buy the Cournot quantity, qc, for a lump sum payment equal 
to Cournot profit, irc (’C5). If Di has played ’A’, U decides to cheat 
’Ch’ and receive 7rc/l, or to stick to the monopolisation contract, i.e. to 
be honest (’H’). If D\ has not accepted the monopolisation contract, 
the Cournot quantities are traded.
We further assume that this game is common knowledge and that 
players have perfect information about past moves.
4 Here, we assume risk neutrality of firms.
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In this context the following pair of strategies form a subgame- 
perfect equilibrium provided 6 is large enough:
D im. play ’A’ in every period if no cheating has occurred so far, but 
always play ’C’ if cheating has occurred (’grim’ strategy).
U : play ’H’ in each period.
t / ’s continuation payoff in period t is given by
oo
TifH' in all periods) =  (1 -  S) £  STr m = 8t -irm.
T — t
But for deviation in period t we obtain
OO
'K^Ch' in period t) = (1 — S)[St(,Km -f n ch) +  2 Stttc].
T = t + 1
As one can easily verify U is better off playing ’H’ if the following 
condition holds:
7Tch
6 > ------------------------------- 7— — .
7Tm  +  7T —  2 tTc
It is important to notice that, as 7rm > 2ttc (monopoly profits exceeds 
sum of cournot profits), there always exists a 8 < 1 that satisfies the 
above condition.
The interpretation of this condition is straight-forward: the restric­
tion on 6 becomes stricter when cheating becomes more worthwhile or 
when, ceteris paribus, the Cournot profits increase or monopoly profits 
decrease.
For D\ it is an equilibrium to accept the monopolisation contract 
because, given U does not cheat, it has no incentives to deviate by 
playing Cournot.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium we have thus established faces, of 
course, the counter argument that it is not unique, in particular, it 
would also be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for U always to cheat and 
for D always to play Cournot. But note that the monopolisation equi­
librium is on the Pareto frontier and, given some degree of rationality 
of firms, it is more likely to be selected than an inefficient equilibrium.
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This is an argument often used in cartel theory. See, for instance, the 
paper by Porter (1983). 5
3.2 Switching Costs
Maintenance of mutual trade relationships might be important because 
of other effects. Some trade relationships are only worthwhile if main­
tained in a minimum number of periods. We formalise this idea in the 
following game.
Fixed switching costs
Suppose U incurs a fixed cost c of supplying a further firm with the 
input good. 6 Suppose further that this cost is such that U would not 
make this investment if there was just a single period in view in which 
U could supply the extra quantity to Z)2 (i.e. c > Trch). A much weaker 
condition will be provided in the end of this subsection.
This assumption which appears to be a rather plausible for a number 
of cases is sufficient to destroy the standard backward induction argu­
ment that would yield cheating as the unique subgame-perfect equilib­
rium in a finite repetition of the stage game.
Consider the following game that is to be played in period £, t =  
1 ,.. .T, T  < 00. The strategies of U and D\ are the same as in the 
previous section with the only modification that U has to pay c if it 
wants to supply Z)2. Then the continuation payoff for U in any period 
t =  1 , . . . ,  T  is given by
T
7r('H; in all periods from t on) =  (1 — 6) 8T'Km
T = t
6 In a more extensive analysis one would have to consider the possibilities of the up­
stream firm to use the threat of making an
exclusive-dealing contract with D 2 if D\  does not accept. As it would be an equilibrium
for D 2 to accept this offer this threat is credible and gives another argument for D\  to
accept the offer.
6One could, for instance, think of c as the cost of designing a machine for the production 
of the particular input good needed by a downstream firm.
32
But for deviation in period t we obtain
T
w^Ch' in period t) =  (1 — 6)[6*(ttto +  Kch — c) -f ^  8T27rc].
T - t + l
In period T, it is certainly optimal for U not to cheat. Now consider 
period Given it is optimal in periods t + l , . . . , T  not to cheat
the payoff for U in period t is as given above. Thus we obtain the 
following condition for U not to cheat in period t:
1 — 8^~^ 7TC^ — C
which is, in fact, true for every 0 < 8 < 1 given our assumption on c 
and the fact that 7rm — 2ttc > 0 always holds.
From a game-theoretic point of view this result is, of course, rather 
obvious. But the point we want to make is an economic one: the specific 
investment is undertaken only once and it only exceeds the one-period 
profit from cheating, but not the discounted sum of profits from future 
cheating. The reason why this investment is not undertaken is not that 
it would not be profitable in itself but that the other downstream firm 
will punish the upstream firm in subsequent periods.
Another way to interpret this model would be to think of rental of 
technology: U can produce a technology for D2 at cost c and then rent 
it for a fixed payment each period. Given U and D\ have agreed to 
monopolise the market, the maximum payment D 2 will be willing to 
make for rental of the technology in period t is the profit from cheating 
in that period, Trch. But, because of c > 7rch, U would not produce 
the technology for D2 if rental could be agreed upon for a single period 
only. Thus the usual backward induction argument does not apply here. 
This case of supply of a more efficient technology to one of the firms 
might be one in which monopolisation is more plausible than in other 
cases: supply of a particular technology might be directly observable, 
not only via price reaction on the final product market.
In the situation modelled above ’cheating’ by U can be excluded 
even though the game is finite and the discount factor may be arbi­
trarily small.
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Initially small switching costs
As indicated earlier the condition c > 7rc/l can be replaced by a much 
weaker condition if switching costs do not have to be constant over 
time. Denoting switching costs in period t by c*, U will cooperate in 
period T  — t if
cr _t > K ck -  Sr)(7Tm -  2 t c) , 0 < t  <  T.
T =  1 '
Using the convention ]Cr=i =  0? this condition implies that c > 7rc/l 
is necessary in the very last period only. In earlier periods switching 
costs may be smaller. Arbitrarily small values of switching costs are 
sufficient for any given value of Trch, for any 6 > 0, and for any T  >  1 
it is optimal for U to cooperate in each period, given (7rm — 27rc) is 
sufficiently large (’monopolisation worthwhile’).
The condition on ct is weaker for larger values of T  or S. Note 
that ct might be negative initially. A nice interpretation for negative 
switching costs would be side payments made by the other downstream 
firm or legal costs resulting from supply refusal. Even in the presence 
of such additional incentives to deviate from cooperative behaviour U 
will cooperate for the sake of future profits.
3.3 R eputation Effects
The idea formalised in this section is that the upstream firm U might 
have incentives to build up a reputation for being honest and that the 
downstream firm D\ might have incentives to build up a reputation 
for not rejecting monopolisation contracts. Instead of proving the ex­
istence of a sequential equilibrium as in Kreps et al. (1982) we will 
use a simplified version similar to the one in Tirole (1988 p. 256 f). 
The reason for this is that this seems to be the simplest framework 
which allows to make the following point: we will show that, even in a 
finitely repeated game, it is sub-optimal for both firms to behave non- 
cooperatively from the first period on, given that they face a sufficiently 
long future and that the discount factor is sufficiently high.
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In what follows we are going to assume that there is a small amount 
of uncertainty about the agents’ types. The intuition for this assump­
tion is that an upstream firm is not sure about whether a downstream 
firm trusts the offer to monopolise the market. A downstream firm, on 
the other hand, faces uncertainty in so far as the upstream firm might 
either stick to an exclusive-dealing contract or cheat by supplying addi­
tional amounts to other downstream firms. If one assumes the latter to 
be very unlikely this can be reflected by arbitrarily small probabilities.
The stage game of section 3.1 is now to be repeated in a finite 
number of periods t = l , . .. ,T. We introduce the following possible types 
of agents. The payoffs given in section 3.1 are valid if the players are 
’sane’ which happens with probabilities 1 — au  and 1 — old for U and 
Di, respectively. With probability a,*, player i is ’crazy’ in the sense of 
deviating from the norm as defined by the payoffs of the stage game. 
To simplify terminology we will say that U cooperates if it does not 
cheat and that D\ cooperates if it accepts the contract. For player i 
the crazy type plays the grim strategy:
- cooperate in period 0
- cooperate in period t > 1 unless player j  has not cooperated in any 
of the previous periods.
The discount factor will be denoted by S. In what follows we need 
to assume that a downstream firm has nonzero bargaining power 7 and 
thus receives a positive share of the profits. We will thus denote U’s 
bargaining power by /?, where one might want to think of /? close to 
one because of I /’s monopoly position as sole supplier in the market. In 
what follows we analyze the behaviour of the sane type in the presence 
of uncertainty about the other player’s type.
If U cheats in period 0 this implies that he is sane. In this case there 
will be no cooperation in any period because D\ will retaliate if crazy 
and will not accept the contract anyway if sane. The only equilibrium 
in this case is that the Cournot quantity is traded in all subsequent
7This assumption can easily be justified by taking into account delays caused by dis­
agreement in the bargaining process.
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periods until T. The payoff for U is then given by
7ru('Ch' in period 0) =  aDP[irm -f Trch + 2ttc(8 +  ■ • • + <5>T)]
+  (1 -  a D ) 2/3ttc(1 +  . . .  +  S T ) .
We now show that U can do better by not cheating in the first pe­
riod. Suppose, for a moment, that U uses the grim strategy: ’cooperate 
until T  or until cheating occurs’. The worst case for him then would 
be that D rejects the contract even in the very first period. This case 
provides a rough lower bound on U’s payoff which is sufficient to derive 
a condition for cooperation, provided the indicated restrictions on the 
parameters are satisfied. Using
iru(grim) =  a D[(37rm(l  +  8 H------ 1- <$T)] +  (1 -  a D)2^'Kc{l  +  <H 1- ST)
and simplifying the algebra yields that Tru (grim) > ^ ( 'C h ' in period 0) 
if
S - p +1  ^ _
1 _  $ > _  2-k* : ' U
For S —► 1, the left hand side of (1) converges to T  so that the condition 
is satisfied for T  sufficiently large. For T  —* oo the we obtain the same 
condition as in the infinite horizon case (3.1)
TTch
S>
7Tm  - | -  7r ch —  2 ttc
More interestingly, for any given S £ 1)? we can giye a minimum
number of periods Ti(S) such that, given T  > Ti(6), it is not optimal 
for U to cheat before period T  — T\{8) :
. . I ! - 1 - 5( ■ - ¥ * )r . W >  l n ;  ' , » < ■ •
The right hand side of this expression is positive for all 8 < 1, and the 
logarithm has a positive argument for 8 > Comparative statics
yields the expected results.
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A similar analysis holds for the downstream firm. Accepting the 
contract in period 1 implies the risk of making a loss, —I say, in this 
period. In subsequent periods then the Cournot quantity is traded, i.e. 
Dl obtains (1 — /3)6t 7rc in period t  A sa  condition for D\ to accept the 
contract one then obtains
a v  [(l- /3 )7 rm(l +  <5+--- +  £T)]
+  ( l - a u ) H + ( l - / ? K ( £  +  --- +  £T)J
> (1 -  0 )^ (1  +  •■• + ST),
which simplifies to
in(‘ -  ^ ' ‘j
*  I n /  ■
for
g  _  7TC +  ( 1  -  OLU ) l - O L U 'Km
au{ ?rm — 7rc) ’ 
where / =  1/(1 — f3). Again, comparative statics results can be easily 
obtained.
So, for T  > max{Ti(^, «£>), T2(<5, at/)} =: M (au, old, 8), the firms 
will cooperate in all periods t < T  — M (a u , ap , 6).
We have thus established in this section that arbitrarily small prob­
abilities for the existence of an honest upstream firm and a cooperating 
downstream firm are sufficient to induce cooperation in a finitely re­
peated game. Only when the number of future periods is too small for 
at least one agent i (given 8 and oij) cooperation breaks down. This 
result corresponds to the intuition provided in the beginning of this sec­
tion, namely that in a world where cooperation is possible, even though 
unlikely, firms can achieve monopolisation of markets even though they 
might be using contracts which are not enforceable. Thus, vertical in­
tegration is not the only way round the firms’ ’inability’ to commit 
themselves to monopolise the market8.
Alternatively, one might think of a sequence of contracts where, in each period, U sets
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Additionally, we would like to emphasise that commitment induced 
by reputation is not only an additional way to achieve monopolisation, 
but it is rather an outcome that even dominates vertical integration. 
The costs of integration, which are represented by a fixed amount of E  
in H-T’s model are not incurred in the setting of this section . Thus, 
privately as well as socially, non-integrated cooperation dominates ver­
tical integration.
3.4 Enforceable Contracts Replacing Nonenforceable Ones
Hart and Tirole, in their paper, assume that vertical integration and 
profit sharing are equivalent in the following sense. The former implies 
the latter and, due to possible profit misrepresentations etc., the lat­
ter is not attainable without the former. Starting from this notion of 
equivalence they conclude that the upstream firm is not able to restrict 
the output in the downstream market other than by integrating with 
a downstream firm. In contractual terms the main source of incom­
pleteness of possible contracts to restrict outputs is nonenforceability. 
In this section we would like to point out that alternative contracts 
can be written which are enforceable and yield the required output 
restriction.
One possibility is to trade the input good for a price pi that is 
conditioned on the price of the final good pf in the downstream market: 
pj =  pi(pF), provided the downstream market price is verifiable which 
will be the case in a large number of markets. If pi depends crucially 
on pp then the upstream firm has sufficient incentives not to supply 
other downstream firms. Demand uncertainty would not change this 
result qualitatively, but just lead to more complicated strategies, e.g. 
trigger-price strategies.
Another possible scenario is to take into account the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Here, payment occurs if and only if D\ has not been
the price in a way that D\ accepts the offer. By building up reputation, U can charge 
higher and higher prices each period. Ultimately, prices will converge to the monopoly 
price.
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forced to exit the market because of big losses in the previous trading 
period. This might induce U to supply very little, if anything, to other 
downstream firms.
Alternatively, one could think of specific forms of payment as, for 
instance, payment in shares of the downstream firm.
These hints are just presented very informally here but this might 
suffice to indicate some commitment devices which arise when enforce­
able contracts are written to replace the nonenforceable ones.
4 Im plications
The various counter arguments presented in the previous sections show 
that, in many settings, it cannot be taken for granted that a non- 
integrated pair of an upstream and a downstream firm cannot commit 
to monopolise the downstream market. To what extent does this affect 
the analysis presented by Hart and Tirole?
As output contraction occurs in Variant I (’ex-post monopolisa­
tion’) of their model only the results in that section axe concerned: it 
is no longer true that firms have to integrate in order to achieve out­
put contraction in the downstream markets, and that non-integration 
implies that Cournot quantities are traded. Total profits are highest 
when firms are not integrated but behave cooperatively. The reason 
why the second (’scarce needs’) and third variant (’scarce supplies’) 
are not affected is that there, output contraction is not at stake: firms 
have incentives to integrate because this enables them to channel scarce 
input goods (or scarce orders) to the integrated firm that would be ra­
tioned otherwise. An important difference is that in variants 2 and 3 no 
additional profits are generated by vertical integration because output 
contraction does not occur. Thus, non-integrated cooperation is not 
equivalent with integration (even when we neglect the efficiency loss 
'E '). Cooperation is likely to arise with a view to output contraction 
and generate additional profits, but not with a view to solving prob­
lems of scarcity of needs or supply where profits could be redistributed
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but not increased.
5 Em pirical Evidence: a Case Study
’Several types of evidence are available 
to enlighten economists... One type of 
evidence is casual observation which, 
although not terribly scientific, is bet­
ter than no observation at all.’
Dennis W. Carlton (1989)
At this stage it might be interesting to investigate cases of supply 
refusal. An especially interesting case seems to be the one against 
TI Raleigh Industries Limited and TI Raleigh Limited in 1980. As a 
basis for our studies we largely rely on a report of the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (1981).
This case seems to illustrate the question we are addressing in this 
note. Raleigh had refused to supply several discount stores. But, in­
terestingly enough, its distribution network consisted of bicycle dealers 
the vast majority of which (87 %) were not integrated with Raleigh.
Much of this report is concerned with questions of public interest 
and questions of applicability of certain competition laws, the relevance 
of market shares etc. But what we will focus on is the argumentation 
presented by Raleigh for their refusal to supply discount stores. The 
reason why, among the arguments presented by Raleigh, we will focus 
on the purely economic ones as effects on prices, sales, profits etc. is 
that we are concerned with the firm’s incentives to refuse supply, not 
the possible ways of justifying it in various legal frameworks.
In what follows we quote from a report by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (1981) and give in brackets the numbers of the 
passages quoted from.
Some of the arguments presented by Raleigh were:
1. A valuable brand image was developed and sustained by the se­
lective distribution system (3.10).
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2. A policy of competing on price (and producing to a low speci­
fication) cannot be successfully combined with a policy of sell­
ing primarily through specialist dealers (and producing to a high 
specification) (3.15).
3. Selling to discount stores would undermine the Raleigh brand 
image both with consumers and with its other retailers (3.19).
4. In Raleigh’s view, it was not uncommon for discount stores to 
sell goods as ’loss leaders’ [...]. Other retailers could not match 
these prices, therefore they would switch to selling other goods 
[...] (3.20).
5. Raleigh did not think it anti-competitive to seek to preserve ex­
isting specialist and technical distribution channels by trying to 
maintain general price levels consistent with the provision of good 
service [...] (although they emphasised the difference between this 
and retail price maintenance (3.22).
6. Raleigh said that it hoped, but could not guarantee, that the 
expanded network [of ’5 Star’ specialist dealers] would increase 
its total sales (3.28).
7. The safety image, Raleigh maintained, was reinforced if the bi­
cycle was sold through a specialist outlet [...] - and this had 
implications for the price (3.29).
The arguments quoted so far can essentially be summarised as follows: 
the selective distribution policy sustains the brand image. This enables 
dealers to charge relatively high prices. If, on the contrary, discount 
stores sell Raleigh bicycles as well these prices can no longer be main­
tained.
As argument no. 6 suggests the hope of an increase of sales due 
to a specialised distribution network is a rather vague one. The main 
point is that delivery to discount stores would result in price cuts. Why 
should Raleigh be concerned about these price cuts in the downstream
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market? Paragraphs (3.36) to (3.42) describe the reaction of specialised 
dealers to a change of distribution policy. This seems to be the main 
drawback.
Again, we quote the main points.
1. Raleigh represented that, if it were forced to supply discount 
stores [...] it would lose much of its dealers’ loyalty and good­
will. Many would desert Raleigh out of a feeling that Raleigh 
had deserted them [...]. Raleigh had built up its good will on the 
basis that it was pursuing the policy of selling through specialist 
dealers (3.37).
2. Raleigh argued that the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) had under­
estimated the probable reaction of Raleigh dealers and that more 
than 10 per cent of them would drop its bicycles if there were a 
change in distribution policy (3.38).
3. Such a reaction by dealers would be understandable because (apart 
from their feeling of being let down) they would face what they 
would regard as predatory selling (3.39).
4. When, in 1965, Raleigh sold bicycles to catalogue mail order 
houses Raleigh’s decision affected its trading relationship with, 
and its sales to, its dealers. Dealers’ allegiance had had to be 
carefully recultivated over the years (3.40).
Although our models do not address the quality issue raised by 
Raleigh 9 some of its features seem to be reflected by the main argu­
ments used by Raleigh that essentially amount to the following line of 
reasoning: if prices cannot be maintained in the downstream markets 
bicycle dealers will no longer buy Raleigh bicycles, at least they will 
not buy them at the prices Raleigh would like to ask for. Raleigh,
9The quality or brand image issue will, in fact, be raised by the majority of firms 
alleged of supply refusal. Hardly any of them would admit that their refusal is based on 
an output contraction strategy aiming at higher prices because such a statement would be 
detected immediately as anti-competitive and resulting in a reduction of consumer surplus 
and welfare. Defensive arguments used by firms before courts should be interpreted as 
such.
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expecting this reaction, does not supply discount stores although this 
would be, in itself, a profitable transaction.
We will now try to relate this reasoning to the question of an up­
stream firm’s commitment possibilities. Raleigh’s motivation for not 
’cheating’ can be related in particular to two approaches we modelled 
in this note. First, the possibility of future trading periods seems 
to be taken into account by Raleigh quite seriously. The situation 
is not viewed as a one shot game. Instead, future periods are vi­
tal for Raleigh’s strategic considerations. This makes ’not cheating’ 
a subgame-perfect equilibrium (section 3.1). Secondly, as the argu­
mentation put forward by Raleigh shows time has been needed and 
used to build up a reputation for not cheating (section 3.3). This rep­
utation would suffer from a change in distribution policy and, more 
importantly, the desire to acquire and maintain this reputation clearly 
is an important motivation for Raleigh to refrain from supplying other 
downstream firms.
In the light of the assumption made in (H-T) one would have ex­
pected Raleigh to supply the discount stores after having supplied the 
specialist dealers. The models presented in section 3 of this note suggest 
that, in various settings, this should not happen. The case presented 
goes farther than this. Raleigh is not only able to commit to a policy of 
monopolisation in the sense of supply refusal but it holds this strategy 
to be so much more profitable than supplying discount stores, that it 
undertakes much effort to defend this policy before the courts.
6 Conclusion
The assumption that vertical integration is the only way for an up­
stream firm to monopolise the downstream market is confronted with 
several specific settings that yield cooperative outcomes in the sense 
that firms can and do commit to monopolise the market without inte­
grating.
Cooperation arises as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if players al­
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ways expect a future trading period with positive probability. A set­
ting in which cooperation occurs as (unique) equilibrium in a finitely 
repeated game is the situation where the upstream firm incurs suffi­
ciently high cost c if it wants to supply other downstream firms (spe­
cific investments). In a setting of a finitely repeated game with incom­
plete information (commitment types) we show that firms may have 
incentives to build up a reputation of being cooperative. The outcome 
obtained is cooperation in all periods except for a limited number of 
periods towards the end of the game. Finally, it is pointed out that 
nonenforceable exclusive-dealing contracts can be substituted by vari­
ous other contracts which are enforceable.
Implications for the model by Hart and Tirole (1990) primarily con­
cern the results in the ’ex-post monopolisation variant’ where integra­
tion is presented as the only way for firms to achieve output contraction 
in a downstream market. However, our models do not imply that inte­
gration is equivalent to collusion of non-integrated firms. Such a claim 
would not hold for situations of scarce needs (variant 2 of H-T’s model) 
or scarce supply (variant 3).
For empirical evidence we analyzed a case against Raleigh. Some of 
Raleigh’s most important arguments can be related to models discussed 
in our paper. Possibilities of future trade and investments in reputation 
appear to be key elements determining Raleigh’s distribution policy.
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CHAPTER III
Network A ccess and Ownership Structure 1 
A bstract
Competition can be introduced to network related industries by giv­
ing competitors access to the network. When regulation requires that 
access prices are based on network operating costs there are generally 
incentives to misrepresent these costs. We analyze how these incen­
tives depend on the ownership structure of the industry, namely verti­
cal integration, vertical separation, and joint ownership. With a fixed 
number of downstream network users vertical separation is dominated 
by vertical integration which, in turn, is dominated by joint ownership. 
With entry this welfare ordering is reversed when incentives to deter 
entry become sufficiently strong. But the following result holds irre­
spective of whether or not entry is allowed for. If capital shares of joint 
owners are adjusted endogenously and optimally incentives to distort 
costs disappear entirely and highest welfare is obtained. Our analysis 
of the incentives for upstream and downstream investments amplifies 
these results. Finally, in the vertical integration case accounting sep­
aration turns out not to be an effective regulatory tool unless some 
rather restrictive assumptions are satisfied.
1 Introduction
We now turn from considerations of ownership and vertical integration 
per se to the impact of ownership in industries that are regulated due 
to the existence of a bottleneck facility.
In various industries like, for instance, telecommunications, gas or 
electricity supply, and railway transportation a single network is supe­
rior to competing network capacity because of the natural monopoly
1This chapter is based on Hardt and Sturmer (1995a).
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character 2 of the network related production or transmission process. 
Therefore, an attem pt to introduce competition into these industries 
requires that network access is granted to third parties.
So far, the relevant theory and politics have primarily been con­
cerned with the determination of the optimal access price that pro­
vides fair access conditions for new entrants and cost coverage for the 
incumbent (see Baumol (1994), Armstrong and Doyle (1994), Cave 
and Doyle (1994) etc.). Research along these lines has mainly treated 
access pricing in settings of complete information and vertical integra­
tion. 3 However, moral hazard (effort decision) and adverse selection 
(asymmetric information about costs of the network operator) induce 
inefficiencies that regulation is designed to minimise. And such inef­
ficiencies may depend to a large degree on the vertical structure of 
the industry. Laffont and Tirole (1993, 1994a), among others, take 
into account informational asymmetries but concentrate on vertically 
integrated settings.
Relatively little research, however, has been done on implications 
of ownership structures on access pricing and on the possibilities and 
incentives to discriminate among network users. This is somewhat 
surprising as network related industries which have been opened for 
competitive access actually show various patterns of vertical struc­
tures, i.e. they differ in the allocation of ownership rights between 
upstream (network operation) and downstream activities (e.g. provi­
sion of telecommunication services, power generation, train operation). 
These patterns differ not only across industries in the same country 
(e.g. telecommunications and railway industries in the UK: the former 
is vertically integrated, the latter is structurally separated) but they
2In some of the above industries the natural monopoly character may be questionable. 
In telecommunications, for example, new technological developments (optical fibre net­
works or radio links) now allow for competing networks even in the local area. For a more 
detailed discussion see, for instance, Baumol and Sidack (1994). In the discussion of this 
chapter our attention will be focused on the access problem in single network industries. 
Network duplication will be considered in chapter 4.
3 See Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) and Cave and Doyle (1994). For a sur­
vey on access pricing with special reference to ownership structures and informational 
asymmetries see Hardt and Sturmer (1995b).
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also differ across countries in one and the same industry (e.g. telecom­
munications in the UK and in the US). These differences do not appear 
to be the result of well understood differences in industry specific or 
country specific characteristics. Rather, there seems to be a consid­
erable amount of uncertainty as to the question of which ownership 
structure facilitates regulation of network related industries and serves 
best the aim of enhancing efficiency.
Moreover, the existing work taking into account different ownership 
structures has rarely considered informational asymmetries.
Among the few contributions treating implications of ownership 
there is a model in Vickers and Yarrow (1988). They distinguish ver­
tical separation - corresponding to non-integration in our terminology 
- and interconnection, i.e. partial integration, and analyze regulatory 
measures to prevent the incumbent from charging excessively high ac­
cess prices. It is argued that vertical separation does not enhance wel­
fare by itself because separation may lead to double marginalization. 
This problem does not appear under partial integration which may thus 
be more favourable if effective access price regulation leads to equal 
access conditions for non-integrated downstream firms. Asymmetric 
information about network operating costs is not taken into account.
Byg and Hardt (1995) analyze a simple network with links that 
may be owned by different firms which, in turn, may be separate or 
integrated. In this setting they investigate the effects of ownership and 
of the class of contracts permitted on equilibrium prices and on entry. 
Starting from this free market analysis they draw conclusions as to the 
informational requirements for the regulator in various settings. But 
private information about costs is not taken into account explicitly in 
the model.
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, p. 135 ff.) show in a sim­
ple model that, in a complete information setting, the optimal access 
price under vertical integration exceeds the one under vertical sepa­
ration. It is argued that under asymmetric information generally the 
same principles apply as under complete information; however, infor­
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mational asymmetries may have negative effects in the case of vertical 
integration because incentives to raise rivals’ costs arise. But a higher 
access price may, on the other hand, lead to less entry and therefore 
less duplication of fixed costs. The overall welfare effect of vertical 
integration is therefore ambiguous. It is also pointed out that some 
other aspects are of importance: the quality of access may depend on 
the vertical ownership structure; and so may the quality of information 
available to the regulator. Therefore, the careful conclusion drawn is 
that ’if vertical conduct regulation is difficult and if the benefits of com­
petition axe thought to be substantial, then structural remedies even 
at some cost in terms of scope economies may deserve examination’ 
(p. 162). Part of this analysis is based on (an earlier version of) a paper 
by Vickers (1995) that analyzes the effect of vertical integration in a 
setting of imperfect information about a (regulated) monopolist’s costs 
and imperfect competition in the downstream industry. The welfare 
effect of vertical integration is ambiguous because of the reason out­
lined above: the incentive for raising rivals’ costs may or may not be 
offset by the resulting lower degree of fixed cost duplication.
Alger and Braman (1993) 4 and Alger (1993) suggest a different 
ownership structure in the context of gas industries. They argue that 
competitive joint ventures induce competition sufficient to regulate 
some natural monopolies. The arguments showing efficiency of com­
petitive joint ventures are based on the assumptions of open ownership, 
independent marketing, and the ’use or lose’ rule. These assumptions 
prevent owners from restricting capacity in either stage of the produc­
tion process (network capacity or downstream services).
Their approach differs from the joint ownership version of this chap­
te r’s model in several ways. When we compare a setting of joint own­
ership to other ownership structures, we do not use the above com­
4Gale (1994) analyses a model which is similar to Alger and Braman, but a complete 
analysis of a price setting game capturing the main features of joint ventures is given. 
Informational asymmetries about costs of production, however, are mentioned among the 
caveats that remain. Lewis and Reynolds (1979) discuss informally a set of rules for 
competitive joint ventures which are similar to those analyzed by Alger and Braman.
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petitiveness assumptions. The network, in our joint ownership case, 
is owned by a fixed number of firms that are active in the down­
stream market. Also, we formally incorporate informational asymme­
tries about the cost of running the network. Alger and Braman argue 
that a new owner is better informed than the regulator and that, there­
fore, the problem of estimating the average costs (which are the basis 
for the access price) is ’not worse’ than the regulator’s problem of de­
termining the access price. We show how, in a setting where network 
operating costs are not enforceable, incentives to misrepresent costs 
can vanish completely.
In this chapter we analyze the impact of such informational asym­
metries under different ownership structures. In doing this we partly 
follow a suggestion by Laffont and Tirole to analyze the costs and ben­
efits of breakups in the light of the foreclosure literature such as the 
models by Bolton and Whinston (1993) and Hart and Tirole (1990). 5 
Our approach differs from the models by Laffont and Tirole in that we 
take into account different ownership structures of the network related 
industry. Further, we do not design optimal contracts for the regu­
lated firm. The question we analyze is rather in how far problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection can be minimised by implementing 
an appropriate ownership structure: suppose the regulated monopolist 
is required to provide network access on the basis of per unit costs.6 
Then, given the assumed informational asymmetries, the network op­
erating firm has incentives to exploit its informational advantage by 
misrepresenting costs with the help of accounting manipulations (’cost 
padding’, etc.) in order to defend higher access charges. If there is an 
ownership structure under which these incentives are small or even zero 
(and we will show that such cases do exist) the role of the regulatory au­
thority in fixing and controlling the access price would be marginalised, 
once the appropriate ownership structure has been established.
In contrast to the vertical integration models by Hart and Tirole
5See Laffont and Tirole (1993), p.267, footnote 9.
6 We do not deal with the question of the optimal allocation of total costs to network 
users. For an overview on cost allocation see Cave and Mills (1992).
51
and by Bolton and Whinston cited above we assume the upstream mo­
nopolist to be regulated and also we allow for more general ownership 
structures than non-integration and partial integration. Joint own­
ership in our analysis means that the downstream firms own capital 
shares (adding up to one) in the upstream firm.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an 
overview of the ownership structures we are going to consider and ex­
amples for their occurrence in various industries. The basic model is 
presented in section 3. Section 4 solves for equilibrium quantities, prof­
its, and access prices under the assumption that the regulatory tool of 
accounting separation is sufficient to prevent the incumbent firm from 
discriminating against a competitor by means of unequal access (con­
trollability). This assumption is dropped in section 5. Welfare impli­
cations of partial integration, non- integration and joint ownership are 
given in both of these sections. Sections 6 and 7 contain extensions of 
the model: in section 6 the roles of downstream and upstream invest­
ments are analyzed; section 7 investigates the impact of entry on the 
equilibrium allocation and on welfare. Section 8 contains some con­
cluding remarks on implications of our findings for regulatory policy 
and suggestions for further research. In the appendix we discuss some 
arguments concerning the effectiveness of accounting separation as a 
regulatory tool.
2 Ownership Structures in Partly D eregulated  
Industries: Som e E xam ples
Although open access provision is a widely used means for the introduc­
tion of competition to network related industries there are significant 
differences in the ownership structures that have been implemented in 




In order to guarantee equal network access for the downstream firms 
the former vertically integrated monopolist has to divest from its down­
stream activities. The most famous example is the deregulation of the 
American telecommunications market where the Modification of Fi­
nal Judgement (MFJ) led to the divestiture of AT&T from the local 
telephone companies in 1984.
2.2 Partial integration
A less drastic step is to keep the vertically integrated structure intact,
i.e. the upstream monopolist competes on the downstream market 
while giving at least one competitor access to the network.
Existing deregulation patterns applied in such settings of partial 
integration can be distinguished by the extent to which the upstream 
firm is able to discriminate against competitors by charging unequal ac­
cess prices. The European Commission’s approach, for instance, is to 
prescribe access prices to be cost based and non-discriminatory which 
requires separate accounting for the upstream and downstream activi­
ties of the integrated firm. This applies not only to telecommunications 
but also to other industries like railway and the energy sector.
The British telecommunications regulator Oftel, in 1984, intended 
to follow a more liberal approach: the determination of access prices 
and conditions of using British Telecom’s local telephone network were 
subject to negotiations between BT and Mercury. Only now the regu­
latory authority is departing from this approach after continuous com­
plaints by Mercury about discriminatory pricing and non-pricing ac­
tivities by BT. Now BT is forced to account for its network business 
separately from its retail activities. Further, BT must publish cost- 
based charges for access to specific services needed by competitors that 
require access to the BT network (see Oftel (1994)).
We will refer to these two ways of organising a partially integrated 
firm by the term partial integration with accounting separation and
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without accounting separation. Both structures will turn out to dif­
fer in their welfare implications only if a rather strong assumption is 
satisfied, namely controllability. We denote the case of partial integra­
tion with effective accounting separation (i.e. accounting separation 
under controllability) by ’P / ’ and distinguish it from the case without 
accounting separation ’P / ^ ’ which includes the case of accounting sep­
aration without controllability. We define the notion of controllability 
in the following way.
Definition 1 Controllability of access prices is given if  and only if  the 
regulator can induce the integrated firm  to base the choice o f down­
stream output on the officially published access price.
Assuming controllability implies that firms always act as if access 
costs were identical for both downstream firms. In this setting, firms 
are symmetric not only as far as accounting is concerned but also as 
far as output choices are concerned. We show later that the controlla­
bility assumption plays a crucial role in the assessment of accounting 
separation as a policy tool to provide fair access conditions and also in 
the assessment of the welfare implications of partial integration.
2.3 Joint ownership
Another possible concept for the introduction of downstream compe­
tition is the common ownership of the network by the downstream 
firms. A few examples can be found in private sector industries. The 
oil pipeline industry in the United States as well as in Europe are ex­
amples where there are joint ventures in which several firms, usually 
oil companies, own a percentage of the pipeline stock often propor­
tional to anticipated usage or joint ventures in which each participant 
owns directly, and therefore has the right to make use of, a percent­
age of pipeline capacity (see Hillman (1991)). A similar arrangement 
was introduced to deepwater ports in the US (see Lewis and Reynolds 
(1979)).
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But this kind of ownership structure does not yet seem to have been 
adopted by regulatory authorities. 7
One of the aims of the model we are going to present is to contrast 
welfare implications of joint ownership with those of other ownership 
structures. We identify conditions under which joint ownership socially 
dominates partial integration and/or non-integration, and vice versa.
Joint ownership, of course, allows for different ways of allocating 
control over the assets to the joint owners. In our specific context, con­
trol will be equivalent to the decision about the access charge (cost 
signal). Here, we will use the majority rule (see Hart and Moore 
(1990)) where the downstream firm with the highest capital share in 
the network operating firm chooses the access charge. Alternatively, 
the charge could, for example, be determined jointly by the weighted 
average of the downstream firms’ choices. For m  downstream firms the 
signal would then be given by s =  ]C2=i Pis* where //,- is the share of 
downstream firm i in the upstream firm, and <s» is the
cost signal given by firm i. The interpretation in the latter case would 
be that a firm’s relative bargaining power in the determination process 
of the access charge largely corresponds to the share in the network 
operator’s capital held by this firm.
A question we want to analyze is whether or not joint ownership 
structures similar to those in the private sector present a desirable 
allocation of ownership rights in regulated industries.
3 The M odel
The presentation of the model will be followed by a number of justifi­
cations of some of the assumptions.
7Although it is true that the National Grid Company (NGC) in the UK is jointly owned 
by the Regional Electricity Companies (REC) this does not constitute a counter example 
to the above claim. This is because generators other than the REC are the main group of 
firms that need access to the NGC’s transmission network (high tension) but do not have 
ownership shares in the NGC. Further, the REC need access to the NGC’s network only 
for a part of their business, namely for the supply of large customers in other areas. For 
a detailed presentation of the electricity industry see Armstrong et al. (1994), Littlechild 
(1994), and Newbery (1994).
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The network is operated by the upstream firm U. Downstream 
Cournot duopolists D \, D 2 have access to the network at a price that 
depends on the extent of usage of the network (s per unit). We compare 
three different ownership structures:
1. Non-integration (NI): the three firms are owned separately (com­
plete divestiture of the downstream activities).
2. Partial Integration (PI): the upstream firm is also active in the 
downstream market, i.e. integrated with one downstream firm, 
D\ say. Effective accounting separation (i.e. the controllabil­
ity assumption holds) is denoted by PI while the cases of non - 
accounting separation and accounting separation without control­
lability are denoted by P I N.
3. Joint Ownership (JO): the upstream firm is owned by the two 
downstream firms (proportions //, 1 — fi). The majority rule ap­
plies for the choice of the cost signal.
We do not need to analyze explicitly the monopolistic case where an 
integrated firm supplies the whole market. The timing of the game is 
as follows:
Figure 1
t = 0 t = 1 t =  2
Network ~Cournot competi-
State 0 6 (0; oo), opera or gives sig tion downstream.
n j-, v j  nal about costs.u r ,  realized.
Upstream per unit operating costs axe given by a random parameter 
0  which is distributed on (0; oo) according to an arbitrary distribution 
function, -F(-). Cost parameter 0 is realised in period t = 0 and is
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observable by upstream and downstream 8 firms but not verifiable.
The network operating firm is required to give access to the network 
at per unit costs.9 In t = 1, a signal about cost parameter 0 is given 
by the network operating firm, i.e. U under NI, {17, D \}  under PI, and 
D{ with fii >  |  under JO. We assume this signal can be either the 
true one, or a fixed amount A > 0 can be added to the incurred costs: 
5(0) 6 {0,0 +  A}. If a signal s ^  0 is given firm U incurs costs K  > 0 
(accounting manipulations). This assumption merely aids intuition but 
is in no way essential; the whole analysis remains true for K  =  0.
Firms D \ , D 2 choose their output levels in t — 2. Downstream per 
unit production costs are denoted by d\ and di respectively. The final 
goods market is imperfectly competitive which is reflected by Cournot 
competition in our model. Demand for the downstream product is 
given by a linear downward sloping function p(Q) = a — bQ.
A few remarks may be in order as further justification for some of 
the above assumptions.
Firstly, cost misrepresentations may be achieved by allocating com­
mon costs or even downstream costs to the network. A building may 
be used for the administration of upstream and downstream opera­
tion. The same technical or managerial staff may be involved in the 
provision of services in the competitive as well as in the monopolistic 
segment. Therefore, there are always some degrees of freedom in the 
determination of the network operating costs, a phenomenon that is 
well known to all those who are involved in, or acquainted with, the 
discussion about access deficit contributions etc.
Further, The parameter A can be interpreted as kind of a proxy 
variable for the seriousness of the moral hazard problem. Allowing for
8 Observability of 6 by downstream firms is necessary for the Nash equilibrium under 
P I N (section 5). The intuition is that all firms active in the industry know the true costs 
of operating the network but they cannot prove this to a third party (regulator).
9 Different suggestions as to the optimal access price have been made in the literature. 
These range from average or marginal costs, or even lower values as in Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988), to concepts including opportunity costs (efficient component pricing by Baumol 
and Sidack (1994)); see also Armstrong et al. (1994) on this point. What we need to 
assume here is only that some fixed compensation per unit can be charged and that this 
compensation is required to be based on the network operator’s costs.
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optimal cost misrepresentation in the sense that the network operator 
is able to choose A from a continuum would complicate the analysis 
considerably without any obvious advantage or additional insight. We 
aim at choosing the simplest model that allows us to analyze the incen­
tives for cost misrepresentations. Giving the network operator a binary 
choice accomplishes this task.
We chose an additive distortion although there is a variety of ways 
of modelling cost misrepresentations. One could, for instance, think 
about multiplicative distortions. Then, firms would turn out to cheat 
for high values of $ (given K  is fixed) instead of for low values as in 
our model. But results remain qualitatively the same in that the same 
ownership structures as in our model turn out to be more vulnerable to 
non-truth-telling, i.e. the welfare ordering we establish is not affected. 
If K  depends on the size of the distortion the range of parameters for 
which cheating occurs depends crucially on the specification of the cost 
function K (A). This seems to be rather arbitrary. As no additional 
insight seemed to be obtained from these modelling alternatives we 
decided to use the fixed additive distortion for our model.
Regulation is modelled in a similarly simple way. Our concern here 
is not to inquire how the regulator may best use the available tools 
(menus of contracts etc.) in order to minimise the moral hazard prob­
lem but rather to analyze the impact or ownership given the regulatory 
policy of cost-based pricing. Underlying this argument there is kind of 
a continuity assumption in the sense that the welfare ordering we will 
establish for a given policy remains the same when a larger set of tools 
is available. A richer set of tools may enable the regulator to extract 
some of the informational rent but there appears to be no plausible rea­
son to assume that the welfare ordering would be affected. However, 
we will provide some arguments later on, i.e. in conjunction with the 
relevant propositions, why we think that some ownership structures 
are inherently more biased towards non-truth-telling strategies than 
others.
We now analyze the model conditional on ownership structures.
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4 Equilibrium  w ithout D iscrim ination
In this section we assume that under partial integration the integrated 
firm is required to publish access prices and to publish separate ac­
counts for its upstream and for its downstream activities. We further 
assume that the regulator is able to make sure that the integrated firm 
produces the output which is profit maximising under the published 
access price, i.e. we assume controllability. This assumption is made 
here in order to demonstrate what one needs to assume if some of the 
arguments frequently put forward in the discussion and informal liter­
ature on access pricing and, especially, on accounting separation are to 
be true. We will argue in section 5 that the assumption is unrealistic 
and analyze the model without assuming controllability.
4.1 The game
Under any of the above ownership structures, in equilibrium, the Cournot 
quantities are traded in the downstream market. Total downstream op­
erating costs for Di are given by c* =  +  s(8 ). 10 The unique Nash
equilibrium in t =  2 is characterised by output levels
a — a(0} — ‘Id: -4- d:
which implies that profits are given by
* 1 fa  — s(0 ) — 2 di -f dj \  2
Xi =  b \ ----------- 3-------------)
in t — 2. For a given ownership structure this equilibrium is unique. 
But equilibrium quantities and profits vary across ownership structures 
because the cost signal s does, as we will see.
Signals about costs are given in t =  1. We can now determine
the conditions under which it is optimal for the upstream firm to mis­
represent costs. This is the case whenever the total profit from the 
non-truth-telling strategy exceeds the total cost incurred by adopting
10Note that under the assumptions of this section both firms, Di  and D 2 , are charged 
the same access price: s i(0 ) =  3 2 (B) =  s(B).
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this strategy. The latter is given simply by K  for the case of NI but 
with PI or JO downstream losses have to be taken into account. There­
fore, for the ownership structures in question, one obtains the following 
conditions: 11
N I: A (qi + q2) > K  (2)
P I :  A {qi + q2) > I< + tt^ O) -  + A )  (3)
JO : fiiA(qi +  q2) > \lxK  +  7Ti(0) -  7Ti(0 +  A) (4)
where (fii > | )  denotes the larger capital share of the two downstream 
firms, D\ say (w.l.o.g.). tti(s) denotes firm D \s  downstream profit 
when cost signal s is given. In t =  1, therefore, s =  0 +  A is chosen 
whenever the relevant condition (2)-(4) is satisfied, and s =  6  obtains 
otherwise. The natural question arising here is if it is possible to infer 
from conditions (2) - (4) whether or not non-truth-telling strategies are 
more worthwhile under some ownership structures than under others. 
We pursue this question in the following subsection.
4.2 W elfare im plications
In what follows we adhere to the welfare notion based on the sum of 
producer and consumer surplus (all results remain true for a weighted 
sum) which implies that welfare is higher for higher output levels or, 
equivalently, for lower output prices. As output and prices in our model 
are contingent on the cost parameter 9 we use expected prices and 
output as welfare indicators 12.
In this setting the following proposition can be stated.
11 We assume that upstream and downstream profits are valued equally although up­
stream profits are not payable to shareholders in the form of dividends and do not appear 
on the balance sheet as they are ’hidden’ by cost misrepresentations. This equivalent 
treatment, however, might be justified if one takes into account the ’dividend puzzle’: 
the value of a firm and therefore of its shares does not depend on the amount paid as a 
dividend (see Black (1984)).
12This welfare definition is equivalent to that of expected consumer surplus only if the 
variances of the prices p(a)  (given some ownership structure <r) satisfy some regularity 
conditions. For the sake of tractability, however, we identify highest welfare with lowest 
expected output prices.
60
Proposition  1 Given that the integrated downstream firm is not too 
inefficient (d\ < d2 +  the following welfare ranking holds. Un­
der jo in t ownership welfare is higher than under partial integration fo r  
any distribution o f ownership shares p 6 [ ,^ 1). Under partial integra­
tion welfare is higher than under non-integration . For sym ­
m etric firm s (d\ — d2) highest welfare is attained fo r  JO with p \ — | . 13
Proof. The difference in downstream profits in (3) and (4) can be 
written as
/a\ ra i a \  ^A a — 6 — 2 d i + d 2 A2„ ( * ) _ * , ( *  +  * )  =  — ------------3-------------- w
Substituting equilibrium outputs q* from (1) into (2) - (4) yields 
that non-truth-telling occurs if and only if 9 does not exceed a critical 
limit 5(cr) for ownership structure cr £ { N I ,  PI ,  (JO] /<i)}:
N I : <? <  S (N I)  := a -  A -  !(<*, +  d2) -  ^  (5)
PI : «  < 5 ( / > / ) : = a - A - i ( 5 d 2 - d , ) - f (6)
JO : 9 < S(JO, f t i )  (7)
where
S ( J O , p i) := a —A — —Yy[A + di(3^i —4)-f d2(3/<i+2) +  - ^ ~ — ].
It is easy to see that S ( N I )  > S ( PI )  obtains whenever
, , , 36/\ +  A 2
d' < d2+  3A ‘
Similarly, S (P I)  > S (J O ,p i) holds for all p\ in the relevant range
(a*i ^ anc^ n0  ^ surprisingly, equality holds for p\ = 1.
Let s (9 , a) denote the signal that is given in state 9 when the owner­
ship structure is cr £ {NI ,  PI ,  {JO, p i)}. These signals and the critical 
values S(a)  are illustrated in figure 2.
13For obvious reasons of symmetry any of firms D \ ,  D 2 can choose the cost signal.
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Figure 2
S(JO ) S (P I)  S (N I)
Because of S(N 1) > S (P I ) ^  S{JO] fjt\ ) the probability of misrep- 
resenting costs are highest under non-integration, lower under partial 
integration, and lowest under joint ownership.
Denoting by F(-) the distribution function of 0, the probability of 
misrepresenting costs under ownership structure o is given by F (S(a)). 
From S (N I)  > S (P I) > S (JO ;fii) it follows immediately that
F (S (N I))  > F (S (P I))  > F (S(JO ;fii)).
This implies that expected access charges satisfy:
£ K - ) | NI] > £ K ) I  PI] > £W -)I JO].
Using (1) we obtain
E[q‘ I NI] < E{q-1 PI] < E[q*I JO], i =  1,2.
This is because output levels are linear in s(-). But, as higher expected 
total output implies lower expected prices, the result follows.
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It remains to be shown that, in case of joint ownership and sym­
metric firms, highest welfare is attained for // =  To see this is true 
it is sufficient to note that for d\ = d>2 (7) simplifies to
cr rr\ \  j  a  QfiibK -f A2
W * )  = = « - * -  A -  A(6Atl_ 2)
and therefore
dS(JO , h i) 18bKA +  6A3
d^i [A(6/ii -  2)]2 >
always holds. This implies that S  is minimised for the lowest value of 
fii in the relevant parameter range, i.e. at /xj =
Q.E.D.
At first sight it might be surprising that such a clear cut welfare 
ranking can be established and, in fact, different conclusions will be ob­
tained once we allow for entry. But the intuition for the result in this 
setting here is plain. Basically, there is a conflict between upstream 
interests, i.e. high revenues from access charges, and downstream in­
terests, i.e. low access charges. A non-integrated network operator has 
upstream interests only and has thus highest incentives to charge high 
access prices. An integrated firm has to balance the upstream incen­
tives to charge high prices with the downstream interest in having low 
access charges and therefore low marginal costs. Under joint ownership, 
finally, there are full downstream interests to be taken into account but 
only a share \li in the upstream profits is being considered. Therefore 
the setting of joint ownership performs better than partial integration 
for any /*i < 1 and best for smallest shares of the firm choosing the cost 
signal, i.e. fii =  | .  The full intuition for this last point will become 
clear after the analysis in the section on efficient outcomes.
Efficient outcom es
A question arising here is in how far ownership structures can induce 
efficient behaviour in the sense that distortions disappear entirely and 
the welfare maximising access price 0 is charged. We will, in fact, 
describe such a setting in what follows.
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For the sake of clearer intuition we now allow for m  downstream 
firms. Each of them initially holds a capital share /t,-, YXLi /*,• =  1, 
in the upstream firm. Further, we modify our basic model in the fol­
lowing way. Firstly, in order to avoid zero share prices, we assume 
that the regulator allows the upstream firm to charge an access price 
that equals the costs of giving access plus a limited amount of profit 
per unit, say 9 +  e. Such arrangements are actually quite common in 
regulated industries14. Secondly, capital shares will be adjusted after 
competition. Timing, therefore, is as follows. The cost parameter 0 is 
realised in period t =  0. In t =  1, the cost signal is given. The major­
ity rule is used in the sense that the downstream firm with the highest 
capital share gives the cost signal.15 The access price now consists of 
the sum of the cost signal and the allowed profit: s +  e, 5 6 +  A}.
Figure 3
t = 2
t =  0 t =  1
0  s q* //* dividends
Period t = 2 is subdivided into three stages as shown in figure 3. 
In stage 1 output decisions are taken. In stage 2 the capital shares of 
the downstream firms may be adjusted according to a rule that has 
been specified by the regulator in advance. 16 This rule specifies the 
amounts of capital to be transferred between firms and the price at 
which these shares are traded, both, of course, conditional on realised
14Average revenue regulation. See Armstrong et al. (1994), pp. 69-72 and p. 178.
15The choice of decision rule here will turn out not to be crucial because, as we will 
show, none of the downstream firms has any incentive for non-truth-telling. Therefore, 
any firm can be asked to give the signal.
16An arrangement along these lines has been advocated by Lewis and Reynolds (1979) 
(for a setting of complete information). They describe a situation where capital shares are 
adjusted on a yearly basis according to ’throughput shares’. This is cited as one out of a 
set of competitive rules which the Department of Justice designed for deepwater ports.
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output. Finally, the upstream firm pays dividends to the downstream 
firms. Total dividends equal the amount of profit the upstream firm 
has been able to make under the pricing constraint imposed by the 
regulator.
Note that for m  =  2 and e =  0 our basic model evolves as a spe­
cial case with the only difference that we now allow for an ex post 
adjustment of capital shares.
In this setting the following efficiency result is obtained.
Proposition 2 If the regulator adjusts capital shares according to the 
following rule
QiPi  : =      , i  =
9l +  • * * +  <7m
and if  the upstream f irm ’s capital is traded at a price that equals the 
profit it is allowed to make, i.e. pu =  e • (<7i +  • • • +  qm) 
then
1. no firm  has incentives fo r  non truth-telling strategies, i.e. to 
choose an access price different from  0 +  e, and
2. if  an access price higher than 0 +  e were charged this would not 
affect the f irm s’ output decisions.
Proof. To see why part 2 of the proposition holds one just has to 
write down the maximisation problem of firm i. Suppose a signal s € 
{i9,9 +  A} is charged. Denote by 7r™(s) the profit of firm i when there 




7r™(s) +  Pi • (s — 0 +  e)Q 
-  &  -  Vi)eQ + ( t ;  -  -  0 + e)Q\,Q r '’ ^ '<3
where the first two terms represent downstream profit and the share in 
the upstream profits given the initial capital share pi and the last two 
expressions show the price paid for the adjustment of capital and the
65
dividend received in return. We now simplify the algebra taking into 
account that w(s) = (a — bQ — s — d)qi implies
*?($  +  A) =  7rf(0 ) -  A®.
Then, for the case s(0) = 0-f A, the above maximisation problem turns 
out to be equivalent to the firm’s maximisation problem in the absence 
of cost misrepresentations, i.e. s(0 ) =  0  :
max x ? ( 0 ) +  tutQ
The cost signal has cancelled out. Therefore, output decisions are 
no longer affected by cost misrepresentations.
We now show that no firm has an incentive, if entitled to do so, to 
choose an access price different from 0 +  e (part 1). Suppose firm i is 
choosing the cost signal s(0). It knows that the choice of this signal will 
not affect output decisions. Taking into account the capital adjustment 
in period 2, choosing s =  0 -f A would be profitable if and only if
n  * m  \
I  ■ A • ( E  9 i)  >  v  K  +  <  W  -  i ? { 9  +  A).
The left - hand side of this inequality equals A • ®; the right - hand 
side equals fiK  +  A • ®. This is because quantity choices are not af­
fected by the imposition of higher access charges s(0) =  0 +  A (follows 
from part 2 of this proposition). Therefore, it is never profitable for 
any downstream firm to charge higher access prices. If accounting ma­
nipulations are costless (K  =  0) the firm would be indifferent between 
s(0) =  0 and s(0) =  0 + A (and, in fact, any other access charge).
Q.E.D.
R em ark  1
Jf. Note that the price at which shares must be traded is verifiable. It 
depends on c only, the component o f U's profit that is known to 
and fixed by the regulator.
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2. The cost signal cancels out but e does not. Equilibrium output is 
qiven by
a - 9 - d  2
m  + 1  m -f
which implies that a higher e would restrict output. But e is chosen 
by the regulator who is aware of this effect.
3. Output is restricted by an amount e and is therefore inde­
pendent of the initial distribution of capital shares pi.
The intuition behind the above proposition is the following: if the 
capital shares equal the respective output shares a downstream loss 
due to a higher access charge would exactly be recovered via the share 
in the upstream profit.
This is the borderline case in which the role of a regulator in choos­
ing and controlling access prices would be marginalised.
An argument put forward frequently against a joint ownership con­
cept is that it might facilitate collusive behaviour (see17 Reitman (1994) 
and references given there). One might suppose that firms agree to 
choose a high cost signal in order to reduce total output. The follow­
ing corollary states that this is not the case in our setting.
C oro llary  1 Under joint ownership with optimally adjusted ownership 
shares firms cannot commit to restrict total output by choosing a high 
cost signal. Joint ownership, therefore, does not induce collusion.
The proof of this corollary is simply this: suppose firms Di agree to 
choose a high cost signal. (It is irrelevant here if one takes s =  ^ + A o r ,  
for instance, s such that a share of the monopoly quantity is produced 
by each downstream firm Di). Then it follows immediately from part 
(2) of the previous proposition that downstream output is not affected 
(as the additional costs are recouped via access charges).
Therefore, to substantiate the claim that joint ownership induces 
collusion one would have to find different mechanisms that may be
17The antitrust literature on essential facilities pursues this point, see for instance Reif- 
fen and Kleit (1990) and references given there.
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activated by JO. But JO does not represent in itself a commitment 
device helping firms to monopolise the market. But it is essential that 
capital shares are adjusted optimally. Otherwise, collusion arises in 
equilibrium and incentives to misrepresent costs exist. In this case of 
exogenous shares one would have to find different mechanisms to solve 
the problem.
On the other hand, although the adjustment rule must be imple­
mented, i.e. capital shares must be endogenous this does not imply 
that adjustments take place in equilibrium. In fact, as the following 
corollary states this is not the case in a symmetric setting.
Corollary 2 If there are m  sym m etric downstream firm s (identical 
production costs) with initial capital shares pi =  and
the regulator implements the rule described in the previous proposition  
then no capital adjustments occur in equilibrium.
Interestingly, the findings of this chapter correspond closely to ar­
rangements adopted in the following two settings. Firstly, as reported 
in Hillman (1991), the guideline often agreed upon in the oil industry 
is that each firm using the pipeline network should hold a capital share 
in the network operator that would equal the anticipated output share. 
Secondly, similar arrangements have been described for deepwater ports 
by Lewis and Reynolds quoted above. So the above proposition pro­
vides a welfare based rationale for such practices and establishes the 
exact timing (of competition, adjustment, and dividends) under which 
these arrangements are optimal.
5 Equilibrium  w ith  discrim ination
There are two obvious cases from which discriminatory access pricing 
could arise, namely the cases where there is either accounting sepa­
ration but no controllability or no accounting separation at all. The 
former case seems to be the more subtle but also the more interest­
ing one and will therefore be fully analyzed in what follows. We will
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then be able to argue that both cases, perhaps surprisingly, lead to 
equivalent outcomes.
5.1 A ccounting separation w ithout controllability
Dropping the assumption of controllability implies that, under PI, the 
integrated firm is now free to choose its profit maximising output. 
Taking into account that, due to accounting separation, the official 
access prices for both firms are identical and given by the cost signal 




(a -  6(?i +  q2) -  s -  di)qi +  (s -  0 )(qx +  g2)] (8)
where the second term represents the additional (upstream) profit that 
arises whenever cost signal s = 0 +  A is given in period 1. Firm D 2 
maximises profits given cost signal s:
max(a — b(qi — q2) — s — d2)#2.
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Equilibrium output levels are then given by
c l -f- s — “H c?2 — 20
91 = ------------ 36-------------
and
a — 2  ^— 2d2 -\- d\ -f" 0
92 = ------------ 36------------- •
This implies that, for s =  0, we have qi — and, for s = 0 + A,
we obtain
c l — 0 — 2d\ -j- d2 A
91 =  36 + 36
and
c l — 0 — 2d2 -}“ d\ 2A
92 =  36 36'
Rem ark 2 Under PI  without controllability a higher access charge in­
duces asym m etric output levels in favour o f the network owner and 
reduces total output.
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In t =  1 the integrated firm chooses the signal about the cost ob­
served in t =  0. It is profitable to misrepresent costs whenever
Aq 2 > K  +  Ti(0,O) -  7ri(0,0  +  A) (9)
where 7Ti(si, s2) denotes firm D[s profit when the signal s,- is charged 
to firm Di.
W elfare im plications
In the absence of effective accounting separation new incentives for 
charging higher access prices arise. The possibility of discrimination 
provides a second motive for raising access charges above true costs. 
Not only does this strategy generate profits for the upstream division 
but it also raises the rival’s operating costs. Unless the competitor is 
too inefficient discrimination can be shown to lead to lowest welfare. 
This is made precise in the following proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  3 In a setting where downstream firm s’ marginal pro­
duction costs d\ , d2 satisfy d2 < d\ — partial integration without 
accounting separation yields lowest welfare:
P I N -< N I.
The intuition for this result and for the parameter restriction im­
posed on costs are as follows. As the controllability assumption is not 
satisfied the integrated firm {[/, D \)  is able to charge s — 0 +  A and 
thereby to collect additional revenues Aq2 and, at the same time, to 
obtain an advantage in the downstream market by raising the rival’s 
costs. Only if the rival’s market share is too small the revenue from 
high access charges become too small compared to the revenue in the 
non-integration case. This case is excluded by the restriction on costs 
which should not be viewed as too strong. In fact, the same result 
obtains in various different versions of the model. It is sufficient, for 
instance, to model the cost of misrepresentation as a per unit cost in
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which case (9) becomes (A — K)q 2 > ni(9-,0) — 7Ti(0, 0 -f A) and the 
same conclusion obtains. Alternatively, one may consider a symmetric 
setting with more than one rival firm.
Proof. Under P I N downstream profits contingent on the signals 
charged are given by
1 (a  — 0  — 2 di +  d2 \  2
fl-i(M) = \ { a ~  3 )
and
f a  a  x w  I  {<* —  2di — 0  +  d 2 +  A ^ 2ni(6,9 + A) =  -  ^-------------   )
which implies
, , , , 2A a -  9 -  2di +  d2 A 2
* > ('•* ) +  A ) -  - T -------------w
Again, condition (9) can be shown to be satisfied if and only if 0 does 
not exceed a critical value S ( P I N) where
S ( P I N) = a -  
v 7 5 5A
A comparison with (5) shows that S ( N I )  < S ( P I N) under the as­
sumptions on costs made above. The remainder of the proof is iden­
tical to the last part of the proof of proposition 1: a higher critical 
value implies higher probabilities of cost misrepresentation which, in 
turn, implies higher expected cost signals and therefore lower expected 
output and higher price level, i.e. lower welfare.
Q.E.D.
This confirms that, under regularity conditions, discrimination has the 
expected negative effects on welfare.
5.2 Equilibrium w ithout accounting separation
If there is no accounting separation at all there would be no reason for 
the integrated firm to calculate its profits on the basis of the cost signal 
(possibly s =  9 -f A) but it would always assess its own costs by using 
the observed parameter 0 :
max (a -  b(qx +  q2) -  9 -  d1 )q1 -f (s -  0 )q2.
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But this problem is equivalent to (8). Therefore, accounting separation 
does not affect the integrated firm’s decision problem as long as there 
is no controllability.
The intuition behind this result is simple: the integrated firm re­
alises that accounting separation will result in a mere transfer pay­
ment from D\ to U without affecting the downstream behaviour at all. 
Therefore, the welfare obtained under accounting separation without 
controllability is the same as in the case without accounting separation.
The previous proposition demonstrates how crucial the controlla­
bility assumption is for political recommendation: only if the regulator 
can enforce that {U, Di} base their output decision on the published ac­
cess price, i.e. controllability holds, partial integration dominates N I.  
Otherwise, partial integration is equivalent to P I N and thus worse 
than N I  which would, of course, be a strong argument in favour of 
divestiture.
The fact that the profit of the integrated firm is not affected by 
accounting separation may well explain the way in which BT reacted 
to the introduction of accounting separation. Instead of the usual op­
position to Oftel’s regulatory demands BT approved claims to separate 
accounts. ”BT condemned Oftel’s ’costly increase in regulation’. But 
Mr Michael Hepher, BT managing director, has assured Oftel of BT’s 
co-operation in the introduction of accounting separation which will 
apply from this financial year.”18
Given the above findings this consent is not surprising.
6 Investm ent D ecisions
The following two subsections deal with investment decisions taken by 
either upstream or downstream firms. We analyze how incentives to 
invest vary under different ownership structures.
18Financial Times 9/3/1994.
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6.1 Downstream  Investm ent
We model downstream investments as follows: firm Di chooses an 
investment level ti which reduces its constant marginal costs: c; =  
Si +  d — et- 19 where s,- is the signal given by the network owner to firm
i. In order to concentrate on asymmetries resulting from ownership in­
duced differences in investment incentives we assume that downstream 
firms are symmetric as far as initial production costs are concerned: 
di — c?2 =  d. Di incurs investment cost (or ’disutility in monetary 
units’) given by an increasing and convex function ^ (e t). In what fol­
lows we take ip(e) =  |e 2.
We assume that the cost signal is known before investment decisions 
are taken. This timing reflects that access charges are determined for 
long periods and are regarded as given when firms invest. The timing 
is therefore as follows:
Figure 4 
t = 0 t = 2 t =  3
0  realized.
Network opera­








We first solve the last two stages of this game for NI. In t =  3 we 
obtain
NI a — s — d +  2et- — ej
=  36 J <10)
and, in t =  2 ,
4
Gj ~  9b
resulting in output levels
- * - < * )  ( i i )
19This assumption of constant marginal costs being reduced by the amount of effort 
undertaken is quite common in the literature, for instance Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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We now analyze the case of JO which will yield the results for PI as 
a special case, i.e. by setting fi\ =  l .20 Given JO firm ZVs decision 
problem in t =  2 is given by
max7rt(e,-, ej) +  — 0)[tft(e*, ej )  +  <7j(e j, et)] — ^ e 2, * =  1,2, i ^  j .
e« z
This results in
e‘ °  =  9 6 ^ 4 (“ “  * “  <*) +  “  W X ' “  0)-
For the case of PI, i.e. fi\ =  1 and /Z2 =  0, this implies 
=  96^ “ - 4 -< 0  +  9 6 ^ (5 - * )
and
e? 7 =  . (a — s — d) — (s — 0)2 96 — 4 ' 96 — 4 '
Given these results we can conclude that
1. If truth-telling occurs (5 =  0) incentives to invest are identical 
under all ownership structures.
2. Non-truth-telling (3 =  0+ A) results in lower levels of total invest­
ment levels under all ownership structures. This makes ownership 
structures under which cheating tends to occur even more ineffi­
cient.
3. In case of PI: even though there may be controllability and there­
fore output levels based on the given cost signal (instead of true 
costs) there are asymmetric investment incentives. The reason 
is simple: although, in t =  3, {£/,D \} cannot take into account 
the upstream profit (arising from ’cheating’) it can do so when 
choosing investment levels. By investing more in t =  2 a higher 
output (due to higher investment and therefore lower marginal 
costs) will be justified in t = 3. Thus, the barrier to cheating that
20Formally, one also obtains the above results for NI by setting Hi =  /z2 =  0 in the 
solutions for JO.
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was implemented via accounting separation and controllability 
can be circumvented via investment decision. Even a regulator 
who believes that controllability of output levels is a reasonable 
assumption must realize that these arduously erected barriers can 
be at least partly neutralized by other strategic decisions of the 
integrated firm where controllability does not apply.
The only way out would be to introduce the assumption of con­
trollability o f investment levels which is simply not possible for 
non-verifiable investment decisions.
6.2 U pstream  Investm ent
We consider a setting in which an effort or investment level, e, is to 
be chosen by the network operator. At least part of the benefits of 
these investments accrues to downstream firms in one of the following 
possible ways:
1. p = (a +  e) — bQ (marketing, higher network capacity, etc.)
2. ct=  d — e-f s (providing better network quality and thus reducing 
downstream marginal costs).
These two specifications, although quite different in interpretation, will 
turn out to be formally identical. In what follows we assume that 
investment decisions are taken in t =  2, i.e. the timing is the same as in 
the section on downstream investments (see figure 4). The equilibrium 
of this game is as follows.
In t = 3, the equilibrium output levels under any given ownership 
structures are given by
a +  e — s — d
9i = ------- 36------- '
This result is obtained for demand increasing investments (p =  a +  e — 
bQ) as well as for cost reducing investments (c, =  d — e +  s). In t =  2, 
the levels of upstream investments are chosen by the firm operating the 








The resulting first order condition implies
2(s -  0)
(s(9) -  0 ) ■ (91(e) +  92(e)) -  ^




The first order condition
(s -  0 ) • (ft(e) +  92(c)) +  7Ti(e) -  - e 2
implies
2(s -  9) 2 ,
36 ^ 96 + e  — s — d) = e
* _  6(s — 9) +  2(a — 9 — d)
Cot —-w  9 6 - 2
Joint Ownership, ^ \  :
maxi “  0 ) '  M e )  +  9 2 ( e ) )  +  7 1 1 ( e )  -  i / * e 5 
The first order condition here implies
6 /i(s — 9) +  2(a — 9 — d)
9//6 — 2
which, in turn, implies that for //* =  j  we obtain
6(s — 9) +  4(a — 0 — d)
' JO,(i* 9 6 - 4
Efficient investm ent levels
Efficient levels of investment that would take into account the effect of 
an investment decision on all firms would maximise the total surplus 
given by
S  =  (s -  9)(qi(e) +  92(e)) +  7Ti(e) +  7r2(e) -  ^e2.
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/The first order condition implies
„ 6(s — 6 ) -f- 4(a — 0  — d)
e  =  9 6 - 4  '
Given these results it is easy to see that there is underinvestment 
in all cases except for the joint ownership case with p =  | .  Under 
non-integration investment levels are lowest, and partial integration is 
an intermediate case. All this follows from simple algebra.
Writing down the conditions under which cost misrepresentation in 
t = 1 is profitable given the different ownership structures would be 
a repetition of the analysis in section 4.1. Instead, we formulate our 
main points here in the following proposition and its corollary.
Proposition 4 Suppose the network operating firm chooses investment 
levels that either augment market demand or decrease marginal costs in 
the ways specified above, then there is underinvestment under all own­
ership structures cr E {NI ,  PI ,  (JO, p E ( | ,1 ] ) | .  Investment levels 
are lowest for N I and highest for (JO, p):
e N I  <  e P I  <  e JO,/i <  e  •
Corollary 3 In the setting of the preceding proposition efficient in­
vestment levels are obtained for the case of joint ownership with capital 
shares =  §(= ^ ) .
eJO,a- =  «*•
This corollary provides an additional rationale for the implementa­
tion of joint ownership with capital shares corresponding to production 
shares: not only do incentives to misrepresent costs or to choose dis­
torted output levels disappear (for p* =  qi/Q endogenous) but also effi­
cient levels of upstream investment are induced (for p* =  qi/Q =  1/m 21 
exogenous). This applies to investments that increase market demand 
as well as to investments that reduce downstream marginal costs of 
both firms.
21 Due to symmetry.
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R e m a rk  3 These results partly rely on the assumption that, in the case 
o f joint ownership, the cost incurred is only a share p of the investment 
costs: p \e 2. This would not be plausible if e is thought of as an effort 
decision but only if the investment costs reduce the hidden profits of 
the upstream firm. Otherwise, in the above calculations, we would have 
p =  1 and therefore e*NI < e*PI = e*JO tl =  e*J0^  < e*.
But even in this case JO would not be dominated by any other own­
ership structure. The intuition behind these results is simply that, for 
each party taking an investment decision, the share in marginal costs of 
investment should correspond to the share in marginal profit generated 
by these investments. This is the case when capital shares correspond 
to market shares (pi = g) or, for symmetric firms, when capital shares 
are equal: pi =  T-, i =  1, . . . ,  m.
7 EN TR Y
In the preceding sections we analyzed a setting in which the network 
is used by a downstream duopoly (or, as in proposition 2, by m  down­
stream firms). The welfare implications of ownership structures de­
rived there rely on the assumption that the number of downstream 
firms is fixed. Liberalisation of formerly monopolistic or duopolistic 
(like telecommunications in Britain) industries, however, requires that 
new competitors can enter the market. Therefore the question arises 
for us which of the ownership structures discussed so far performs best 
in settings where entry is possible. We thus allow for entry of addi­
tional downstream firms into the industry. This is of particular interest 
because the ownership structure of the industry will turn out to have 
an impact on the motivation to deter entry from the industry. Such ef­
fects should be incorporated into a welfare analysis of these ownership 
structures.
Among the traditional ways of deterring entry there are low prices, 
high capacities (or even low capacities, following Benoit (1991)) or high 
levels of R&D or advertising outlays aiming at comparative advantages
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in cost structure or in demand for the advertised good. In our frame­
work the upstream firm has additional opportunities. If it manages 
to claim higher than the true costs for the network operation it can 
influence a potential entrant’s marginal costs. This, in turn, affects the 
entrant’s profit and, possibly, the entry decision.
We assume that two firms, D\ and £>2, are active in the downstream 
market and there are potential entrants, D3 , • • •, £)/, that incur entry 
sunk costs E 3 < • • • < Ej. Allowing sunk costs to vary across firms 
would reflect that there may be firms that are already active in related 
industries or foreign companies active in the same industry and thus 
have different prior knowledge and incur different levels of R&D costs. 
Alternatively, one could allow for different levels of marginal costs of 
new entrants but this would only complicate notation and analysis 
without changing results qualitatively. Further, we assume controlla­
bility (definition 1).
The firm controlling the network (17 in case of NI, {£/, Z>i} in case 
of PI, and Di with /z, > |  in case of JO) gives a signal about observed 
upstream per unit costs. Given this signal entry decisions are taken by 
firms D i, i € {3,••*, /}.  The equilibrium number of firms is assumed 
to be the largest integer number of firms for which each firm’s profit 
covers the entry costs incurred. There is Cournot competition in the 
last stage. The timing is shown in figure 5:
Figure 5
t =  0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
0  realized.
Network opera- Entry decisions Cournot com-
tor gives signal taken by firms petition
about costs. D{, * =  3, • • •, / .  downstream.
Equilibrium  w ithout discrim ination
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For t =  3 the Cournot equilibrium is given by
* a — 2c; +  Cj a — s — d
6(m +  1) b(m +  1)
and
„ I fa  — s — d \ 2
** =  b \  m + 1  /  ’
where m is the number of firms in the market.
In t = 2, firm D, enters if and only if ir* > E{. The equilibrium
number of firms is thus given by
m *  =  m a x i 2; m a x { m | m  <  —— . — 1, m  =  3, • • • ,/} } .
I J
In  ^=  1, the firm operating the network chooses a signal s G {0,0 +
A} about its per unit costs observed in t =  0. This choice may affect the
equilibrium number of downstream firms. Figure 6 shows the intervals
0 t- =  [0;, 0{] in which entry of firm i can be deterred by choosing cost




The maximum signal that would make entry profitable for Di is 
given by
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The intervals 0 ; are defined by
f t  =  3 j““  =  f t  +  A
and, to simplify the analysis, we assume they are disjoint. We denote 
by 0  the union of the intervals 0 t.
For 0 £ 0  entry cannot be deterred. The conditions for profitability 
of cost misrepresentations are qualitatively the same as those in the case 
without entry.
For 9 G 0  it must be true that 6 € 0 m for some m. Thus entry of 
firm D{ can be deterred by choosing the high signal, i.e. s(0) = 0 +  A. 
But this is not necessarily profitable. Given an ownership structure <r 6 





<1 * j +<7m-1) > K  +  _ 7rJn,_1(0 +  A).
J O : /zA(?i+,-« > liK  +  <*(0) --  7 r r 1(0 +  A),
There are quantities of m  — 1 firms on the left-hand side because, 
for 0 6 0 m? entry of firm m  is deterred.
Denote by e(0) the difference in downstream profits in state 0, i.e. 
e(0) := n™(0) — xj7l-1(0 -f A). We distinguish the following three cases:
1. e(0) > 0 : in this case entry deterrence is not profitable in the 
sense that downstream profits under the true signal 9 with m 
firms would exceed downstream profits under the high signal 0 + A 
with m — 1 firms. This leads us to exactly the same conclusions 
as in the analysis where the number of firms in the market was 
fixed: incentives for misrepresentation of costs are highest for NI, 
second highest for PI, and lowest for JO.
2. e(0) < 0 : In this case entry will be deterred. The order of the 
critical values S(cr) is reversed: S(JO ) > S (P I)  > S (N I).  So is 
the welfare ranking.
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3. e(0) = 0. In this (borderline) case incentives to misrepresent costs 
are the same under all ownership structures a  6 { N I, P I , JO }.
There are two opposite effects on a firm already active in the market 
which are connected with entry deterrence. Firstly, the firm suffers 
from the higher signal (same effect as in the 2-firm case). Secondly, 
there is the gain arising from a reduction in the number of firms (here 
by 1, i.e. to m — 1, as the intervals ©t are disjoint). The inequality
e(0) = irm(0) -  +  A) < 0,
i.e. case 2, holds if and only if the second effect dominates the first. 
This condition is satisfied if A < a~^~d. We summarise the welfare 
implications in the following proposition.
P ro p o sitio n  5 I f  entry deterrence is possible and profitable then the 
welfare ranking of proposition 1 is reversed: non-integration dominates 
partial integration and partial integration dominates joint ownership. 
Otherwise, i.e. if  entry deterrence is not possible or not profitable, the 
results of the previous sections (no entry case) remain unchanged.
The intuition for this result is clear. The network operator is in­
terested in high output levels downstream and therefore in entry but 
downstream firms are interested in high downstream profits and there­
fore in entry deterrence. This implies that deterrence of potential en­
trants is more profitable for ownership structures that involve a higher 
emphasis on downstream activities. This entry deterrence effect may 
or may not (depending on 0) dominate the ownership structure effect 
worked out previously.
Efficient outcom es w ith entry
Having established the above welfare rankings in a setting with 
entry two important questions arise. Firstly, JO is usually best but, 
with entry, it may be worst. Does this risk imply that JO should be 
rejected as concept for regulated industries? Secondly, we may ask
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just as in the framework with a fixed number of downstream firms: is 
there an ownership structure under which tru th  - telling is always the 
equilibrium outcome? Both of these questions will actually be answered 
in one by the following argument.
It is possible to show that the optimal JO concept of proposition 
2 can be generalised such as to allow for entry. The timing would be 
as follows. In t =  0, 0 is realised. Initial capital shares are p 1, • • •, pm 
with p i +  ^2 =  1 and the shares of potential entrants equal zero. In 
t =  1, the cost signal is given by the firm with the largest capital share. 
In period t — 2, entry decisions are taken. Period t =  3 corresponds 
exactly to the last period in figure 3: output decisions are taken, then 
capital shares of all firms in the maxket are adjusted, and dividends 
are paid. In this setting the following corollary to proposition 2 and to 
corollary 1 holds.
Corollary 4 In an industry with free entry as described above joint 
ownership with optimal adjustment o f capital shares yields efficient out­
comes in the sense that no downstream firm has incentives to charge 
an access price different from the true costs o f access. Output levels do 
not depend on the access price. Firms cannot use a higher signal about 
costs as a commitment device for collusion.
Proof. Exactly as in the proof of proposition 2 the profit maximisa­
tion problem of firms D \ , • • •, Dm in / =  3 can be shown not to depend 
on the cost signal. Therefore, the entry decisions do not depend on the 
signal either (t =? 2). Therefore, the choice of the signal in t =  1 is 
irrelevant, i.e. there are no incentives for non-truth-telling strategies.
Rem ark 4 The above corollary implies that also the second motive for  
charging high access prices, namely the deterrence of entry, disappears 
i f  capital is adjusted optimally at the end of the trading period.
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8 Conclusions and E xtensions
Access pricing theory has often treated the access problem in isola­
tion from either informational asymmetries or differences in ownership 
structures or both. We believe, however, that both factors are highly 
relevant to the problem. In this chapter we have shown how ownership 
affects incentives to exploit informational asymmetries.
In the basic model with two downstream firms the following welfare 
ranking is established. Joint ownership dominates partial integration 
which dominates non-integration. But the latter result is true only 
if the regulator can ensure that the integrated firm bases its output 
decision on the published access price (which, as we have argued, is 
highly unlikely to be the case). Otherwise, partial integration performs 
worst because of discriminatory practices. These results are underlined 
by the fact that the same order turns out to describe the degree to 
which underinvestment (in the case of upstream investment) occurs. 
The case of downstream investment shows how controllability of output 
levels can be circumvented with the help of investment decisions. This 
provides a further argument against the hypothesis that accounting 
separation can rule out discrimination.
In a setting with entry, however, this ranking is preserved only if in­
centives to deter entry do not become too strong. Otherwise this rank­
ing is reversed: non-integration dominates partial integration which, in 
turn, dominates joint ownership. We therefore argue that in assessing 
welfare implications of ownership structures in regulated industries it 
is generally important to take into account industry specific features 
such as desirability of entry and possibilities and profitability of entry 
deterrence.
Joint ownership with optimal capital adjustment (such that capital 
shares equal output shares) turns out always to yield efficient outcomes 
in the sense that incentives to misrepresent costs disappear entirely. 
Collusion cannot be sustained by choosing higher cost signals. This 
result holds irrespective of whether or not there is entry into the in­
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dustry. Further, it provides a welfare based rationale for forms of joint 
ownership that occur in some private industries.
Regulators should consider possibilities to implement such joint 
ownership structures.
Among the extensions one could consider there are, for instance, 
product differentiation and network effects (see Willig (1979)) both of 
which might provide arguments for lower access prices and more en­
try. An especially interesting and relevant line of research would be 
an extended model that takes into account competing networks. Due 
to the development of new technologies in some industries it becomes 
increasingly relevant to deal with upstream oligopolies. Our conjecture 
here would be that competing networks may mitigate some of the prob­
lems that are associated with the pricing of access to a monopolistic 
network (under non-integration or partial integration). But a single 
network owned jointly would outperform a situation of competing net­
work capacity under any of the other vertical structures.
Another interesting question arising from the analysis contained in 
this chapter is related to the use of mechanisms. One of the items 
on our research agenda is to investigate in how far the various inef­
ficiencies arising in some of the settings discussed may be overcome 
if appropriate mechanisms are implemented. A mechanism avoiding 
collusive behaviour in the case of joint ownership with exogenous or 
non-optimally determined capital shares would be of special interest.
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Appendix to Chapter III
The Nonequivalence of Accounting Separation  
and Structural Separation  
as R egulatory D evices 22
Introduction
Suggestions supported by conventional wisdom not always coincide 
with theoretical analysis.
The issue of accounting separation seems to provide another exam­
ple for this observation. There are properties which may be wrongly a t­
tributed to accounting separation by regulators as well as by economists. 
We feel that, firstly, economists should be as clear as possible about the 
true impact of ownership structures and supplementary arrangements. 
Secondly, it is vital for regulators and for all other parties involved in 
the discussion to have a clear understanding of the effects of regulatory 
tools. We therefore include, in the form of an appendix, the discussion 
of a paper presenting a view on accounting separation we tend to dis­
agree with and we analyse the arguments presented there in the light 
of the analysis conducted in chapter III of this thesis.
In a recent article Cave and Martin (1994) discuss current regula­
tory policies with regard to accounting separation in Australia and the 
UK. They assess the costs and benefits of accounting separation and 
give a detailed account of the practical measures adopted in Australia 
and in the UK. Their article compares accounting separation with the 
alternative of structural separation.
Cave and Martin point out that there are significant institutional 
and political barriers to structural separation. The supposed effect
22In this appendix we summarise the arguments presented in Hardt (1995). Some as­
pects have already been indicated in the main part of this chapter. However, in policy 
oriented literature different results have been claimed to hold. We analyze some, rather in­
formal, arguments presented there and propose counter-arguments on a similarly informal 
level, though corroborated by predictions from the model presented in this chapter.
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of accounting separation is as follows. ’Proper accounting separation 
may achieve the same regulatory aims as structural separation • • • ’ 
and ’there are potentionally significant welfare benefits arising out of 
economies of scope • • •; however, unless accounting separation is clearly 
shown not to be a viable regulatory alternative to structural separation 
why risk the potential for economies of scope?’ (p.14).
The simple economic analysis of chapter III provides results that 
are surprising in the light of what accounting separation is supposed to 
achieve. Theory 23 predicts that, unless an assumption of controllabil­
ity is satisfied, accounting separation has no effect on the dominating 
firm’s behaviour, accounting separation does not effectively prevent 
discrimination of a competing network user, and accounting separa­
tion cannot effectively be used to promote entry either. In many ways 
accounting separation is not equivalent to structural separation. Al­
though both may look equivalent at first sight, their way of functioning 
economically and their implications (in terms of access prices, output 
levels and prices, and entry possibilities for potential competitors) differ 
considerably.
Finally, Cave and Martin outline the dangers of accounting separa­
tion caused by informational asymmetries. The extent of these dangers, 
they conclude, is likely to become clearer over the next few years.
We would like to link this suggestion with the model we have dis­
cussed in this chapter.
T he im pact o f accounting separation
Without accounting separation the network operating firm is able 
to discriminate. It will charge the competitor a high access price and 
charge its downstream division a lower access price. The high access 
price charged to competitors leads to
1. increased revenues from access charges
23 We will point out later that our conclusions are based on a very general argument 
(namely joint profit maximisation) and not on peculiarities of our model.
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2. downstream cost advantage compared to the competitor which, 
in turn, implies
3. a relatively high share of downstream output and profits accruing 
to the incumbent.
Now, accounting separation is supposed to deal with these discrimina­
tory reactions, but we would like to argue that this is not the case: sup­
pose the network operator must publish access prices and separate ac­
counts for network operating activities distinguished from downstream 
activities. This will create a transparency that prevents discrimination, 
defenders of accounting separation would argue.
In our model, however, the following happens. The dominant firm 
will continue to charge high access prices to the rival. Further, it will 
charge its own downstream division the same high access price. But 
it will not condition the output decision on the published price. The 
incumbent’s downstream division will behave as if the low access price 
were charged and will be able to offer services cheaper than the com­
petitor (i.e. produce high output in terms of the Cournot model). This 
strategy maximises the sum of profits of the dominant firm’s up- and 
downstream activities. And this is how an integrated firm behaves: 
maximising joint profits.
So, what is the effect of the high access price? The high (non- 
discriminatory) access price plays the role of a mere transfer payment 
between the incumbent’s downstream division and the incumbent’s up­
stream division. It does not affect the incumbent’s total profits in any 
way. The effect of accounting separation is completely neutralised by 
the rationally behaving incumbent firm.
It is immediately clear that the arguments we applied to accounting 
separation do not apply to structural separation: the difference is that 
an integrated firm (with or without accounting separation) maximises 
joint profits of upstream and downstream activities. Structurally sep­
arated firms each maximise their own profits.
These arguments show that accounting separation does not achieve
the same ends as structural separation.
We do not conclude, on the other hand, that separating accounts 
and enforcing the publication of access prices has no effect at all. It 
does complicate discriminatory practices slightly. In the case of sev­
eral network users the network operator cannot discriminate between 
two of the nonintegrated users, but this is not the main problem of 
discrimination. The problem is discrimination between an indepen­
dent, i.e. nonintegrated, network user and the network operator’s own 
downstream division. Accounting separation cannot abolish these dis­
criminatory practices at all. Enforcing separate accounts simply means 
to erect barriers that, with some effort, can be circumvented.
R em edies
From a theoretical point of view, are there any remedies that would 
make accounting separation an effective tool in regulation? Yes, there 
are, but the practical applicability is rather doubtful and must be con­
sidered carefully.
Theoretically, it is sufficient to assume ’controllability’, i.e. to as­
sume that the regulator is able to control the dominant firm’s decision 
in the following way: the regulator must make sure that the output (or 
price) decision of the dominant firm’s downstream division is based on 
the published access price, not on the true (nonverifiable) costs.
But distinguishing these two strategies will be extremely difficult 
for a third person (regulator). And what will be even more difficult is 
the verification of a conclusion reached by the regulator to a firm that 
has private information about its true costs. How can the regulator 
prove that the firm would have acted in a different way (lower output, 
higher prices) if the published access prices were the true costs? These 
difficulties are considerable. There are, however, some industry features 
we would expect to evolve if the integrated downstream firm bases its 
output decision on a lower value than the published access price.
1. If the incumbent bases output decisions on the low access price
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but pays the high transfer price the result must be that the up­
stream profits are high and downstream profits are low, possibly 
negative.
2. Output of the integrated firm will always remain considerably 
higher than the rival’s.
3. Market prices will remain relatively high, competition will have 
little effect.
The first of these points would be the clearest indication if we observed 
it. But the incumbent will have ways to avoid such a clear picture. The 
upstream firm could undertake investments that might otherwise have 
been carried out by the downstream division and thus prevent losses 
downstream. Also, costs accruing in the downstream division might 
be attributed to upstream activities, again reducing downstream losses 
(or, equivalently, raising downstream profits).
Items (2) and (3) are features that can actually be observed in sev­
eral regulated industries. But these facts, although they may be a clear 
indication to an unbiased party that some discriminating practices are 
going an, can hardly be seen as a conclusive proof. The incumbent 
would rather argue, they must be attributed to different sources: the 
output shares are asymmetric just because of the incumbent’s techno­
logical and managerial superiority, marketing, etc. Prices are relatively 
high because it is costly to provide telecommunications services, not 
because of inherent inefficiencies in the production process or in the 
determination of access prices.
Therefore, none of the above three items could enable the regulator 
to ensure that the output level produced by the incumbent is based on 
the published price and not on a different value. So, there might be 
some empirical evidence, especially along the lines of items (2) and (3), 
that would support the thesis that a high transfer price does not affect 
the incumbent firm’s strategy. But such evidence can, at best, pro­
vide an indication for us that predictions obtained from our model are
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realistic. But it will hardly be sufficiently clear-cut to ensure controlla­
bility. And without controllability accounting separation has no effect 
on the incumbent firm as shown in the previous paragraph. Account­
ing separation can therefore hardly be a viable and effective regulatory 
policy in this context.
Further issues: investm ent, entry and evidence
Even if one still assumes controllability there are further complica­
tions that can easily destroy the derived effects of accounting separa­
tion. As mentioned earlier, investment decisions provide further means 
for the integrated firm to circumvent accounting separation (even in the 
presence controllable output prices) and to create asymmetries. This is 
because incentives for investments depend on the true marginal costs 
and not on published access prices. Trying to introduce an assumption 
of ’controllable investment levels’ is not only highly unrealistic in gen­
eral but positively impossible as far as non-verifiable investments are 
concerned.
In a setting with entry, discrimination has further ramifications. 
High access prices discourage entry. If entrants perceive that, under 
accounting separation, there is still scope for an integrated firm to prac­
tice discrimination they will (correctly) anticipate low profits. Entry is 
discouraged by discrimination.
A policy that is designed to encourage entry and competition can 
hardly be backed up by enforcing accounting separation. There are, 
in fact, doubts as to the effectiveness of current policy in achieving 
a reduction of prices on the end user market: ’It remains to be seen 
whether the new entrants to the liberalised telecommunications market 
will force down prices for residential users ...’ 24. The above arguments 
provide a theoretical foundation for such doubts.
If regulatory measures are used which cannot effectively prevent 
discrimination, the impact of new entrants will remain very limited.
Some kind of casual evidence may be contained in positive reaction
24Blackman (1994).
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of BT we alluded to earlier. In the light of our economic analysis this 
reaction is not surprising. It fits exactly into the picture of a ratio­
nally behaving firm: the rational firm will not suffer from accounting 
separation, as accounting separation has no effect (except for a trans­
fer payment within the firm). So, why protest? A rational firm will, 
instead, give in as far as this m atter is concerned and concentrate its 
bargaining power and efforts on negotiating regulatory measures that 
do hurt.
Concern
Often, concern has been expressed as to the effectiveness of a t­
tempts to achieve lower prices for telecommunications services and to 
make these services available for a larger share of the world population. 
Experts have often pointed out 25 that there is the danger that
1. the technologically driven progress in the information sector may 
not become available to a majority of society but only to a small 
proportion of it, an informational elite.
2. privatisation and competition do not bring about the effects we 
hoped for.
In other words, what we are winning on the technological side of 
things might be lost on the economic side. High prices prevent a huge 
majority either from using these services at all (in some countries) or, 
in other countries, from using these to a larger extent and at more 
affordable conditions.
Our claim is that a wrong assessment of accounting separation as 
a regulatory tool is part of the problem. Actually, a critical review 
on the effectiveness of accounting separation was to be carried out in
25One might, for instance, quote a recent note by Colin Blackman (1994): ’There is also 
continuing talk of convergence - between telecommunication, information and broadcasting 
and between business and domestic use - and the creation of conglomerate telecommuni­
cations and cable companies to provide multimedia services... is cited as evidence that we 
are at last entering the much-vaunted Information Society. I am not so sure: the impact 
on the vast majority of people has been rather limited...’
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Australia at the end of last year (1994) because the opinion emerged 
that the introduction of accounting separation in Australia has not had 
the desired effects on Telecom 26.
These remarks shed light on the importance for regulators to be 
aware of the full effects of regulatory measures. If accounting sep­
aration is wrongly regarded to achieve the same goals as structural 
divestiture this might slow down competition and a more universal use 
of information technology considerably.
Conclusion
In the presence of informational asymmetries a vertically integrated 
network operator can engage in discriminatory access pricing.
Accounting separation does not, although this has often been as­
sumed in the literature, solve this problem. With and without ac­
counting separation the same output quantities are produced by the 
integrated firm. We have shown that the effect of separate accounts 
merely amounts to a transfer payment within the integrated firm. Un­
der structural separation, on the other hand, the access price is no 
longer a mere transfer payment but represents the true costs for the 
separated downstream firm.
While Cave and Martin suppose that accounting separation is ei­
ther equivalent to structural separation (in the absence of economies of 
scope) or dominating structural separation (in the presence of economies 
of scope) we have shown why accounting separation cannot be used 
effectively to prevent or diminish discrimination while structural sepa­
ration can.
The arguments summarised in this appendix do not imply that 
structural separation is the best of all worlds. In fact, as shown in 
the main part of chapter III, it is not. But it does show that there are 
benefits of structural separation that need to be taken into account.
It is important for regulators to be fully aware of the economic im­
plications of the measures adopted in a policy aiming at nondiscrimina-
26I owe this hint to Ian Martin.
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tory access pricing. An incorrect assessment of the effect of accounting 
separation will lead to higher consumer prices and lower welfare.
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CHAPTER IV
A ccess Pricing, Ownership and Contracts 1 
Abstract
In vertically related industries an integrated incumbent firm owning 
a bottleneck facility does not necessarily have incentives to grant ac­
cess to a competing downstream firm, even if the competitor is more 
efficient. If the competing firm’s productivity advantage is small the 
incumbent firm can obtain its monopoly profit by leaving the entire 
market to the rival and by charging the optimal access price. A com­
petitor with a large productivity advantage will be left to serve the 
market alone but the resulting prices are even higher.
The burden of regulation depends on the class of contracts permit­
ted. Two-part-tariffs increase welfare but do not solve the problem 
of market power. It is also analyzed how ownership afTects equilib­
rium pricing and entry. Duplication of the bottleneck facility, under 
Bertrand competition, leads to marginal cost pricing. Under verti­
cal separation, price discrimination leads to a reduction in final goods 
prices. If the access price must be chosen before entry decisions occur 
this leads to more entry and lower access prices than the reverse of this 
timing structure.
1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes pricing and entry decisions in markets in which 
a firm supplies an essential input to other firms and may compete with 
these firms in the final goods (downstream) market. Typical examples 
are transport and utility industries.
Final products are regarded as perfect substitutes. This case is es­
1This chapter is based on Byg and Hardt (1995).
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pecially relevant for basic services in telecommunications (long distance 
calls, faxes, etc.) where consumers largely regard service providers as 
equivalent. Electricity and gas are other obvious examples where dif­
ferent firms can hardly engage in product differentiation except for 
modifications in related services such as itemised bills etc. The as­
sumption of perfect substitutes is therefore a good proxy for a large 
class of goods provided by utility industries.
An interesting question arising in this context is whether or not a 
full service provider has incentives to supply a competing downstream 
firm with the essential input (produced upstream). This question is 
discussed for various ownership structures and for different relative 
productivities. Further, the upstream firm’s decisions concerning pric­
ing and access provision will be affected drastically by the existence of 
a second upstream firm.
We analyze simple network structures where different segments may 
be owned by different firms. Among the arrangements we consider 
there are vertical integration (with a downstream competitor), vertical 
separation, and a setting in which there is a second supplier of the 
essential input, either as separate firm or integrated with the second 
downstream firm.
In these settings we analyze a game with three stages. First, down­
stream firms decide whether or not to enter the market. Then,2 access 
prices are set by the upstream firm(s). Downstream competition, in 
the form of simultaneous price setting, takes place in the final stage. 
Equilibrium pricing and entry decision are derived for various cases 
that differ in the relative productivity of the firms.
We first investigate how equilibrium pricing and entry are affected 
by network duplication, ownership structures, and pricing regimes al­
lowed (structure of tariffs and possibility of price discrimination). S tart­
ing from this free market analysis we point out implications for regu­
lation of such industries by comparing informational requirements in




Two strands of the literature are especially relevant to the theme of 
this paper, namely vertical integration and regulation. For the former, 
surveys are, for instance, Perry (1989) and Waterson (1993). For the 
latter, Armstrong et al. (1994) provide a comprehensive overview of 
regulation in theory and practice in various industries. Baumol and 
Sidack (1994) focus on the telecommunications industry and propose 
the ECPR (efficient component pricing rule). Laffont and Tirole (1994) 
provide a comparison of the ECPR with alternative pricing rules.
As pointed out in the introduction and in chapter 2 of this thesis, 
relatively few contributions focus on the impact of ownership on regula­
tory requirements. A paper that does discuss various ownership struc­
tures in network related industries is Economides and Woroch (1992). 
Their analysis, however, differs from ours in several aspects. Firstly, 
Economides and Woroch assume that downstream goods are imperfect 
substitutes. 3 Further, they consider the case of an upstream monopoly 
only. More importantly, they do not analyze the impact of ownership, 
tariff structures, timing etc. on regulation but restrict their analysis 
to private incentives. Unlike Economides and Woroch, we show that 
in some cases there are incentives to foreclose a competitor from the 
market and that divestiture may be socially advantageous because it 
leads to productive efficiency.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents 
the basic model and analyzes the case of vertical integration with a 
downstream competitor when only simple tariffs are allowed. In section 
3 general tariffs are shown to reduce the regulatory burden. Section 4 
considers the impact of alternative ownership structures on equilibrium 
pricing and entry and on the regulatory burden. Section 5 concludes.
3 Their model cannot handle perfect substitutes as a special case because the assumption 
of perfect substitutes implies a discontinuity of their demand function.
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2 Vertical Integration and Sim ple Tariffs: a Bor­
derline Case
In this section we analyze a situation in which a vertically integrated 
firm acts as sole supplier of a downstream competitor. This case is rele­
vant due to its frequent occurrence in regulated industries but we use it 
as borderline case only. The impact of other contracts and allocations 
of ownership will be investigated in sections 3 and 4.
Interconnection charges are given by linear tariffs in our basic model. 
There are several arguments why it is of interest to look at simple tar­
iffs. This case of linear tariffs plays an important role in some industries 
as well as in much of the literature in this area. One theoretical rea­
son for the use of linear tariffs appears to be the fact that they rule 
out arbitrage opportunities that would exist under two-part-tariffs, for 
instance. Even if regulators allow for two-part-tariffs to be used they 
will generally not allow the network operator to choose an arbitrary 
fixed component. Rather, many regulators follow a paradigm of cost 
based access charges and would therefore limit the fixed component 
to an amount representing the amount of fixed costs allocated to this 
particular service.
2.1 A M odel
We analyze a network that consists of points A, B, C and the links 
a,b,c connecting those points with each other.
Figure 1
This simple network structure can be used to analyze various pro­
blems in different industries. Most of our interpretations will be phrased 
as referring to the telecommunications or transport industries. But ap­
plications to other network related industries such as gas and electric­
ity supply can be made quite easily although the vertical structures of
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AB C
those industries are not exactly identical. 4
One possible interpretation will be that links b and c represent the 
assets owned by an integrated incumbent (local network and long dis­
tance operations) while a is owned by a long distance operator that 
needs access via c to the local network. Alternatively, c can be viewed 
as a network that can bypass the incumbent’s local network (i.e. second 
cable network or alternative technologies, e.g. microwave based). The 
long distance operator may or may not be integrated with this firm. 
A slightly modified version of the network will be used in section 4.1. 
This will allow for an analysis of vertical separation of the incumbent.
There are two firms offering ’transport’ on this network. In the 
standard version of the model D\ is the incumbent running the network 
lines b and c and can be thought of as being vertically integrated with 
an upstream firm U owning these links. Firm D2 owns and runs link a 
and needs access to the bottleneck facility c.
D\ operates link b at constant marginal costs k -f d\ and link c at 
marginal costs k. D2 operates link a at constant marginal costs d2. 
D\ chooses the access price p at which D 2 gets access to link c. Firms 
Dij D2 incur fixed costs Ft, F2 respectively. In this framework Fi is 
given by the sum of fixed costs attributable to the operation of links b
4In our analysis it is the upstream activity that is considered to be monopolistic. In the 
electricity or gas industry the ’upstream’ sector may be (potentially) competitive but, still, 
access to a network is needed. Therefore the conclusions apply although minor rephrasing 
may be necessary.
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and c, F1 = Fb -f Fc, and F2 =  Fa.
There is demand only for ’transport’ from A to C, where the demand
schedule is given by D(p) =  a  — p. Transport via B (ABC ) is a 
perfect substitute for direct transport along AC. Firms compete by 
setting prices simultaneously for transport from A to C, i.e. we assume 
Bertrand competition. D\ faces demand
di(p i,p2) =
a - p i  
\ ( a - p i )  
0
Pi  <  P 2 
P i  =  P 2 
otherwise
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage t = 0 a competi­
tor (e.g. long distance operator) decides whether or not to enter the 
market. In case of entry, sunk costs S  > 0 are incurred. In t = 1 the 
incumbent fixes the access charge. Bertrand competition takes place 
in the final stage (t = 2).
Figure 2
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Entry of competi­
tor D 2 in section a 
of the network. En­
trant incurs sunk 
costs S  >  0.
Bertrand com­
petition of Di 
Access charge and D2 in the
fixed. market for trans­
port from A to 
C.
In what follows we analyze equilibrium outcomes in the stages of 
this game starting in t =  2.
2.2 C om petition in t =  2
In stage t = 2 the access price p is given. If D2 did not enter in t = 0 
then D\ will simply charge monopoly prices on link h. We therefore 
focus on the case in which both, Di and D2, have entered the market 
(in t =  0).
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Firm 1
Firm ZVs profit is given by 
n\(PuP2) = <
(a - p i) (p i  -  k -  di) -  Fi 
\{a  -  px)(pi -  k -  +  |( p  -  k)(a -  px) -  Fx
(a -  p2)(p -  k) -  Fi
P i  <  P 2 
Pi  = P 2 
Pi  > P 2
For any given price p2 chosen by firm D2 for the operation of link 
a firm D\ decides whether to stay in the market and sell at px =  p2 
or not to operate link b at all and to make profit simply from giving 
access to link c. In the former case D \’s profit is given by
1 1
7T i := ~{p2 ~ k ~  di)(a -  p2) +  - (p  -  k)(a  -  p2) -  Fx.
But, as D\ will just slightly undercut D2, the profit would be
7Ti := {jp2 k di)(a -  p2) -
In case Di leaves all transport to D2 the profit is generated by access 
charges:
* i  :=  {P -  k ) i a  ~  P2)  ~  ^1
It is easy to see that, no m atter which of the two alternative definitions 
of 7Ti is chosen, one always obtains
7Ti >  7Ti P 2 >  pH- di. (1)
Firm  2
D2 s profit is given by 
7T 2(P l,P2) =  <
- f 2
i(p2 - p -  d 2) ( a  -  p 2 ) -  F 2
Pi  <  P2 
P i  = P 2 
P i  >  P2k { P2 ~ P ~  d 2 ) ( a  -  p2) -  F 2
if Di is active in the market. D2 exits if px < p -f d2. Otherwise, D2 
will choose
p2 =  min{p^(p),pi}.
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If D\ is not active in the market Z)2 maximises
max 7r2 =  (p2 — k — p)(a — p2) — F2.
These considerations lead to
Proposition 1 In t =  2, there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium given 
by
case 1: di < d2
. f a  +  k +  d\ \
pi = m m j   ,p  +  d2|  (2)
P2 =  p +  d2. (3)




case 1: d\ < d2
Given p2 =  p +  d2 is charged by firm D 2 firm D\ will maximise 
its profits by undercutting or charging the monopoly price in case this 
is lower, i.e. pi =  p +  d2 if p +  d2 < p™ and pi = p™ = 
otherwise. Firm D2 cannot raise its price above p +  d2 because in that 
case D i  would undercut and D 2  loses its market. Nor can D 2  lower 
the price because this would imply losses. For uniqueness simply note 
that the standard Bertrand argument implies that there cannot exist 
an equilibrium in which p2 > p + d 2. Furthermore, D2 will never choose 
P2 such that p2 < p +  d2.
case 2: d\ > d2
D\ will not price below p -f d i  because of a simple opportunity cost 
argument: it would always earn margin p — k and save d\ +  k for a unit
=  p +  di. (4)
. f  a  +  p +  d2 \ / N
=  nun I    ,p  +  (5)
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sold by ZZ2 to final customers. Nor can D\ raise its prices above p-\-d\ 
because this would be undercut by D 2 . In analogy to ZVs behaviour in 
case (1) D 2 will undercut if necessary and charge the monopoly price 
otherwise. Again, uniqueness follows.
Q.E.D.
The analysis of t =  2 can be interpreted as follows. If D\ is efficient 
(di < d2) D2 will exit because Di will undercut. If Di is inefficient 
(di > d2) Di will want to induce D 2 to produce an output quantity 
which is as large as possible. D \’s credible threat is to sell at p +  d j. 
So P2 = p +  di will obtain since D\ cannot credibly commit to choose 
a lower price.
2.3 A ccess pricing in t =  1
We here have to analyze the following four cases. In case (i) firm D\ 
is efficient (di < d2). Otherwise (di > d2) we distinguish the following 
subcases: in case (ii) the condition 3di < a  — k +  2d2 holds. This is 
the case in which ZZ2’s productivity advantage d2 — di is small which 
induces Di to stay in the market. More specifically, this condition arises 
from setting ZVs monopoly price greater than ZVs opportunity cost 
p+ d i and then substituting the optimal access charge p* derived below. 
If, on the other hand, 3di > a — k +  2d2 holds then firm D\ can no 
longer induce firm Z)2 to serve the market at marginal costs. Here two 
subcases have to be distinguished: D\ maximises its profits either by 
acting as a supplier of firm Z}2 (case (iii)) or by serving the market alone 
(case (iv)). The former happens whenever d\ > (o: — &)(1 — ^ -) -f ^  
as will be demonstrated below, 
case (i): di < d2: (’Efficient incumbent’)
D\ sets p =  00 and charges the monopoly price in t = 2.
case (ii): di >  d2 and 3di < a  — k +  2d2 : (’Competitor with small 
productivity advantage’)
D \’s optimal choice is to pick the maximum of its monopoly profit 7rm
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(which results by setting p = oo) and the maximum profit obtained 
from access charges:
max |m ax{(p — k)(a  — p — di)}, tt™ j  
Interestingly, the first order condition implies
* a  — di +  k 
P =  2------
which leads to
7 T i( P * )  =  (





Substitution of p* into (5) yields
_* . J _  a  +  k  „mP 2 — P +  di — ----------  — P1 .
This result is due to Bertrand competition. It does not depend, as 
we will state in corollary 2, on the assumptions made concerning the 
demand schedule. We now analyze
case (iii): d\ > d2 and  3di >  a-k-\-2d2 an d  di > ( a -k ) (  1- 75) + ^  : 
(’Efficient competitor serves market alone’).
D\ : solves
m a x  j m a x { ( p  -  k)(a  -  p™{p))}, 7T™ j
The first order condition implies
ol +  k — d2
p = — 2— •
Substitution yields
3a +  k +  d2 
P 2 \ P )  = -----------1 -----------
will be charged in t — 2. Firm D \S  profit therefore will be 
7Ti =  (p* -  k)(a - p 2 ) = ^ (a  - d 2 -  k)2.
This profit tti exceeds the monopoly profit n™(di -f k) when
or, equivalently,
Further, we had
d , >  ( a - k ) (  l - - L )  +  A  (6)
di >  Q +  232 ~ fe (T)
Either of inequalities (6) or (7) may be binding.
case (iv): d\ > d2 and 3di > a —k+2d2 and d\ <  (a —&)(1—^ 5)+^% : 
(’Efficient competitor foreclosed’)
Like in case (iii) firm D\ is so inefficient that it can only maximise 
its profit by choosing an appropriate access price if firm D2 is in the 
market. Due to the last condition characterising case (iii) now being 
reversed the maximal profit it can obtain with firm D2 active is lower 
than its monopoly profit. Firm D\ can make the monopoly profit by 
precluding firm D2 from entering the market.
The above discussion is condensed in
Proposition 2 In t =  1 firm D \ ’s optimal choice of access price is 
given by
00 : case (*) and case (iv)
case (ii)
2 . case (iii)
The analysis of stage t = 1 suggests 
Corollary 1
1. I f  the incumbent firm is efficient (d\ < d2) it has no incentive to 
open link c.
2. Deterrence of socially desirable entry may occur.
3. Depending on the size of a competitor’s productivity advantage the
incumbent may choose to serve solely as a supplier to D2. The
access price is higher in case (iii) than in case (ii). For a  large, 
market prices are highest in case (iii).
P =
a — d i  + fc  
ot — fi
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Proof. Part (1) simply corresponds to case (i) in which link c is not 
opened. Part (2) describes the outcome of case (iv). The access price 
in case (iii) must exceed the one in case (ii) because d\ > d2 in both 
cases. To see that the market price is highest in case (iii) note that 
P^iP*) =  ^ * 4+c*2 exceeds the monopoly price p™ =  if and only
if a — k — d\ +  (d2 — d\) > 0  which, for a  large, is always true (in other 
words: the productivity differential must not exceed the monopolist’s 
’maximum margin’ a — k — d{).
Q.E.D.
In case (iii) p* is higher than in case (ii). The intuition for this 
outcome is that firm Di cannot credibly threaten to sell cheaper than 
p +  d\. Therefore firm D\ has to maximise its profit by the choice of a 
high access price.
Corollary 2 Given the parameter restrictions of case (ii) firm D\ can 
extract monopoly profits either by operating as a monopolist on link b 
or by giving the whole market to D2 and charging an optimal access 
price p*. This result holds for arbitrary demand schedules.
Proof. Consider a general demand schedule D(p). If firm D2 charges 
price p2 < pi and firm D\ demands access price p then ZVs profit is 
given by
TTlfeO =  (jp2 ~  k -  di) • D(p2) 
if firm D\ undercuts firm D2 or by
M P 2) =  ( p - k ) - D ( p 2)
if she confines herself to the role of a supplier to firm D2. D2 s best 
reply is then given by
p*2(p) = min{p +  du p^(p)}.
Let p +  d\ < p^(p). Then tti(p) =  (p — k)D(p +  di). Therefore, the 
first order condition is
D(p +  di) +  (p -  k)D'(p +  di) = 0.
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Substituting p = p2 — di yields
DiA)  +  (ri -  *1 -  * W (A )  = 0
which is exactly the monopolist’s unique first order condition.
Q.E.D.
Corollary 2 shows that Di, by charging access price p*, can obtain 
exactly her monopoly profit without being directly active in the market.
2.4 E n try  in  t = 0
We now have to analyze stage t =  0. Due to our analysis of stages 1 
and 2 the following obtains. In cases (i) and (iv) entry never occurs. 
In case (iv) this leads to inefficiency provided that the entry cost S  is 
not too large. In case (ii) entry occurs if and only if S  < 7r2. But as
2^ =  {p*2 ~  P* ~  d2)d(p2) -  Fa
/ a  +  di +  fc a — di +  k , \ / a  — d i — k \  _
=  ( ------ ---------------------------- -------------- =--------\ - F .
2
entry occurs if and only if the following condition holds.
5  <  (dl - d t )C ~ F ~ k ) - F . ,  (8)
which means that entry is more likely for larger cost differentials d\ — d2 
as long as the conditions defining case (ii) are not violated. Analo­
gously, in case (iii) entry occurs if and only if
s  <7T2 = (p* -  p* -  d2)d(p*2) -  Fa
%a-\-d2 -{-k a — d2 + k ^ \ / a  — d2 — k ' ^
or, equivalently,
(a — d2 — k)2
< 1— ! — -  -  p .-  (9)
This condition is independent of d\ because, in case (iii), D\ cannot 
credibly threaten D 2 to charge a lower than its monopoly price for the 
optimal access price. The following proposition summarises the main 
findings of this section.
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Proposition 3 Inefficient entry does not occur. Efficient entry occurs 
if the competitor’s productivity advantage is sufficiently large. Other­
wise, socially desirable entry will not be individually rational. In the 
latter case inefficient production obtains.
2.5 R egulatory m easures
In the setting described above there might be a need for the following 
regulatory measures:
1. Force firm D\ to charge such an access price that firm D 2 is will­
ing to enter the market whenever D 2 is efficient because, in some 
cases, D\ might, inefficiently, prefer not to do so. This would 
improve welfare in that case. For access pricing it would be suf­
ficient for the regulator to know k. Then she could set p equal to 
k. This implies equilibrium prices px = p2 = k -f  m axjd i,^}*
2. Price regulation of the final goods: in order to obtain efficient 
final goods prices, however, the regulator would have to fix the 
final goods prices at min{pi,p2} =  k -\-m m {di,d2} in addition to 
the regulation of the access price. This implies, of course, that 
in case d\ ^  e?2 the inefficient firm does not produce which is a 
socially desirable result.
Effects of regulation on entry
With the two kinds of regulation described above entry occurs when­
ever this is efficient i.e., in cases (ii), (iii), and (iv).
Effects of regulation on investm ent decisions
We now assume that, preceding competition, firm D\ can choose 
levels of investment that lead to reductions in per unit costs of either 
k or d\.
Without regulation there are full incentives to invest in cases (i), 
(ii), and (iv). In case (iii) incentives are discontinuous in the following
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sense. There are zero incentives to invest as long as d\ > ol~ k + 2 d 2 anc[ 
di > (a — k)( 1 — ^-) +  ^  remain true. There are full investment 
incentives whenever either of these conditions does not hold.
With full scale final goods price regulation in the sense that
p = k -f m in(di,d2),
on the other hand, there are zero incentives for any of the firms to in­
vest since their profit, due to regulation, is independent of their costs. 
This changes, of course, when we allow for a time lag between invest­
ment decision and regulation. If there is a period in between in which 
profits can be realised this situation would, to a certain degree, mimic 
competitive markets as has been pointed out, for instance, in Baumol 
(1994).
Concluding, one can state that with simple i.e., linear, contracts 
there is a need for both regulatory measures mentioned above: access 
price regulation and final goods price regulation. Informational re­
quirements for an implementation of these measures are considerable.
3 G eneral Tariffs
In this section we consider the consequences of allowing for a wider 
class of tariff contracts in the access pricing stage. We will focus on 
resulting differences in the equilibrium outcomes and in the need for 
regulatory intervention.
3.1 A M odel
We use the model presented in section 2.1 with the modification that 
the access price for link c does not need to be a fixed per unit payment 
but can be any contract agreed in t =  0, i.e. before the entry decisions 
are taken. 5
5If the contract is agreed in t  — 1 the outcome depends crucially on the modelling of 
the bargaining game: if firm D \ makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to D 2 it tries to extract 
7 r Fa and therefore D 2 will not enter in equilibrium (which may be a socially undesirable 
outcome). If, on the other hand, D 2 makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer it offers tc™. In 
equilibrium this offer is accepted by D \.
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Interestingly, the following proposition allows us to limit our dis­
cussion to the class of two-part-tariffs i.e., contracts (p, z) specifying a 
payment function of the form p(p, z) = z + pq2 , where z is a lump sum 
payment made by D\ to D 2 , p is the per unit access price, and <72 is 
ZVs output level.
Proposition 4 I f  d2 <  di then there exists an optimal contract of the 
form p(p*,z*) namely, p* — k and 1t™ < z* < ir™.
Proof. The maximisation of the sum of the firms’ profits implies 
p — k. Further, d2 <  d\ implies that 7T™ > n™ which implies that there 
exists a z* £ [tt™, 7t™]. The lump sum payment z € [tTiSttJ1] is chosen 
such that signing the contract is individually rational.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 Two-part-tariffs increase welfare, but do not imple­
ment the first best solution.
Proof. The sum of profits is higher than with simple, i.e. linear, con­
tracts because there is no double marginalisation. Consumers’ surplus 
is higher because the market price is lower. But there is still market 
power which leads to the implementation of the price that would be 
charged by an efficient monopolist.
Q.E.D.
3.2 R egulation w ith general tariffs
In this setting link c is opened whenever this is efficient (c?2 < d\) and 
therefore productive efficiency obtains (as long as efficient entry oc­
curs). Also, the efficient access charge is chosen in equilibrium: p* =  k. 
Therefore the thorny issue of access price regulation does not arise here. 
Nor does any necessity of behavioural regulation. The problem of mar­
ket power, however, remains. On the final goods market monopoly 
prices are charged unless regulation successfully solves this problem. 
For this task downstream production costs will have to be known and
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therefore the informational needs of regulation are still far from negli­
gible. But the essential point of this section was to show that two part 
tariffs may lead to efficient access provision and to efficient production 
in the vertical integration setting.
Arbitrage will not be a large problem as long as the number of firms 
for whom firm D\ acts as a supplier is small which, for a number of 
industries, seems to be a reasonable assumption.
4 O wnership Structures
We will now focus on different allocations of ownership rights with a 
view to determining their effects on equilibrium prices for access and 
for final goods.
4.1 A ccess to  com plem entary links
In order to be able to analyze the case of a vertically separated access 
provider we first define a slightly modified network structure. We mod­
ify our model by making link c a complementary unit of the network in 
the sense that access to this link is needed as a complementary input 
to the use of links a and b. We thus obtain, in the simplest case, a 
network structure like in the following diagram which is similar to an 




If firm D 2 owns link I2 and firm D\ is integrated as before, i.e. 
owns the two other links, the analysis is very similar. We consider
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the same game structure and timing as in the preceding sections with 
the only modification that firm D\ also takes a decision whether or 
not to open link c in stage t = 0. It is simple to consider such an 
entry decision in the original model as well: in the initial model firm 
D\ would only enter, i.e. open link c, if this is worthwhile. There 
are cases when it is socially desirable but not individually rational to 
open this link. A comparable problem does not occur in the network 
structure modelled in this section since the link is necessary for D[s 
own production process. For t =  2 and for t = 1 we obtain exactly the 
same equilibria as in the model with substitutive links. But in t = 0 
link A B  is always opened in equilibrium which is not the case with link 
c (=  A B )  in the other model.
The setting in which link A B  is owned by a separate firm is one 
of the cases we take into account in what follows. We distinguish the 
following four possible allocations of ownership.
1. D\ owns links b and c while D2 owns link a in figure 1. D\ 
gives access to link c. (’Vertically integrated incumbent with a 
downstream competitor’).
2. An independent firm U owns link c and may grant D2 access to 
it. D\ owns link b and D2 owns link a. (’Vertically integrated 
incumbent facing competing network operator and downstream 
competitor’).
3. Di owns link b and D2 owns links a and c (’Integrated duopoly’).
4. U owns A B  in the model of section 4.1 (figure 3) and gives access 
to firms D\ and D2 that own links l\ and l2 respectively (’Verti­
cally separated upstream monopoly’).
The first of these four cases has already been discussed in detail 
in section 2. We briefly analyze the other cases in order to demon­
strate the influence of the allocation of ownership on pricing and entry 
decisions.
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4.2 Vertical integration with upstream  and downstream  com ­
petition  (case (2 ))
If di < c?2? firm Di serves the market alone at pi =  min(p -f d2,p™). 
This holds for any access price p >  k charged in t = 1. Due to Bertrand 
competition in t =  2, U will, in equilibrium, offer access at p =  k6 which 
implies zero profits for U and for D2. Unless D2 is extremely inefficient 
the final goods price p2 =  min(& -j- d2,p™) is lower than D[s monopoly 
price because the foreclosure possibilities of case (i) in section 2.3 do 
not exist here.
If d\ > d2 prices p\ =.p^ — m in|m ax{p +  d2, k + d i } , p™, p™ (p)^ are 
charged in t = 2. Firm U, in t = 2, chooses, in equilibrium, p such as 
to annul productivity differentials, i.e. p-\-d2 =  k + d\ or, equivalently, 
p =  k +  (di — d2) unless Di is so inefficient that the resulting market 
price p2(p*) would exceed p™. Substitution yields final goods prices
P*i=P*2= min(fc +
U thus extracts D2 s profit. Entry occurs in t — 0 if and only if 
[d2 <  di and 5  =  0].
Note that this outcome depends on the timing of the game. If the 
entry decision follows the determination of the access price the following 
obtains. The price equilibrium in t =  2 is not affected. Entry occurs 
in t = 1 if and only if entry sunk costs can be recovered, i.e.
k +  d\ >  p +  C?2,
i.e. D2 can undercut by setting p2 =  k +  d\, and the equilibrium profit 
of firm D2 is larger than her entry costs,
(a — k — di)(k -\- di — d2 — p) — Fa > S. (10)
In t = 0 firm U will choose p such that (10) is satisfied with equality 
unless this implies a loss:
p* =  k +  max ( 0, dx — d2  —■ 1 ^ .
V ol — k  — d \ J
6One could allow for firm D i offering access to D\ as well. But, as p  =  k holds anyway 
this would not affect the equilibrium prices in t  =  2 and we can therefore assume w.l.o.g. 
that D 2 buys access from U only.
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The intuition for this result is that more entry occurs and lower access 
prices tend to be charged if network operators must commit to an access 
price before entry occurs or, equivalently, if network operators are not 
able to extract all of the downstream firm’s profit subsequent to the 
entry decision. A policy recommendation would therefore be that the 
regulator requires access providers to specify access prices in advance, 
i.e. to freeze7 access prices over a sufficiently long period of time.
4.3 Integrated D uopoly (case (3))
In this setting the prices charged in t =  2 are p1 = p2 = fc+m axf^, di}.  
Here the issue of access pricing does not arise because D 2 owns c. We 
can therefore set p =  k. Entry by D 2 occurs in t = 0 if and only if
c?2 <  d\ and S  <  (di — c/2) • (a — k — d\) — Fai (11)
where we neglect the case that firm Di  is so inefficient that firm D2, 
in equilibrium, can charge her monopoly price. Case (3) does not yield 
comparatively more entry than case (2) [with ’reversed timing’] because 
there firm U chose such an access price that entry occurred whenever 
efficient.
4.4 Vertical separation (case (4))
Firm U owns A B  and firm Di owns link /*•, i =  1,2, in the model of 
section 4.1.
In this setting we distinguish two cases, namely whether or not the 
upstream firm is allowed to discriminate between the two downstream 
firms by charging different access prices. We first assume discrimination 
is allowed, i.e. U may charge access prices 7*1 /  7*2 to firms D\  and D 2 
respectively.
In t = 2 there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. It is given by
7It is, of course, only a price ceiling one has to fix over time. This would give firms 
some downward flexibility in pricing and enable them to respond to positive exogenous 
shocks such as new technologies etc. What is needed is a commitment that prices will not 
be raised subsequent to entry.
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pi — m injm ax{ri +  d i ,r 2 +  d2},p™ j  (12)
p2 = m injm ax{ri +  d i ,r 2 +  d2},p™j (13)
In t = 1 consider the case d\ <  d2 (w.l.o.g.). Firm U will set r i, r2 
with a view to inducing large quantities of final goods sold which is 
achieved by equating
n  +  di =  r2 +  d2.
(Again we omit the trivial case that firm D\ is very inefficient compared 
to firm D2.) Let di(pi,p2) = a  — pi if p\ — p2 for existence. Then,
as Bertrand competition implies pi =  p2 =  d\ -f r, the upstream firm’s 
profit is given by
7ru =  (a  -  dx -  ri)(r! -  k)
which is maximal for
a  +  k — d\ 
n  =  2 *
i.e. the efficient firm serves the market. Substituting this into (12) and 
(13) yields prices
ex. -j- k T d\
P i = P 2  = ------ ^-------*
If entered in t=0, D2 would serve the market only if d2 < d\. But, 
due to Bertrand competition in t=2, the margin per unit is zero: under 
d2 < d\ we obtain r2 =  a+k~-d2 and prices pi = p2 = a+k+d2. D2 s profit 
is therefore given by
(  a  - k d2\  ( ol +  k -j- d2 a  +  k — d2 \
*>={a ---------2------M ------2----------------2---------dV  -F> = -F2.
Therefore entry occurs in t=0 if and only if S  = 0 and F2 = 0.
We now analyze the non-discrimination case n  = r2 = r. In t =  2 
prices charged in equilibrium are given by
pi = p 2 = m in jr  +  m axjdi, d2},p™,p™ j .
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Let dx < c?2- Then, in t =  1, the access price is chosen such as to 
maximise ttu =  (r — k) (a — r — d2) which implies
* a  +  k — d2 
r =  2 '
Substitution yields final goods prices
ct k -{■ d,2 cx -+■ k +  d\
*  =  r  +  <*2 =  2  >   2 •
D 2 enters the market if and only if sunk costs as well as fixed costs 
are zero. These findings lead to
Corollary 3 Price discrimination undertaken by an upstream mono­
polist leads to lower access prices, lower downstream profits and higher 
upstream profits. The prices charged for the final good correspond to 
the price of an efficient monopolist if  price discrimination is allowed 
and to the price of an inefficient monopolist otherwise.
The intuition for this result is that price discrimination enables the 
monopolist to induce tough competition. By using the access charges 
in order to offset downstream productivity differentials the upstream 
firm induces lower prices in order to raise output levels and thereby the 
total amount of access charges that will be collected.
4.5 Comparison between different ownership structures: im ­
plications for equilibrium  prices and for entry
Summarising results from sections 2 and 4 the following can be stated 
(using cases 1 to 4 as defined in section 4.1).
Vertical integration with a downstream competitor generally leads 
to monopoly pricing. Only if the competing firm has a sufficiently 
large productivity advantage it will serve the market alone, but the 
final price charged in this case, at least for a  sufficiently large, exceeds 
the monopoly price pJ*.
If a second network operating firm is present, either separate (case 
2) or integrated with D 2 (case 3), final prices are given by the maximum 
of the marginal costs, i.e. p\ = p\ =  k +  max(c?i, e^).
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Vertical separation (case 4), on the other hand, leads to prices an 
efficient monopolist would charge. This is true as long as price discri­
mination is allowed. Otherwise the monopoly price of the inefficient 
firm obtains.
Entry decisions are affected by ownership in the following way. With 
vertical integration (case 1) a downstream competitor enters only if 
sufficiently more efficient than the incumbent and not foreclosed (i.e. 
not in cases (i) and (iv) and in cases (ii) and (iii) only if conditions (8) 
and (9) hold respectively.
In case a second (but non-integrated) supplier of the essential input 
exists (case 2) entry occurs if d2 <  d\ and S  = 0 which means that 
upstream entry encourages downstream entry. If the access price is 
fixed before the entry decision is taken then entry obtains whenever (10) 
holds, i.e. entry is no longer ruled out by positive sunk or fixed costs. If 
the second supplier is integrated with a downstream firm (case 3) entry 
obtains under (11). This implies that a vertically integrated competitor 
enters when his productivity advantage is sufficiently large to cover 
the sum of sunk and fixed costs. Under the original timing, i.e. if 
entry precedes access pricing, case (3) therefore leads to more (socially 
desirable) entry than case (2) which may be taken as an argument 
for allowing vertical integration of competitors in the presence of a 
vertically integrated incumbent.
Under vertical separation (case 4), again, entry occurs if d2 <  d\ 
and if sunk and fixed costs are zero.
4.6 R egulatory m easures
From the preceding subsection it is clear that access price regulation 
is crucial whenever there is a monopoly in the bottleneck, i.e. in cases 
1 and 4. Setting p =  k leads to Bertrand competition and therefore 
prices pi = p\ =  k -f ma,x(di,d2) whenever both downstream firms are 
active in the market. Entry occurs and leads to productive efficiency 
as long as the productivity advantage is sufficiently large compared 
to the entry sunk costs which can therefore be recovered. In cases
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(2) and (3), on the other hand, the issue of access price regulation 
does not arise. Whenever industry features allow for duplication of the 
essential facility (or bottleneck) this avenue should be pursued unless 
the associated sunk costs are prohibitively high.
5 Conclusions
In much of the literature on regulated industries ownership and regu­
lation are treated in isolation from each other. In this paper we have 
started by considering a setting without regulation. We analyzed the 
behaviour of firms in an industry with features that are typical for in­
dustries that tend to be regulated: an essential input is required by all 
downstream firms and provided by one or more integrated or separate 
upstream firms.
We have shown how equilibrium pricing depends on productivity 
differentials and on ownership. Productive efficiency by no means im­
plies efficient outcomes. Production by a more efficient firm may even 
lead to higher prices as long as a monopolistic supplier controls the 
bottleneck. Duplication of the bottleneck changes the situation dra­
matically even if the second supplier merges with a downstream firm. 
Regulation of industries with a monopolistic upstream segment should 
therefore focus on the provision of efficient access to the bottleneck. 
Further, it was shown how a long term commitment of a monopolistic 
supplier to fix access charges over a longer period leads to lower access 
prices and more entry.
Vertical separation may be advantageous because it leads to pro­
ductive efficiency while an efficient competitor may well be foreclosed 
by a vertically integrated incumbent. If the incumbent is vertically 
integrated then vertical integration of competing firms should not be 
banned. This policy may encourage efficient entry in the downstream 
industry which would not occur otherwise.
Starting from these results we have pointed out how the burden of 
regulation is affected by the industry characteristics described above
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(ownership, tariff structure, timing, and relative efficiency of firms). 
We identify the kind of regulation (access price, final goods price etc.) 
required in different scenarios and indicate implications for situations 
with asymmetric information.
A major problem with regulation along these lines, of course, will 
be the informational advantage of the network operating firm. It has 
been argued by Hardt and Sturmer (1995) that the incentives to exploit 
these informational asymmetries vary between ownership structures as 
well.
Further analysis along these lines is needed. In our view a first step 
is to find the best ownership structures for each specific industry. Net­
work duplication, for instance, may cause prohibitively high sunk costs 
in some industries (rail industry etc.) but may be desirable in other 
industries (telecommunication services) due to new technologies. One 
can then analyze which are the best tools to solve problems of informa­
tional asymmetries starting from a structure that minimises the overall 
regulatory burden. In other words, we regard regulation with complete 
information as one borderline case and the free market analysis as the 
other borderline case. Regulation with asymmetric information may 
then be interpreted as intermediate case. An ideal ownership structure 
would then be one under which both borderline cases coincide. Such a 
case was found in chapter III.
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CHAPTER V
Consum er Behaviour  
and C om petitive Equilibrium  1
A bstract
We consider a general equilibrium model which is modified in so far 
as consumption behaviour is characterized by probability distributions 
instead of preferences. In this setting markets generally do not clear. 
We define the concept of an expected equilibrium and examine the pro­
perties of expected market demand. These results are used to prove 
the existence of expected equilibria. Uniqueness of expected equilibria 
obtains under rather restrictive assumptions on consumption distri­
butions. Quantity rationing is introduced as a way in which excess 
demand or supply can be dealt with. For the case of proportional 
rationing schemes it is shown that rationing becomes insignificant (ar­
bitrarily small) when the economy becomes large. We finally provide a 
result on the size of disequilibrium in a finite economy. A sharp upper 
bound is given for the probability that excess market demand for some 
good exceeds a given bound e.
1 Introduction
’It is [...] necessary to show how as­
sumptions of bounded rationality could 
replace assumptions of optimisation in 
actual economic reasoning.’
Herbert A. Simon (1992)
1This chapter is based on Hardt (1995).
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1.1 General equilibrium  and bounded rationality
In the literature on general equilibrium theory as well as in many other 
areas of economics individual choice behaviour has commonly been 
described with the help of preferences or utility functions. Although 
valuable insights can be derived with the help of utility maximisation 
models the scope of their application and their inherent realism are 
strongly limited. In recent years more and more attention has been 
paid to bounded rationality (see Simon (1982) and Simon (1992)). It 
has been argued that individuals do not at all follow a calculus of 
maximisation when making their choices. Abundant empirical evidence 
for this claim has been obtained from various laboratory experiments. 
For an overview in experimental economics see Tietz, Albers and Selten 
(1988).
But, on the other hand, economists carry on building models based 
on assumptions of utility maximisation and perfectly rational behaviour. 
The reason for this phenomenon seems to be a conjecture that without 
utility maximisation all the commonly used models break down and 
hardly anything can be said about the functioning of a market econ­
omy. This chapter attem pts to abandon this commonly chosen avenue 
of complete rationality.
It is hard to define in general terms what is meant by complete ra­
tionality but it seems even more difficult to give a formal definition of 
bounded rationality. One could even argue that it is characteristic for 
the notion of bounded rationality that it cannot be fully captured by 
any formal definition. So we will not pretend to have found a general 
definition that does. Various approaches for modelling weaker rational­
ity have been suggested in the literature. Magill and Quinzii (1992), 
for instance, argue that in a general equilibrium setting incomplete­
ness of the asset market structure may arise from a lack of rationality. 
Geanakoplos (1992) develops the impacts of different rationality lev­
els on speculation, betting, and ’agreeing to disagree’. Among other 
approaches there is the concept of qualitative reasoning which would
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suggest that agents take qualitative decisions only, revising variables 
up or down, instead of attempting to find the parameter values that 
would lead to a maximisation of the outcome.
Here, we will choose randomness of demand as one possibility to 
replace utility maximisation as a description of human behaviour. Spe­
cial cases of random demand have been suggested by Becker (1962) and 
by Mirrlees (1986) to formalise irrationality or bounded rationality re­
spectively. A motivation for our approach is given in the following two 
subsections. We do not inquire which of the above approaches is fitting 
best for which purposes because the question we want to ask in this 
chapter is rather the following one: how essential is the assumption of 
utility maximisation really or, more precisely, how sensitive is general 
equilibrium analysis to this assumption? Thus the main part of this 
work is a re-examination of classical issues and questions in an alter­
native framework. It will in fact turn out that some of the predictions 
from standard general equilibrium theory can be obtained without as­
suming that individuals maximise utilities. Other conclusions differ 
from the standard results which, however, does not imply that they 
are less plausible.
1.2 A m otivation for random ness of dem and
It appears appropriate to provide some arguments why stochastic de­
mand appears to be a suitable alternative way of modelling consump­
tion behaviour.
1. It allows for a simple model capturing a wide range of rationality 
levels, starting from irrationality on the one hand to full ratio­
nality on the other hand: even though we do not make the as­
sumption that consumption is in any way a result of utility max­
imisation such an interpretation is possible. One could start, for 
instance, from stochastic endowments or from stochastic prefer­
ences: after a certain state of nature has been realised preferences 
(or endowments, respectively) are fixed and agents maximise their 
utility subject to these realisations (see Block and Marshak (1960)
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and Hildenbrand (1971)). In such a model agents are, of course, 
somewhat ’hyperrational’. They are not only able to maximise 
utility, but they do so any time a new state of nature occurs. On 
the other hand, in our model agents are not necessarily rational 
at all. They could, for instance, be characterised by a uniform 
distribution associating the same probability (i.e. density) with 
each consumption bundle satisfying the budget constraint. This 
case is usually meant to describe ’irrational agents’ (see Becker 
(1962)). 2
2. The random demand model we will use contains the standard gen­
eral equilibrium model as a special case: under standard assump­
tions on probability distributions consumption behaviour can be 
derived from maximisation of stochastic preferences. Thus a one 
point distribution on individual preferences corresponds to the 
usual model.
3. Some of the results obtained from this model seem less counter­
intuitive than classic predictions like, for instance, boundary be­
haviour.
4. Stochastic consumption allows for an analysis of stochastic in­
teraction. Choice behaviour of an economic agent is obviously 
influenced by other agents’ choices. Random demand provides 
a possibility of analyzing such interaction. Research along these 
lines has been conducted for example by Follmer (1974). Al­
though we do not tackle this problem explicitly in this chapter 
we would like to emphasise that the model we present establishes 
a rather general framework in which stochastic interaction can be 
dealt with. In fact, we do not make any assumption of indepen­
dence except for two subsections where the issues of uniqueness 
and large economies, respectively, are addressed (propositions 7,
2 For the special case of deterministic utility but stochastic decision rules (see section 
1.3) it has already been argued by McFadden (1981) and by Mirrlees (1986) that random 
demand well captures the idea of bounded rationality.
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8 and 9).
5. It is sometimes argued that, due to the Law of Large Numbers, 
randomness of demand simply ’cancels out’. This is true in the 
limit, i.e. when the number of agents tends to infinity, but we 
do not focus primarily 3 on limit economies. Instead, we are 
interested in analyzing markets we observe: they are characterised 
by a finite number of agents and by fluctuations in demand rather 
than by a continuum of agents or by ’zero variance’. 4
6. Random demand is used in a wide variety of models in the litera­
ture. Thus a treatment of some of these approaches in a unified 
framework might be desirable. A short overview of this area is 
given in the following subsection.
1.3 Random  dem and in econom ic theory
There 5 is in fact a huge literature in different fields varying from Math­
ematical Psychology and Theory of Choice to applications in Industrial 
Organisation, Learning, and many other areas of economics where con­
sumption is assumed to be stochastic. Although the resulting random­
ness is traced back to rather different causes all these models have in 
common that consumption is stochastic. Thus they can be treated 
as special cases of, or even as motivation for, the assumptions of our 
model. We will now quote some of these approaches in order to make 
precise what has been said above and in order to provide some refer­
ences.
The thought that human behaviour in a given situation may differ 
from one time to another and thus exhibit inconsistencies like intran­
3We do analyze a limit economy in proposition 8. But we do so with the intent to 
examine the effect of economies becoming larger. We then analyze the finite case and 
show that the probability that the amount of rationing exceeds a given limit becomes 
small for large economies. This is made precise in proposition 9.
4 We still assume price-taking behaviour of the agents: this assumption is more appro­
priate to describe boundedly rational agents than an assumption of strategic behaviour 
would be.
5The following outline owes a lot to the first chapters of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 
(1992) where a detailed survey of the literature on discrete choice is given.
128
sitivities, for instance, is rather old. The history of random utility 
models can be traced back to Thurstone (1945). Psychological exper­
iments led to the statement that the utility of each alternative is in 
fact measured by a random variable. This approach is equivalent to 
assigning random preferences to the set of alternatives as was shown 
by Block and Marshak (1960). Thus the central idea of this approach 
is the maximisation of a ’momentary utility’. The kind of utility rele­
vant at a certain point of time is determined by unknown parameters, 
moods, or ’psychological states’ (Thurstone). In more economic ter­
minology this would correspond to agents maximising state dependent 
preferences. Machina (1985) shows that the random utility model is 
a special case of his model in which agents are supposed to maximise 
deterministic utilities on lotteries. The choice probabilities are then 
given by the optimal lottery (i.e. they are determined endogenously in 
contrast to the theory of choice under uncertainty).
Another approach has been followed by Luce (1959) and Tverski 
(1972a,b), namely the approach of deterministic utility and stochastic 
decision rules (see Tverski (1972a) p.281): an individual’s choice does 
not have to coincide with the alternative that would yield a maximum 
utility (see our remarks on bounded rationality in section 1.1).
This concept of random preferences or random choice behaviour 
has been applied in various fields of economics: there are, for instance, 
learning models using random demand. One example from the learn­
ing literature is Bray and Savin (1986). Many models in Industrial 
Organisation assume stochastic market demand in order to analyze 
firms’ behaviour under uncertain demand conditions. Among a large 
number of models 6 dealing with oligopolistic or monopolistic markets 
with uncertain demand one could quote Novshek-Sonnenschein (1982). 
The book by Anderson et al. quoted above contains many applications 
of random demand in the theory of oligopoly in differentiated product 
markets. In most of the models of these areas the motivation for de­
6Demand uncertainty is not necessarily a complicating factor introduced to determinis­
tic models. An evident example is Klemperer and Meyer (1989) where demand uncertainty 
is shown to reduce the multiplicity of Nash equilibria.
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mand uncertainty is that suppliers lack information about the demand 
they face. This corresponds to the interpretation of stochastic human 
behaviour by Manski (1977 p.229) and McFadden (1974). The alter­
native interpretation, namely intrinsically probabilistic behaviour, was 
originally adopted by Quandt (1956) and later followed by psycholo­
gists.
For our equilibrium analysis based on the notion of random demand, 
however, we do not need to take a clear position towards these differ­
ent interpretations of randomness, nor do we confine ourselves to any 
specific class of models mentioned above. We rather regard them as 
approaches which differ from each other in many aspects but all have 
the common feature of random demand thus providing motivations 
for replacing the utility maximisation paradigm of general equilibrium 
analysis by stochastic demand.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in the following sec­
tion we present our random consumption model and show that, with 
probability one, markets do not clear. In section 3.1 the concept of 
an expected equilibrium is defined and properties of expected market 
demand are examined (propositions 1 and 2). These results are used to 
prove the existence of expected equilibria (propositions 3 and 4). The 
problem of uniqueness is examined in Section 3.2. It is pointed out 
there that monotonicity of expected partial market demand is implied 
by a property of stochastic dominance of individual demand (propo­
sition 7) and that monotonicity of expected demand holds for price 
independent distributions. Section 4 introduces quantity rationing as 
a way in which excess demand or supply can be dealt with. In sub­
section 4.1 we present the model of quantity rationing and define the 
notion of a rationing - allocation. It is shown in subsection 4.2 that 
rationing becomes the more insignificant the larger the economies get. 
Finally, we provide a result in subsection 4.3 about the size of dise­
quilibrium in a finite economy (proposition 9). Conclusions follow in 
section 5.
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2 M odel: A n Exchange Econom y w ith  S tochastic  
C onsum ption
An exchange economy is usually defined by a commodity space and 
by the agents’ characteristics, i.e. their endowment vectors and their 
preferences or utility functions:
£r =  [ ^ , ( t / i ,ei )i=, /].
We adopt this model as far as the commodity space and the endow­
ments are concerned but we do not consider explicitly preferences that 
might induce the agents’ consumption choices. Instead, we start with 
the choices themselves: an agent i chooses stochastically a consump­
tion bundle X \  i =  1 thus X ' : ft —► EiL is a random vector. 
We assume that agents spend their total income. Thus, as illustrated 
in the figure below, an agent’s consumption behaviour is characterised 
by a probability distribution on his budget hyperplane and a stochastic 
exchange economy is given by
£  =  [tf?*:,(X\e')i=1....,].
Figure 1
The budget sets arc IB(p,cl) = (a? E 1R+ : p • (.r — e’) < 0} for 
p G -S++1 := {p G : YJi=\Pi — !}• We denote by 5 +-1 the analo­
gous set where prices are not required to be strictly positive: p E IR+.
Let l B ( p , e*) =  { iG  I R +  : p - (a? — e*) =  0} denote the respective budget 
hyperplane. As we assume the budget identity to hold the probabil­
ity distributions have dimension L  — 1. The shape of an agent’s con­
sumption distribution depends, of course, on the relevant price vector 
P  €  5 + + 1 - A  density function describing agent Vs  consumption is de­
noted by • • •, x l ' , p )  or, in short, f l ( x , p ) .  It is non-negative on
the budget hyperplane and satisfies
For p  £ S L + 1 we define /*(x;p) := f %( x , p /  Y^b=iPi)- Marginal densities 
for good / are then given by
f i ( x r , p ) ~  f  f l( y ’,p)dyyi=xt}
and marginal distribution function are defined as
F i ( x p , p )  =  f  f t ( x ; p ) d x .
Jo
We omit the index for the good and simply write F %( x p , p )  and f l ( x p , p )  
respectively when no ambiguities are involved.
In this framework markets generally do not clear as the following 
lemma states.
Lem m a 1 L e t  £  b e  a  s t o c h a s t i c  e x c h a n g e  e c o n o m y .  L e t  a g e n t  i ' s  r a n ­
d o m  c o n s u m p t i o n  b u n d l e  X 1 h a v e  a  c o n t i n u o u s  d e n s i t y  f l ( x ; p )  o n  t h e  
b u d g e t  h y p e r p l a n e .  T h e n  f o r  a n y  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  G m a r k e t s  d o  n o t  
c l e a r  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o n e ,  i . e . :
'£ ,X \u ; p )  w.p.l.
1= 1  1=1
This result obtains because 5Zf=1 X 1 = e% describes a hyper- 
plane of Lebesgue measure zero. In the Edgeworth box below indiffer­
ence curves have been substituted by demand densities. Realisations 
of demand are unlikely to coincide with supply (even if the respective 
expected excess demands add up to zero).
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Figure 2
Edgeworth box with demand densities
This result, although not quite in line with the spirit of general 
equilibrium theory, may well be more descriptive than the prediction of 
market clearing. A less demanding notion of equilibrium is introduced 
in the following section.
R em a rk  1 Lemma 1 states that one cannot implement ex ante a price 
that will lead to market clearing. It is simple to construct random 
demand models that yield market clearing in the following way. A real­
isation of a state o f the world fixes preferences and therefore a demand 
function for each individual. Then the usual tatonnement process leads 
to a market clearing price. The difference with our model is that the 
notion of a demand function simply does not exist. Thus there is no 
way to predict how individual consumption changes with prices and thus 
there is no way to define a tatonnement process.
3 E xpected  Equilibria
3.1 E x isten ce
The equilibrium concept we define in this section formalises the idea 
that markets do not clear for every state to € fl, but they may clear 
on the average, i.e. in expected terms. One can imagine the Walrasian
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auctioneer 7 modified in the following way: he does not know which 
state of the world will be realised, but he does know the probability 
distribution of agent i ’s consumption p) (instead of the preferences 
y*, i = 1 , . . . , / ) .  Thus he is able to calculate expected excess demand 
and aims at choosing a price p such that, for each good, expected 
demand equals supply.
D efinition 1 A n  e x p e c t e d  e q u i l i b r i u m  (p *, ( E [ X 1 ( p * ) ] , . . . ,  i?[XJ(p*)]))
€ R %  x 1 R ^  o f  a  s t o c h a s t i c  e x c h a n g e  e c o n o m y  i s  d e f i n e d  b y  a  p r i c e  
v e c t o r  p *  £ a n d  a n  e x p e c t e d  a l l o c a t i o n  ( E [ X 1 ( p *)], . . . ,  E l X ^ p * ) ] )  
s a t i s f y i n g
± E [ X \ p ) ]  = ±e<.
i= 1 t=l
Remark 2  A n  o p t i m a l i t y  p r o p e r t y  o f  p *  w i l l  b e c o m e  c l e a r  i n  s e c t i o n  f  
( s e e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  8  a n d  9 ) .
In order to address the issue of existence of an expected equilib­
rium we will now examine the structure of expected market demand.
The following proposition shows that, under regularity assumptions, 
the properties of homogeneity, Walras Law, and continuity can be es­
tablished for expected market demand.
Proposition 1 L e t  S  — [1 R + ,  ( X %  ez)t=i,..Mj] b e  a  s t o c h a s t i c  e x c h a n g e  
e c o n o m y .  L e t  i n d i v i d u a l  d e m a n d  X*(-;p), * =  1 , . . . / ,  d e p e n d  c o n t i n u ­
o u s l y  o n  p r i c e s  p ,  i . e .  f l ( x ; p )  i s  c o n t i n u o u s  i n  p  Vx. T h e n  i n d i v i d u a l  
d e m a n d  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :
1. H o m o g e n e i t y :  E [ X l { A • p)] =  E [ X l ( p ) \  V A £ R +
2. Walras Law: p ■ ( E U  £pC(p)] -  Z L i  0 V €
3. Continuity: i?[X'(p)] is con
rWe are well aware that the old story about the auctioneer is not very satisfactory. This 
problem has not been resolved in general equilibrium analysis and we shall not attempt to 
solve it here. But the modification seems obvious: in the case of uncertainty the auctioneer 
aims at market clearing in the sense that expected demand equals expected supply.
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P roof.
1. For prices p £ S+ 1 the density functions are given by f l(x,p) =
f ' ( x , = £ — ). Thus for A € M+ : f %(x,Xp) =  f*(x, ^ l p- -  ) =  
2 ^ = i  pi  Z ^ i = i  x pi
P{x,p)-
2. As the distributions are defined on the budget hyperplane the 
budget restrictions hold (with equality) for every possible realisa­
tion u  G D. Thus they hold for expected demand so that Walras 
Law is satisfied in expected terms.
P' X*(p) (u>)  =  p  ■ e* V lj G D
£[** '(?)]- X V )  =  o.
i=l i=l
3. Due to integration by parts we obtain:
too rO
E [X tl (p)]=  (1 -  F l(xi;p))dxi -  /  F*(xl;p)dxi.
JO J — oo
Distribution functions depend continuously on p  because densities 
are continuous. Therefore, the integrands of both integrals are 
continuous. Thus, due to Lebesgue’s theorem, expected demand 
is continuous in p.
Q.E.D.
Thus some of the main properties of demand under utility maximi­
sation can be established in our framework for expected demand. But 
this is not the case for boundary behaviour. The problem with bound­
ary behaviour is that the usual analysis relies essentially on maximisa­
tion of unsatiated preferences. But as we do not assume any form of 
maximisation here it is not possible (without making further assump­
tions) to derive an ’explosion’ of demand in case one price tends to 
zero. This can be illustrated by the following
Exam ple 1
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Let an agent’s consumption of good k  be characterised in the following 
way. Consider first a density /(-;p) on [0; oo] which has a finite mean 
p. Now let the agent’s consumption of good k  be described by the 
truncated normalised density defined as follows:
f (x k ‘,Pk) — 1 ])k\  for 0 < Xk < — and 0 otherwise,
1 - c ( p k )  Pk
where income is denoted by b 8 and
/oo f { x ; p k ) d x k
Pk
is the appropriate constant to achieve normalisation. Then the ex­
pected value of the truncated distribution converges to the expected 
value of the original (non-truncated) distribution and is therefore finite:
E<m  -  r ^ - r r
—► E f [ X ]  for pk -> 0 
=  fi < oo.
Thus we have constructed a simple example where the assumptions 
made as to the distribution of the agents’ consumption do not seem 
to be too counter-intuitive but a lack of boundary behaviour can be 
derived. This result is in line with the observation that only Walras 
Law and continuity can be empirically verified. In what follows we 
examine classes of distributions for which various forms of boundary 
behaviour can be derived.
Definition 2 A  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  s y m m e t r i c  i f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  d e n s i ­
t i e s  f l ( x i ' , p ) a r e  s y m m e t r i c  a r o u n d  i . e .
r { ±  +  XhP)  =  r { ± _ x , p)) o <  *, <  T
8Notation is a bit sloppy here because we treated b as a constant. But the argument 
does not change when one writes income explicitly as 6 =  p ■ e because then ^ 2  =
e* +  • ej where pi is non-decreasing for p* —<► 0 such that ^ 2  —*■ oo for p* —+ 0.
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D efin ition  3 A probability distribution has a price independent shape 
i f  the following condition holds for the marginal distributions
F \ —\pi) =  F \ ^ p \ )  V y <E M V  pi,p\ such that p,p' e  £++.
Pi Pi
The geometric intuition for this definition is that the shape of the 
marginal distribution is invariant under price changes. This does not 
mean that the distributions /(-;p/) are all of the same type (e.g. expo­
nential) but rather that the transformation of the distribution induced 
by a price change is either an expansion or a contraction. To see this 
let yi — pixi, denote the expenditure level for good /, then the above 
condition becomes
F\xp,pi) = F \x i  •
where the ratio is the expansion or contraction factor.9
The following proposition shows that various kinds of boundary be­
haviour are implied under various distributional assumptions and shows 
how they are related to each other in the sense of logical implications.
P ro p o sitio n  2 Let S  =  [-K+, (X*, e®)i=i >...j/] be a stochastic exchange 
economy where the individual consumption distribution have (continu­
ous) densities. Then for conditions 1 to 6
1. 3 e >  0 : E[X\{p)\ — e/ > 0 for pi < e, Z =  1 , . . . , L.
2. E[Xj(p)\ —> oo for pi -* 0.
3. The marginal density /*(^/;p), 1 <  / < T, is symmetric.
4. The distribution of X 1 (p) has a price-independent shape and f l(x,p) 
> 0 on the budget-hyperplane.
5. P(X}(p) < ei) -> 0 for p{ -> 0.
9We consider price changes in component I : p[ >  pi. As prices are normalised the 
other components of p are determined by the change in component I. Therefore we can 
write F*(-',pi) instead of F*(-',p).
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6. Agent i chooses X 1 := arg max ul(X z) +  e where u(x) is a mono­
tonic utility function and e is an error variable with expected value 
zero.
the following relations hold:
(4) (5)
JJ. I).
(3) = »  (2) =*• (1)
ft
(6)
P roof. The implications ’(2) = >  (1)’ and ’(6) =>■ (2)’ are immedi­
ately evident. For the rest just note:
’(3) = >  (2)’: symmetry of the marginal density fj(x ;p )  on [0; 
implies that E[XJ] = -E-. Thus we obtain E[Xf(p)\ —> oo for pi —> 0. 
’(4) =>  (2)’: using a simple substitution y := pix\ one obtains
m h  = JJ'{ i -F(xr,p,))dx,
=  [  ( 1 - F ( —; p i ) ) d y  —
Jo Pi Pi
But, due to the assumption of price independence, F ( ^ p i )  is constant 
in pi. Further, F(-) =  1 cannot hold on the entire interval [0 ,^]. So 
the integral is bounded away from zero: 3 e > 0 such that / 06(1 — 
F (^;p i))dy  > e V pi which implies that E\X](jp)\ —> oo for pi —► 0.
’(5) =>  (1)’: P(X} =  ei) =  0 because densities are continuous. So, 
if P (X \ < ei) —* 0 for pi —> 0, then P (X j >  e/) —► 1 for pi —> 0. But 
this implies that E[X\{p)\ > ei for pi —► 0.
Q.E.D.
Thus individual consumption satisfies some boundary behaviour for 
special classes of distributions, for example distributions satisfying ei­
ther (3), (4), or (6). But for general distributions one does not know 
whether any boundary behaviour is satisfied. It is now straight forward
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to state the following two propositions.
P ro p o sitio n  3 Given that the assumptions of Proposition 1 are satis­
fied for all agents i =  1 market demand satisfies the properties 
of homogeneity, Walras ’ Law, and continuity.
Boundary behaviour, i.e. any condition of (1) - (6) of proposition 
2, is satisfied for market demand, whenever the respective condition is 
satisfied for at least one consumer i E { 1 ,... 7}.
P roo f. Given propositions 1 and 2 the proof of proposition 3 follows 
immediately from proposition 3.2 in Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988).
Q.E.D.
P ro p o sitio n  4 Given that the assumptions of proposition 1 are sat­
isfied, an expected equilibrium (p*, E[X(p*)\) exists. I f  in addition to 
the above properties boundary behaviour is satisfied for at least one 
agent i then there exists an expected equilibrium (p*,E[X(p*)]) such 
that p* >> 0.
P roof. Given propositions 1 and 2 the proof of the first part of 
proposition 4 corresponds to the proof of proposition 3.4 in Hildenbrand 
and Kirman (1988), the second part of our proposition is proved by 
Theorem 3.1 of the same book.
Q.E.D.
3.2 U niqueness
3.2.1 A rationality requirement (individual level)
In the analysis of this section we impose an assumption on the agents’ 
consumption behaviour, namely that of stochastic dominance. In vague 
terms this means that with a rising price of a good I the probability 
for low consumption levels of this good rises.
D efin ition  4 Let F , G be distribution functions. F  is said to dominate 
G stochastically, F  >- G, at first order if  F (x ) < G{x) V x  E {x E
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M \F (x),G (x) G (0,1)} (first order stochastic dominance). We speak 
of weak first order stochastic dominance if the inequality holds weakly.
A ssum ption  1 Let p,p' G S++1 such that p'k > pk and the relative
/
prices of the goods I ^  k are unchanged: -£*- = -}- V /, ra ^  k. Then the
P m  P m
marginal distribution function F l(-,p) satisfies the following condition:
F \ x k;p) < F l(xk;p ).
R em ark  3
1. Assumption 1 still is a weak rationality requirement: we do not 
exclude that, despite o f risen prices, some individuals consume a 
higher quantity of this good, only the probability for higher con­
sumption levels is expected to decrease. 10
2. For the assumption of stochastic dominance empirical tests are 
available for which it is not necessary to make assumptions as 
to the type of distributions considered (nonparametric methods; 
for instance the test of the sum of ranks by Wilcoxon and Mann- 
Whitney).
D efin ition  5 Let X l(p) be the random vector o f agent i ’s consumption 
when price p is relevant. Let F[(-;p) be the corresponding marginal dis­
tribution function for good I. X l(p) ~  F %(’,p). Then individual demand 
of agent i is called stochastically monotonic if  assumption 1 holds for
F / ( . ;p ) V /=
One might wonder whether the property of stochastic monotonicity 
is implied by the assumption that individuals spend all income, i.e.
10 An alternative interpretation of this assumption is obtained for (deterministic) distri­
bution economies where I  subeconomies E \ , . . . , E i  are considered. The densities /* are 
in this case interpreted as frequencies of consumption levels in the subeconomy Ei .  The 
requirement of stochastic dominance then means that the frequency for lower demand 
levels of good I rises with price pi, i.e. there are more individuals who consume less of 
good I. So for any subeconomy we allow for individuals who behave arbitrarily irrational, 
it is only the demand distribution of the subeconomy which we assume to shift to the left 
with rising price.
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choose from the budget line. But the counter-example in the following 
figure shows that this is not the case.
Figure 3
On the other hand, stochastic monotonicity as defined above turns 
out to be satisfied for a large class of distributions. In fact, when the 
distributions are price independent then stochastic monotonicity can 
be derived.
Proposition 5 L e t  X ' ( p )  d e n o t e  a g e n t  i ’s  c o n s u m p t i o n  g i v e n  p r i c e  
p .  L e t  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  b e  p r i c e  i n d e p e n d e n t .  
T h e n  i n d i v i d u a l  d e m a n d  X ' k ( p )  o f  a g e n t ,  i  f o r  g o o d  k  i s  s t o c h a s t i c a l l y  
m o n o t o n i c  i n  i t s  p r i c e  p k -
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P roof. Consider prices p, p' £ such that p{ > p\ and 2s. =  ^  
V m ,k  ^  /. Then, because of monotonicity of F*(xi;pi) in #/, we get
F*'(x,;p,) =  F ‘(—;pi) = F *{% A ) < =  F^xnp',)  Vx, 6  B +
Pi Pi Pj
=► ^ ( - ; pi) >=
where 6/ =  pixi denotes the amount of money spent on good /.
If the density of consumption is strictly positive on the interior of 
the budget hyperplane the marginal distribution function is strictly 
monotonic. Thus a strict inequality holds and we obtain y
F ’i'tPi)-
Q.E.D.
The notions of stochastic dominance and price independent shape 
of distributions can be related to Becker’s example and its discussion in 
Hildenbrand (1994) as follows. Becker assumes that agents’ consump­
tion is characterised by a uniform distribution on the budget line. If 
the consumer has income b this implies that the marginal distribution 
is price independent. To see this for L = 2 one just has to realise that
F ( x i , P i )  =  t - ^ 1’ Vb p1
This immediately implies F (ff ;p i)  =  f  • % =  ^  ^  =  F ^ - p 'J .
Thus the Becker example is a special case of price independent 
distributions and price independent distributions are a special case of 
distributions satisfying the assumption of stochastic dominance.
As Hildenbrand (1994) remarked the crucial point in Becker’s exam­
ple is not uniformness of distribution but price independence of budget 
shares of mean (or expected) demand, i.e. the fact that E[X( ^ Pt] =
i /  t\ t
E[ 1Y {] V pj, V I. As we will see this condition is implied by price 
independence of the distribution’s shape. The converse, however, does 
not hold in general.
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uniform price independent stochastic domi-
distribution shape of distribution nance
price-independent 
budget shares of 
(mean) demand
The last implication is shown in the following
P ro p o sitio n  6 Let X \p )  denote agent i ’s consumption given price p 
and income b. Then the following holds: if  the distribution of consump­
tion X %(jp) satisfies price independence then agent i (s expected budget 
shares b)(pi) =  E \^p -\ o f good I are price independent. The converse 
does not hold.
P roof.
1. We show that for prices pi ^  pj of good I the budget share b\ of 
agent i is still the same:
EMM] = *W(r)-?] = ?  ■ J f  {I -  Fiiu-^du
=  J  - f  (1 -  f i ( — \ P i ) ) — d x i  b Jo pi pi
b Jo pi
The third of the above equalities follows from price independence.
2. It is obvious that the converse does not hold (equality of integrals 
does not imply equality of integrands).
The question we now want to consider is what can be said about 
aggregate demand X(p) := X t (p) if assumption 1 holds for all 
agents. In fact, stochastic dominance will turn out to be a rationality 
assumption which is robust under aggregation.
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3.2.2 Implications of stochastic dominance for market demand
Stochastic monotonicity of partial individual demand implies that the 
same property holds for partial market demand:
Proposition 7 Let assumption 1 hold for  Xj ( p ) , i  =  1 1 =  1, 
p  £ 5 + -1. Let X f ( p ) be independent ofY^Zi X\ (p) ,  2 < k <  I.  Then 
partial market demand X\{jp) — J2i=i XJ(p) fo r  good I is stochastically 
monotonic.
Proof. Proposition 7 is a straight forward application of the follow­
ing
Lem m a 2 Let X i , . . . ,  X n, Y i , . . .  ,Y n be random variables, X{ stochas­
tically dominated by Yi (Y{ >z X {), i =  1, . .  .ra. Let Xk be independent 
of  Efci1* ,  2 < k <  n. Then Y  := Yfi=i Y{ stochastically dominates 
X : = E t i  Xi> *.c.; Y h X .
Proof. We give an inductive proof of this lemma.
n = 2 : let Y\ >z X \  and Y2 >z X 2, i.e. FYi(x) < FXi{x) V x € 
7R, * =  1,2. Let X \  be independent of X 2 and let Y\ be independent 
of Y2. Then the distribution of the sum of these random variables is 
given by the convolution of the respective individual distributions:
FYX+Y2{t) =  FY l * F Y2( t ) = f  FYl{t -  z)dFY2(z)
Jo
<  f  FXl (t -  z)dFY2 (z) =  r  Fy2 (t -  z)dFXl (*)
J o  J o
<  j Q Fx2(t -  z)dFXl (z) =  FXl * Fx2(t)
=  FXl+x2{t)
= *  Y! +  Y2 h  X i + X 2.
We now assume the claim is true for some n >  2 and infer from this 
that it also holds for n -f 1. Let X i , . . . ,  X n+i,  Y i , . . . ,  Yn+\ be random
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variables, X{ stochastically dominated by Y{ (Y\ X X{), i — 1, . . .  n +  1. 
Let Xk be independent of i  X u  2 <  k < n -f 1. Then Y  := Y\ +  
. . .  +  Yn+1 stochastically dominates X  := X \ +  . • • +  X n+i, Y  >z X .  To 
see this we write
FYl+...+Yn+1{t) =  f y * FYn+1(t) =  [  FY { t - z )dFYn+t(z)
J  0
< /  Fx(t -  2)dFY„+1{z) =  /  •FV„+.(< -  * W x ( z )Jo  Jo
< Jo Fx„+1 (t -  z)dFx(z) =  Fxn+1+x{t)
=> Yi +  . . .  +  Yn+i y  X \ . . .  Xn+i .
The first of the above inequalities holds because of the assumption 
that the claim holds for some n > 2 (and we had shown that this is 
true for n = 2).
Q.E.D.
Note that this result holds rather generally. In proposition 7 we do 
not make any assumption as to the type of distributions. Individual 
consumption distributions do not even need to be identical. Additivity 
of stochastic dominance also holds for multi-dimensional distributions. 
The proof of the lemma does not change but here, however, we need 
the one-dimensional case only because we use marginal distributions.
Rem ark 4
1. (strict monotonicity) Let Xj(p) be agent i ’s demand for good I with 
price p. Let partial individual demand for good I be stochastically 
monotonic, i.e.
F l ( - , p t )  <  F t {- ,p' i ) ,  p \ > p i , 8 =  1 , . . . , /
then expected partial market demand for good I is strictly decreas­
ing in pi. This can be shown with the help of integration by parts.
2. 1.) implies that all members of the main diagonal of expected 
market demand’s Jacobian are strictly negative.
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3. To establish uniqueness of an expected equilibrium one has to find 
properties of the individual consumption distributions which imply 
that the off-diagonal elements of expected demand’s Jacobian are 
such that a criterion of diagonal dominance holds.
4 . One example where the uniqueness conditions of the Jacobian are 
satisfied is the case of distributions with price independent shape.
Besides the role of stochastic dominance for uniqueness of expected 
equilibria it has been applied in Industrial Organisation. Examples 
are Rob (1991) where the impact of stochastic dominance of market 
demand on the entry of firms is investigated, and Rob (1992).
In this section we have dealt with expected demand only. Actually 
realised demand will be treated in the following section.
4 Formulated and A ctually  R ealised Dem and
4.1 Q uantity rationing
We have shown in section 3.1 that under the imposed conditions an 
expected equilibrium always exists, but once a state of nature is realised 
excess demand is distinct from zero with probability one (lemma 1). 
This is quite in line with the empirical observation that suppliers may 
set prices and that they may expect to sell exactly the amount of 
products they offer, but actual demand often exceeds supply or vice 
versa.
In this section we formalise one way of dealing with nonzero excess 
demand. The model we use is basically the one by Benassy (1982). In 
contrast to an alternative model by Dreze (1975) this model allows for 
agents formulating their net trade offers without taking into account 
their true constraints whereas in Dreze’s model agents choose from 
their constrained budget sets. In the context of our model, where as 
little rationality requirements as possible should be made, we allow for 
agents making trade offers from their whole budget set (which, in the 
language of Benassy, actually means that they do not even need to take
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into account any ’perceived constraints’).
We use the following notation11: z\ £ JR is a net trade offer for 
commodity / sent to the market by agent z, i.e. z* =  X*(p, uj) — e% 6 ML. 
Thus the vector of trade offers of all agents is z = (z1, . . . ,  z1) £ JRIL. 
We denote the sum of trade offers for good I made by agents 1 
by Zi = E i z\.
Since in general markets do not clear we denote the actually realized 
transaction of agent z in commodity / by z\. These actual transactions 
are determined by a rationing scheme G\(zl , . . . ,  z 1) — z\ satisfying the 
following conditions, the interpretation of which is straight forward.
1. E i • ■ • » ^7) =  0 f°r ab I
2. \z\\ <  \z\\ and z\ • z\ > 0
3. Z\ • z] < 0 ==> z\ = z\
4. All functions G\ are continuous in their arguments.
As Benassy (1982) has pointed out these conditions are satisfied
for a large number of rationing schemes, such as queuing, rationing
tickets, priority systems, and proportional rationing. The crucial as­
sumption made by Benassy, namely that an agent % takes into account 
his constraints on all markets except for the one he is trading on is not 
needed here, but only for a fixed point argument in Benassy’s proof 
of the existence of an equilibrium. We will now define the concept of 
a rationing-allocation (which is much weaker than, though defined in 
analogy to, a Benassy equilibrium).
D efin ition  6 A rationing - allocation is a set of
trade offers, actual transactions, and prices such that
1. z\ are the net trade offers that result from a random realisation 
of demand, i.e. z\ = X\(u',p*) — e\
2. Zj = G j(z1, . . . z I )
11To keep notation as simple as possible we will just write z* for the realisation z'(p, u)  
as well as for the random variable z'(p,  •) if no danger of ambiguity is involved.
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3. G}(‘) satisfies the conditions of a rationing scheme.
Property 1 of a rationing scheme is market clearing. Therefore the 
concept of a rationing-allocation is well defined.
The concept of a Benassy equilibrium has thus been weakened 
mainly in two aspects: firstly, agents do not take into account per­
ceived constraints and, secondly, a rationing-allocation is in no way 
motivated as fixed point of a tatonnement process. Although the main 
importance of our concept will become clear at the end of this section 
we would like to point out some features observed in reality that are 
captured by this concept:
1. Goods markets do not necessarily clear.
2. Rationing is rarely anticipated by consumers.
3. Feasibility problems can arise in the sense that an agent i cannot 
provide enough goods in exchange for the goods z\ > 0 she ac­
tually receives because she is rationed on some other market: a 
consumer might, for instance, not be able to sell her labour en­
dowment so that she cannot pay for her actual transaction. Or, 
similarly, in a production economy a firm might have bought in­
puts but it is rationed in demand for its production good so that 
it might not be able to meet its liabilities at once. A way to 
formally close the model would be to allow agents to carry their 
liabilities over to a following period in which they would have to 
take them into account ex ante (by subtracting their liabilities 
from their endowment vector before they formulate their trade 
offers). But a multi-period model along these lines is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.12
12This would just complicate notation without shedding further light on the point we 
want to make in this section: we will show in the following proposition that the rationed 
amounts become more and more insignificant when the economy becomes large. But we 
will come back to this issue when we point out possible extensions of the model in the 
final section of this chapter.
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4.2 L arge econom ies
To prepare the way for our proposition about rationing in large econo­
mies we define the notion of a replica economy and prove the subsequent 
lemmas. Lemmas 3 and 4 are used to prove lemma 5. Lemmas 5 and 
6 are used in the proof of proposition 8.
D efin ition  7 With a stochastic exchange economy 8(1) we associate 
the N-fold replica
£N(I) = [mL, ( X i, e % 1 jvj]
where in the N-th replica the preferences and endowments o f agent 
i , i E {1, . . . ,  I} , satisfy X % ~  X*+nI and e% =  el+nI, n = 1 , . . .  ,7V — 1, 
and X %, 1 < i <  I N , are independent.
If there exists an expected equilibrium of 8(1) there also exists 
an expected equilibrium of the TV—fold replica £n {I) as the following 
lemma demonstrates.
L em m a 3 Let (p*, (E [X 1(p*), . . . ,  E [X r(p*)])) be an expected equilib­
rium of 8(1). Then the vector (p*, (E [X 1(p*), . . . ,  E [X N'I(p*)])) is an 
expected equilibrium of the N-th replica economy £n (i ).
P roof. We assumed that in the TV-th replica economy 8n (I), N  E IN, 
all random variables X %, 2 =  1 , . . . ,  IN , are independent of each other. 
The product probability space is well defined. Further, as distributions 
of X 1 and X t+nI coincide for all i = 1, • • •, I  and for all n — 1, . . . ,  TV — 1 
so do the respective means: E [X l] = E [X l+nI]. For the price vector p* 
of an expected equilibrium the following implication holds:
I  I  I N  I N
= £ e' = »  E  W V ) ]  =  E e*
i=1 *=1 i=l i=l
where E n  denotes the expectations operator defined by the probability 
measure P ^  on the TV-th product probability space.
Q.E.D.
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In what follows we will make use of Komolgorov’s theorem which 
implies that the probability space and measure are also well defined in 
the limit economy (TV —> oo).
L em m a 4 Let (p*, E[X(p*)]) be an expected equilibrium of £ (I). Let 
f3\(N,uj) := {j\z{(uj) >  0, j  = t +  n /  for some n =  1, • • • ,7V — 1}, 1 < 
i <  / ,  u) G n , 6e the set of buyers of type i and let a\(N,uj) := 
{j\zj(w) < 0, j  = i+ n l  for some n =  1,• • • ,7V —1}, 1 <  i < / ,  lj £ fi, 
6e 7/ie respective set o f sellers of type i in a replicated economy £n (I). 
Then, in a sequence of replicated economies {£jv(f)}ivea^ there exist 
numbers ib and is £ {1, . . . , / }  such that the proportion of
buyers of type ib and the proportion ^  0j  sellers o f type is of
good I are bounded away from zero (TV —> oo) with probability one.
P roof. Suppose that for some good / £ {1, . . . ,  L} the proportion of 
buyers — tends to zero for TV —> oo with positive probability for 
all types of agents i £ {1, . . . ,
K “ ^ P  =  0) > 0  =
This would imply that
/  1 NI \  
P ( f e f V T 7 ' S ( W ) - e * )  <  0) > 0
i = l
which cannot be true because
i N I  i I N
T777 - E * V )  =
i = l  i = l  n = l
As in a replicated economy X z+nI, 0 <  n < TV — 1, are all identically 
distributed the Law of Large Numbers can be applied. So, for TV —> oo, 
the above expression tends to
7  • £ £ [ * > * ) ]  =  y - E ^
1 i = l  1 t = l
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because p* is the price vector of an expected equilibrium.
This contradiction terminates the proof. For the proportion of sell­
ers the proof is entirely symmetric to the one for the buyers.
Q.E.D.
L em m a 5 Let £ n ( I )  be the N-th replica economy of S (I). Denote by
the demand and by
D i(p ,N )= Y ^  Y ,  *i (p)
i=1 je0i(N)
Si(p,N) = '%2 Y  %(p)
i=1 jEcri(N)
the supply o f good I in S n {I). Let(p*, E[X(p*)]) be an expected equilib­
rium of £ ( I ) .  Then, for I € {1, . . . ,  L],
D , ( p ' , N )
S,(p*,N)
1 a.s. for N  —> oo.
P roo f. In the following we will use the shorthand notation Di := 
Di(p*,N) and Si := Si(p*,N) and the corresponding shorthand /?/ and 
a) for the sets of buyers and sellers unless specific reference to the 
arguments is necessary.
Note first that, for continuous demand densities,
D i  _  J2 i= i  E j e p t  _  i n  ^ * = i  i n  ^ t = i  
S‘ ELi Ej€<rj it 7Tv Xi=i E3€<rj it
1 \^IN 
I N  ^ i = 1 *1 -  1
Now it is obvious from the proof of Lemma 3 that the numerator of 
the above fraction tends to zero for N  —► oo. It remains to show that
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the denominator is bounded away from zero. To see this is true note 
that
I n T ^ * 1 N  '#<7t=1 jGa} *=1 ^  ‘
As the £?f are all identically distributed (j € crj) we apply the Law 
of Large Numbers to obtain
1
^2  zj —*■ E[z\\z\ < 0] < 0 N  —> oo.
3Go\
But, according to Lemma 4, there exists an is (E {1, . . . ,  7} such that 
ftcr^/N  is bounded away from zero with probability one. This implies
4L*8 ,
that at least one expression of the form — • ^77 £ j e<r** *1 *n 
above sum is strictly negative in the limit while all other terms are 
either negative or zero in the limit.
Q.E.D.
In what follows we use the norms || • Hx and || • H2 defined as usual:
Iklli := £?=i k»| and | |a:||2 := ( e ?=1 x f j  for x  6 M 1.
L em m a 6 Let £at(7) be the N-th replica economy of S (I). Let X 1 be 
independent, 1 < i < N  *7, and let 7?[(X*)2] < 00. Then
1 NI I 1
7 7 7 'Z )ll5'll2 -> < 00 a s- for N —* 00.
Jvi t'=l 1 i=1
Proof.
which is the arithmetic mean of the second moments all of which are 
finite by assumption.
Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to formulate the main proposition of this 
section stating that rationing becomes insignificant for large economies.
P ro p o sitio n  8 L et£ (I)  =  [ML, (X*, be a stochastic exchange
economy with I  agents and £n {I) be the N-th replica economy o f£ (I) . 
Let X 1 be independent, 1 < i < N I, let (p*, E[X(p*)]) be an expected
, 2
equilibrium of £ (I). Let E[{XX) ] < oo. Let G(-) be a proportional ra­
tioning scheme. Then
1 IN
TT7 S  P* — 0 in prob. for N  —> oo.
*** *=i
P roo f. A proportional rationing scheme G(-) is defined in the follow­
ing way: G%(zi) = z\ • m in(l, |*-) for buyers (i : zj = X \ — e* >  0) and, 
analogously, Gx(z{) =  5J-min(l, §j-) for sellers (i : z\ =  X\(p) — ex < 0). 
Therefore, for i € {1, . . . ,  I} ,
5(5,)| <  | 5 } | . ( | l - m m ( l , | j | ? i | ) +  1 — m in
I N
i=i
i I N  L
= txf EE I*-<?(*•)!I N  u  ,=1
1 I N  L
*  T j v E E I ^ I
l i y  i= l  1=1
1 -
I N
Sl ip)  
A (p)
<*ll2 +
+ 1 - A (p )
Si(p)
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where a  is the vector the /-th component of which is 1 — | | and ft
is vector the /-th component of which is 1 — |-
The last inequality follows from the Cauchy Schwarz inequality. In 
order to see that the expression we obtained tends to zero note that 
the first factor has a finite limit. This follows from Lemma 6. The 
second factor tends to zero because, due to Lemma 5, each component 
of a  and /? tends to zero.
Q.E.D.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter the reason why we examine 
this limit case (N  —*■ oo) is not that we attach much importance to 
this case itself but rather that we want to examine the impact of the 
size of the economy on the problem that market clearing does not hold 
in our model. Proposition 8 is an answer to this question in so far as 
it states that under the assumptions made the problem of rationing 
becomes arbitrarily small for sufficiently large economies.
This result, together with the non-existence result of lemma 1, ex­
plains both of the following features observed empirically: although 
markets do not clear entirely and rationing does occur it is still true 
that, on the average, agents are rationed by amounts which tend to be 
insignificant in large markets.
One implication of proposition 8 is that it states an optimality 
property of the price p* defined by the expected equilibrium concept, 
namely that, given price p*, excess demand converges to zero in large 
economies. The proof of our proposition relies heavily on the ’expected 
market clearing’ property of p*.
Another interesting question would be in how far proposition 8 
can be generalised for arbitrary, or at least for some other, rationing 
schemes.
4.3 The finite case
An obvious question arising at this stage is what can be said about the 
finite case ( IN  <  oo). It seems desirable to quantify the degree of dis­
equilibrium for a given size of the economy. This line is pursued by the
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following proposition which gives an upper bound for the probability 
that, for any good, average excess demand exceeds a given value e > 0.
P ro p o sitio n  9 Let £ (I) be a stochastic exchange equilibrium. Let 
(p*, ^[^(p*)]) be an expected equilibrium of £{I). Further, let the co- 
variance matrix of the random vector j  be non-singular.
Then
> e> for some 1 e  { 1 , . . . , L } )  < tr
where tr denotes trace, B  is the unique positive definite matrix having 
ones on the main diagonal such that B H ^ B  is diagonal, and II is the 
matrix with typical elements II/)m =  ( jj)2Yli=ia'i,m w ffl,m denoting 
the covariance cov(X l,X fn).
P roof. The proof of our proposition relies on Theorem 3.6 in Olkin 
and Pratt (1958) which is a multivariate generalisation of Tchebysheff’s 
inequality. It is shown there that for a random vector y =  (p i , . . . ,  yp) 
with mean zero and non-singular covariance m atrix E the following 
inequality holds:
P ( \ y i \  > fcj<7,-,for some i) < tr B _1 II,
where B  is defined as in the above proposition and II =  K ~ l R K _1 
with R  =  (pij) denoting the correlation matrix of y and K  is a diagonal 
matrix with * =  1, . . .  ,p.
We apply this result to our variable y = j  H0,i=i{Xl(p*) ~  e*) which 
has mean zero because p* is the price vector of an expected equilibrium. 
The covariance matrix of y is the covariance m atrix of j  E)f=i ^ ‘(p*) 
and therefore non-singular by assumption.
It remains to calculate the typical elements of II: we choose k} = 
where cr/ denotes the standard deviation of yi. This standard deviation
is given by gi =  • It follows that
TT — ( K ~ X T i K ~ X\  —  — rr rr n —  ^ \2 i11/, m  — { R  R R  ) l ,m  2 m  — e2 — t l  '
i=l
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These equations hold because X % and X *, i ^  j ,  are independent.
Q.E.D.
R e m a rk  5
1. The inequality of the above proposition is sharp in the following 
sense: if  the bound given is less than 1, there is a distribution for 
\H \= \X X (with mean 1 e* and covariance matrix U) under 
which the bound is attained. Otherwise, there is a distribution 
such that P( \ j  Y^i=i{Xi(’;p*) — ej) | > e, for some 1) =  1.
2. An obvious implication of the proposition is P (||y  ]Cf=i(A l(-;p*) — 
e*)||i >  e, for some 1) < L • tr  R - 1II. This inequality is not nec­
essarily sharp.
3. Again, as in proposition 8, it is essential that p* is the price vector 
of an expected equilibrium.
4 . The bound given in the above proposition depends negatively on 
e and negatively on I  which is a comparative statics result one 
would intuitively expect to hold.
P ro o f. Part 1 is a direct implication of theorem 3.7 in Olkin and 
Pratt (1958). The rest is evident.
Q.E.D.
We formulated proposition 9 with reference to average demand. 
Alternatively, one can give a bound for the probability that total excess 
demand exceeds a given bound e in which case the typical elements of 
II no longer contain the factor i.e. n^m =  (^)2 £)f=1 <r}m.
5  Conclusion
Economic theory has been criticised because of its lack of realism and 
its more or less counter-intuitive assumptions. In this chapter we have 
taken up the challenge and go a (certainly very preliminary) step to­
wards a higher degree of descriptiveness of economic models by relaxing 
the utility maximisation hypothesis.
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Another objective was to get some further understanding as to the 
following questions:
1. How heavily do results in general equilibrium theory rely on utility 
maximisation?
2. In how far are unrealistic conclusions due to unrealistic assump­
tions?
3. Which predictions as to the functioning of a market economy can 
be made without any assumption of utility maximisation?
In answer to these questions the following results have been ob­
tained: although the realisation of excess demand will, with probability 
one, not equal zero, there exists a price vector for which markets do 
clear in expected terms. The properties of expected demand which are 
necessary to establish the existence of an expected equilibrium can be 
obtained under regularity conditions. But in order to derive boundary 
behaviour of excess demand one needs more restrictive assumptions. 
Uniqueness of an expected equilibrium is established for special classes 
of distributions.
Further, we have argued in section 4 that the discrepancy between 
non-market-clearing and expected market clearing becomes smaller and 
smaller when the economy becomes larger, more precisely: the average 
amount of rationing in the N-th. replica economy tends to zero when 
N  tends to infinity. For an economy of finite size an upper bound is 
given for the probability that rationing exceeds a given amount. This 
bound is sharp.
Summarising our sensitivity analysis one can state that some of the 
predictions made by utility maximisation models which break down 
when the assumption of preference maximisation is given up. These 
predictions are the least intuitive ones (e.g. boundary behaviour, in­
stantaneous market clearing) while those predictions which correspond 
to salient features observed empirically (existence of equilibrium prices 
that lead to market clearing on the average, small amounts of rationing,
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properties of expected excess demand) can well be derived without any 
assumption of utility maximising behaviour.
A line of research that would seem to be a particularly interesting 
continuation of this work would be the project to
1. embed the model into a multi-period model
2. introduce asset markets to this model and to examine whether 
assets can reduce variance or improve allocations in the sense 
that they reduce the total amount of rationing
3. extend this model to a production economy and model firms’ be­
haviour when they face demand uncertainty.
Extension no. 2 may deserve special attention for the following rea­
son. Once assets can be traded our model can provide a foundation for 
an ad hoc assumption often made in financial markets models, namely 
the existence of noise traders. Noise traders would arise naturally here 
as rationing on the demand or supply side would cause agents to buy 
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